connections between these discourses and antipoverty measure implementation. This is a first step toward identifying how antipoverty measures may be “shame-proofed,” how they may help to promote dignity and individual agency. Our focus on the personal and
The Potential for Shaming and Dignity Building through Delivery Interactions
Erika Gubrium and Sony Pellissery
Encounters and Interactions within Two US Public Housing Programs
Erika Gubrium, Sabina Dhakal, Laura Sylvester, and Aline Gubrium
provision at two public housing sites, exploring their connections to the generation of shame or dignity building. Welfare in the United States Paternalistic, shame-based policies are reported to be common in a US setting, where those having to rely on
The Senior Citizen’s Grant in Uganda
Grace Bantebya Kyomuhendo
dignity for all participants, program providers, and targeted beneficiaries alike have the potential to improve the effectiveness of antipoverty measures by fostering social cohesion and inclusiveness, mitigating shame, and generally promoting human
Tracing Rights, Discretion, and Negotiation within a Norwegian Labor Activation Program
Erika Gubrium, Leah Johnstone, and Ivar Lødemel
participants. We also focus on how changed delivery interactions may connect to heightened shame or enhanced dignity for program participants. In the next section, we provide an overview of the changing terrain of Norwegian social assistance in past decades. In
Adding Social Quality to Organization Studies on Aging
Prabhir Vishnu Poruthiyil
criterion for social inclusion; and human dignity as a necessary condition for social empowerment. Normative factors, Alan Walker (2009: 213) notes, are “used to make judgments about the appropriate or necessary degree of social quality.” Though
Has “Uncle Sam” Learned any Lessons from “Typhoid Mary?”
Amani Othman and William W. Darrow
population density and limit growth, but it should develop, pass, and enforce its statutes, policies, and procedures with respect to the normative factors of social justice, solidarity, equal value, and human dignity ( Van der Maesen 2017 ). Normative
Dignity, Prestige, and Domination in the “Colonial Situation”
My contribution is an attempt to resolve one of those enigmas that the French colonial archives hold for assiduous readers. In the course of comparative research on the juridical status of métis children in the French Empire,1 I was struck by the frequency with which the terms “dignity” and “prestige” figured in a wide range of colonial preoccupations—whether on the part of local or central administrations, private individuals or institutions. These were not merely personal or social qualities, but terms that had precise legal meanings and that played a central role in colonial jurisprudence. In this context, the terms were predominantly used in the negative—referring to threats to prestige (atteintes au prestige) or to the obligation to maintain one’s dignity (garder sa dignité).
Beyond the Liberal Grammar of Contemporary Sociology
honor and dignity. In his well-known essay, “The Politics of Recognition,” Taylor (1994: 27) argues that modern identity was formed during the transition from ‘honor’ to ‘dignity’. In line with Orit Kamir (2002) , 10 who has written extensively on
This study aims to identify future care preferences and examine the associations between personal resources, filial expectations, and family relations and the preferences of independent elderly Jews and Arabs aged 65 and over, using mixed methods. Data were collected using structured interviews of 168 Jews and 175 Arabs; additionally, 20 Jews and Arabs were interviewed in depth to enable more detailed analysis. The main findings show the effects of the modernization and individualization processes on elder preferences. Significant differences were found between Jews and Arabs for most variables. Whereas Jews' first preference was formal care, with mixed care following as second, Arabs preferred mixed care to other types. Differences in several factors associated with preference for mixed care were also noted, including in categories that were identified in the qualitative phase, such as 'dignity' versus 'honor' and the meaning of 'home'.
In classical African communitarianism, individual rights have tended to be accorded a secondary status to the good of the community. What is prioritised are the duties and obligations the individual has to the whole as opposed to the entitlements one can expect to derive from a community qua individual. I seek to show that this view, by its own standards and assumptions, is erroneous in framing rights as secondary to the good of the community. I attempt to show that individual rights are an inherent component of classical African communitarian accounts. Further, I seek to argue for a non-communalist view of African communitarianism which takes into full account the multiple factors that constitute modern African communities. Such a view, I suggest, will avoid the unnecessary dichotomisation of rights which has become synonymous with the classical African communitarian account.