This paper critically examines Sartre's argument for the meaninglessness of life from our foundationless freedom. According to Sartre, our freedom to choose our values is completely undetermined. Hence, we cannot rely on anything when choosing and cannot justify our choices. Thus, our freedom is the foundation of our world without itself having any foundation, and this renders our lives absurd. Sartre's argument presupposes, then, that although we can freely choose all our values we have a meta-value that we cannot choose: that values are acceptable only if they are justified by some independent factor rather than by one's free choice. I argue that we need not accept this presupposition: subjectivists may well choose to be 'proud subjectivists' who are pleased with, rather than ashamed by, their subjectivism. Indeed, many subjectivists, including those considering the meaning of life - for example, Harry Frankfurt and Brooke Alan Trisel - adopt this position.
Peter Jones, Michael Butler, Taylor Smith, Matthew C. Eshleman, and David Detmer
Three articles analyze David Detmer’s first book on Sartre, Freedom as a Value. Peter Jones argues that Sartre uses freedom in only one sense, as freedom to choose, whereas Detmer argues that Sartre distinguishes between freedom of choice (“ontological freedom”) and freedom of obtaining (“practical freedom”). Michael Butler’s paper contends that under a Sartrean framework, any moral judgment we make regarding our own action is never final; the meaning and moral value of our past actions always remains reinterpretable in light of what unfolds in the future. Our interactions with other people reveal that we are responsible for far more than we had initially supposed ourselves to be choosing when we began our project, such that it is in fact impossible to ever finish taking responsibility completely. Taylor Smith and Matthew Eshleman tackle Sartre’s supposed “subjectivism” from the opposite angle. They agree with Detmer that Sartre’s belief that values are mind-dependent does not necessarily entail ethical subjectivism, but argue that even the early Sartre was more fully committed to a cognitivist view of normative justification than Detmer allows. Detmer’s replies to all three essays round out this section and this issue.
Limits and Options for Epistemological Orientations
This article identifies what Sir Edmund Leach once called 'amongitis' as one of socio-cultural anthropology's major problems that make interdisciplinary dialogues on evidence-based epistemological topics difficult. Topics of wider and larger scale, however, can and should be addressed if anthropology brings out more fully its implicit epistemological strength of a dialogical relationship between objectivism and subjectivism. The current conditions of a globalizing world actually transform this possibility into a necessity. In order to face this need, a new realism is proposed that is capable of dealing with the conditions and challenges of a second modernity. Two ranges of epistemological sources are suggested that may inform such a new realism. One range is based in the traditions of Western philosophy, while the other is rooted outside the secularized or theological legacies of monotheism.
Phenomenology Encounters Cognitivism
things themselves” while remaining mindful of the partial and contextual (i.e., hermeneutic) conditions of possibility defining any kind of phenomenological investigation. Phenomenology: Two Problems of Subjectivism The “classic” difficulty facing
Introduction, Translation Notes, and Comments
Ronjon Paul Datta and François Pizarro Noël
kind of subjectivism requires studying the external and visible characteristics of negative, penal, civil, and positive sanctions. A clear contrast is made between the disorganised, spontaneous, and reflex-like qualities of social sanctions that one
requirements and the encouragement of complete subjectivism; rather, it is a question of putting the person at the center of scientific research, while taking into account the subjective components of both culture and science (Lukov and Lukov 2008: 7 ). Lukov
Historicizing Édouard Dujardin’s Les Lauriers Sont Coupés
Kelly J. Maynard
in its own right, analyzing its interiority as an innovative product of overlapping aesthetic milieus symptomatic of the French fin de siècle, including symbolism, Wagnerism, modernism, and subjectivism. 2 In this article, I explore Les Lauriers
Elizabeth Justice’s A Voyage to Russia and Amelia
Matthew W. Binney
insist upon their authenticity by underscoring the author-narrator’s temporally distinct, social, and economic circumstances. Subjectivism, Consciousness, and Authenticity Recently Thompson (2011: 78) summarized the development of “subjective
Historical ethnography on multiple border crossings at the beginning of the twentieth century
in a more complex way bearing in mind what Comaroff and Comaroff write: “Ethnography is a historically situated mode of understanding historically situated contexts, each with its own perhaps radically different kind of subjects and subjectivism
, inference by analogy, and direct observation of reality. Due to the dynamic nature of the research problem, the press sources, due to their overt subjectivism, required critical interpretation (i.e., more so than the other sources). 4 It is worth noting