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Joel W. Krueger

In this essay, I argue that Sartre's notion of pre-reflective consciousness can be summoned to offer a general challenge to contemporary functionalist accounts of mind, broadly construed. In virtue of the challenge Sartre offers these contemporary functionalist accounts and the richness of his phenomenological analysis, I conclude that his voice needs to be included in ongoing debates over the nature of consciousness. First, I look at some of the basic claims motivating functionalist accounts of mind. Next, I look at Sartre's notion of pre-reflective consciousness and discuss how this notion challenges functionalist accounts of mentality. I conclude by suggesting that Sartre's rendering of pre-reflective consciousness remains overly cognitivist. I show how this notion can be deepened to include the sensory-motor capacities of the situated body—resulting in a pre-reflective bodily self-awareness—and how this deepened formulation offers a further challenge to functionalist accounts of mind.

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Sartrean Self-Consciousness and the Principle of Identity

Sartre’s Implicit Argument for the Non-Self-Identity of the Subject

Maiya Jordan

-itself” synonymously. (This is not Sartre’s sole use of the term “for-itself.” Sometimes he uses “being-for-itself” to describe the mode of being of consciousness.) Finally (as is explained later), I follow Sartre in treating pre-reflective self-awareness as the self

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The Punctum and the Past

Sartre and Barthes on Memory and Fascination

Patrick Eldridge

–111]. 7 Sartre, L’imaginaire , 35. 8 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Imaginary , tr. Jonathan Webber (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 14. 9 Cf. Dan Zahavi, ‘Inner-time Consciousness and Pre-reflective Self-awareness’, in The New Husserl , ed. D. Welton

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Matthew C. Eshleman, Eric Hamm, Curtis Sommerlatte, Adrian van den Hoven, Michael Lejman, and Diane Perpich

at all. It is welcome, then, that Ciaunica identifies scientific findings on child development that are relevant to Sartre’s notion of pre-reflective self-consciousness. She persuasively argues for two theses: (1) a form of pre-reflective self-awareness