Despite their common roots in the phenomenological tradition, Jean- Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty differed markedly in the way they formulated the problem of being-in-the-world. As is well-known, Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (1943) emphasized the dualistic, oppositional, and even antagonistic relationship between human consciousness and the world inhabited by consciousness, while Merleau-Ponty, in texts such as Phenomenology of Perception (1945) and The Visible and the Invisible (1964, posthumous), conceptualised a kind of originary communion between consciousness and world that stressed their imbrication rather than their separateness.
Loving and Grieving with Heart of a Dog and Merleau-Ponty's Depth
. In this article, I look to the philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty's later writing on depth in order to approach but not try to measure Anderson's film and its poetic evocations of loss. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty's “Eye and Mind” and other relevant texts
Ghosting a History without Shadows
Duane H. Davis
actions carried out in the name of revolution, how do we reconcile the apparent contradiction between political ideals and historical forces in revolutionary praxis? 2 This article concerns entirely the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty on a topic for which
The transition made by Sartre to an increasingly political brand of commitment after the Liberation proved to be one of the most challenging and difficult transitions of his career. L’Etre et le néant had been taken by many, both followers and critics alike, to be the fullest exposition of his world-view, but the type of commitment Sartre spoke of in this work did not seem to be an obvious candidate for reconciliation with a radical political agenda.
The work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty has enjoyed a marginal presence within Anglo-American sociology and social theory for many years, particularly within the phenomenological and interactionist camps. In more recent years, however, his profile has grown. This is due largely to the growth of sociological interest in embodiment, a theme which Merleau-Ponty’s work addresses at length, and perhaps also to the rise to prominence within sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, whose work is influenced by that of Merleau-Ponty, particularly in relation to themes of embodiment and habit. Loic Wacquant1 has described Bourdieu as the ‘sociological heir’ of Merleau-Ponty and many other writers2 have identified the connection between the two thinkers as pivotal in their attempts to elucidate the nature and contribution of Bourdieu’s thought. It is perhaps only natural, therefore, that Bourdieu’s recently elevated standing in Anglo-American sociology should entail some reflected glory for Merleau-Ponty too.
This article discusses experimental studies of facial imitation in infants in the light of Sartre's and Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological theories of embodiment. I argue that both Sartre's account of the gaze of the other and Merleau-Ponty's account of the reversibility of the flesh provide a fertile ground for interpreting the data demonstrating that very young infants can imitate facial expressions of adults. Sartre's and Merleau-Ponty's accounts of embodiment offer, in my view, a desirable alternative to the dominant mentalistic interpretation of facial imitation in terms of the theory of mind.
Christinia Landry and Ingrid Glaster
George J. Marshall, A Guide to Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception Review by Christinia Landry
Comment on the review by Benedict O'Donohoe in SSI, vol. 13, issue 1, 2007 Comment by Ingrid Glaster
Human freedom resides primarily in exercise of that capacity that humans employ more abundantly than any other species on earth: the capacity for judgement. And in particular: that special judgement in relation to Self that we call aspiration. Freedom is not the absence of a field of (other) powers; instead, freedom shows up only against the reticulations of power impinging from without. For freedom worthy of the name must be construed as an exercise of power within an already-present field of power. Thus, liberty and causal necessity are not obverses.
Ideology and Representation in the Zen Garden
Allen S. Weiss
It is impossible to separate the semiological from the mytho- logical, the poetic from the historical, the aesthetic from the ideo- logical. Since, as the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty insisted, any entity can be taken as an emblem of Being, one must be attentive to the symbolic power and semiotic valences of every word, object, and image. This article is an attempt to sketch out the role of the rock in Zen-inspired Japanese gardens and, consequently, to offer a new inter- pretation of one of the most famous gardens in the world, Ryōan-ji.