This article examines Locke's slippery notion of consensual taxation. Locke insisted that property right entailed that all taxes be voluntary, requiring the consent of the taxpayer or the consent of a majority of representatives. However, Locke did not think that everyone who paid sales taxes was entitled to vote for the government to which they were subject but claimed that these taxes were passed on to, and borne by, landowners. Taxes on land were voluntary in that they were subject to gentlemanly agreements between landowners, whereas excise taxes fell on all without their consent. Locke did not specify a property qualification for the franchise in his Two Treatise of Government, as he did in other writings, but indicated that political representation should be proportionate to tax burdens. Although Locke's doctrine of taxation and representation is far from clear and unambiguous, the legacy of voluntary taxation continues to haunt us.
'Tacit consent' has long interested historians of political thought and political philosophers, but its nuances nevertheless remain unappreciated. It has its roots in the Roman law concept of a 'tacit declaration of will'. Explicating this concept allows a new conception of tacit consent to be proposed, which I term the 'tacit declaration of consent'. The tacit declaration of consent avoids both the triviality of common sense views and a weakness in Hobbes' account. Unlike other contemporary philosophical accounts, it avoids fictions and meets the condition of intentionality. Furthermore, it also advances understanding of the sorts of claim offered by proponents of a tacit consent-based theory of political obligation, whilst facilitating a more radical critique. The tacit consent-based theory of political obligation is not simply limited in application, but indefensible. It unwarrantedly transposes onto tacit consent the potentially fictional character of declarations of will.
The consent theory of power, whereby ruling elites depend ultimately on the submission, cooperation and obedience of the governed as their source of power, is often linked to debates about the effectiveness of non-violent political action. According to this theory, ruling elites depend ultimately on the submission, cooperation and obedience of the governed as their source of power. If this cooperation is with-drawn, then this power is undermined. Iain Atack outlines this theory and examines its strengths and weaknesses. Atack argues that incorporating the insights of other theories of power, such as Gramsci's theory of hegemony and Foucault's views on 'micro-power', can provide us with a more sophisticated understanding of both the effectiveness and the limits of nonviolent political action than the consent theory of power. Gramsci's contribution deepens the analysis in terms of our understanding of the origins of individual consent in the context of larger economic and political structures, while Foucault adds a different dimension, in that his micro-approach emphasizes the ubiquity and plurality of power, rather than its embodiment or reification in large-scale structures.
Grounds for a Purely Procedural Defense of Majority Rule
legitimacy of majority rule could be established. In particular, I show in the following section of this article that a purely procedural justification of majority rule can be provided on the basis of the value of consent , defined as the idea that
A Case Study of Norman Douglas
Rachel Hope Cleves
activists responded by sharply differentiating between their own advocacy for the legitimization and legalization of sexual relations between consenting adults and any defense of intergenerational sexual relations. The line was drawn within internal debates
The basic human right to sexual autonomy and self‐determination encompasses two sides: it enshrines both the right to engage in wanted sexuality on the one hand, and the right to be free and protected from unwanted sexuality, from sexual abuse and sexual violence on the other. This concept elaborated by the European Court of Human Rights, in the light of European legal consensus, suggests that the age of consent for sexual relations (outside of relationships of authority and outside of pornography and prostitution) should be set between 12 and 16 years. In any event the age of criminal responsibility should be the same as the age of sexual consent.
Negotiating the Unforeseen Challenges of Ethnographic Fieldwork
Jocelyn D. Avery
Many anthropologists will be required to gain ethics approval in order to begin their research. Prior to commencing, though, it is not always possible to predict what will happen in the field, or how you as the researcher will react, much less to incorporate all possible safeguards in an ethics application. My research was conducted at a special education needs college with the aim of discovering the sense of self of students with intellectual disabilities. I underwent a lengthy and complicated ethics approval process and gained associated external approvals. As my research evolved in the field, I became interested in strands of enquiry that without care could have potentially breached my ethics guidelines. New questions could suggest to staff that I was doing something other than stipulated in their consent documents. The ethics approval process can help refine the research methodology and analysis; however, it cannot prepare us for the moral conundrums that arise in the field.
Consent and Gendered Power Dynamics in Sex
Katrín Ólafsdottir and Jón Ingvar Kjaran
Sexual consent determines if sex is consensual, but the concept is under-researched globally. In this article, we focus on heterosexual young men and how they negotiate sex and consent. We draw on peer group interviews to understand how young men are constituted by the dominant discourses at play in shaping their realities. We have identified two different discourses that inform consent, the discourse of consent (based on legal, educational, and grassroots discourses), and the discourse of heterosexuality (based on the heterosexual script, porn, and gender roles) resulting in conflicting messages for boys. They are supposed to take responsibility for sex to be consensual as well as being gentle partners, but at the same time, the heterosexual discourse itself produces power imbalances in sex and dating.
Thomas K. Hubbard
Classical Athens offers a useful comparative test‐case for essentialist assumptions about the necessary harm that emanates from sexual intimacy between adults and adolescent boys. The Athenian model does not fit victimological expectations, but instead suggests that adolescent boys could be credited with considerable powers of discretion and responsibility in sexual matters without harming their future cultural productivity. Contemporary American legislation premised on children’s incapacity to “consent” to sexual relations stems from outmoded gender constructions and ideological preoccupations of the late Victorian and Progressive Era; that it has been extended to “protection” of boys is a matter of historical accident, rather than sound social policy. Rigorous social science and historical comparanda suggest that we should consider a different “age of consent” for boys and girls.
Emma Celeste Bedor
2012) . During the two years it existed, IAU evolved into a pornography/social media hybrid that included the names, phone numbers, and links to the social networking site profiles of people whose naked photos were posted without their consent. Yet