recent work in embodied cognition, primarily the idea of disgust. 4 I suggest that we explicitly incorporate disgust and other embodied cognitive responses into Mills’s conception of how race, racism, and the epistemology of ignorance work because
Catalin Brylla and Mette Kramer
-Ponty’s and Martin Heidegger’s phenomenological ideas, is a major paradigm in the relatively recent strand of embodied cognition studies (see, e.g., Madzia and Jung 2016: 3–5 ; Wang 2015 ) that focus on the “4EA” (Embodied, Embedded, Enacted, Extended
put to the test. Since the MNS is also a cornerstone of Smith’s understanding of embodied cognition in film reception—backing up his suspicion regarding any strict lingua-form theory of such engagements—it should be a desideratum to understand the
The Role of Situational (Dis)continuity and Conceptual Metaphor in the Understanding of Complex Cases of Character Perception
Maarten Coëgnarts, Miklós Kiss, Peter Kravanja and Steven Willemsen
hypothesis as developed in the 1980s by Lakoff and Johnson (1980 , 1999 ; see also Shapiro 2011 ). The general idea behind this theme of embodied cognition, also known as CMT, is that human concepts (including the central concept of our paper, perception
Between Movies and Mind, Affective Neuroscience, and the Philosophy of Film
philosopher Mark Johnson takes up in relation to ethics, imagination, and the neural underpinnings of embodied cognition: Moral imagination – both as our capacity to empathically understand and feel with others and our ability to imagine how experience would
Christopher Chabris and Daniel Simons, The Invisible Gorilla (New York: Random House, 2009).
Laurie Johnson, John Sutton, and Evelyn Tribble, eds, Embodied Cognition and Shakespeare’s Theatre (London: Routledge, 2014).
Jacques Ranciere, trans. Gabriel Rockhill, The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible (London: Bloomsbury, 2004).
David Hillman, Shakespeare’s Entrails: Belief, Scepticism and the Interior of the Body (London: Palgrave, 2007).
Spinoza's Radical Enactivism and You Were Never Really Here
Since the emergence of embodied cognitive theories, there has been an ever-growing interest in the application of these theories to media studies, generating a large number of analyses focusing on the affective and intellectual features of viewers’ participation. The body of the viewer has become the central object of study for film and media scholars, who examine the conceptual physicality of the viewing experience by associating body states with parallel intellectual and moral constructions. In this article, I contribute to the study of embodied cognition and cinema by drawing upon Baruch Spinoza’s philosophy, especially from his process-based notion of the body. I will put this ecological and dynamic concept of the body in connection with recent studies on enactive cognition, and define a radical enactivist approach to be applied in the discussion of the experiential dynamics of Lynne Ramsay’s You Were Never Really Here.
Robert Sinnerbrink and Matthew Cipa
Peter Kravanja, Embodied Cognition and Cinema ((Leuven University Press, 2015), 382 pp., €30.00 ISBN: 978-94-6270-028-4. Reviewed by Matthew Cipa This is the first book to bring together embodied cognition and film studies, though it is part of a
Sinnerbrink reviews Daniel Yacavone’s Film Worlds: A Philosophical Aesthetics of Cinema . And Matthew Cipa reviews Maarten Coëgnarts and Peter Kravanja’s edited volume Embodied Cognition and Cinema .
Situating Narration in the Fiction Film in the Context of Theories of Narrative Comprehension
Joseph P. Magliano and James A. Clinton
, and other factors represents a central research agenda in this theme. A second theme focuses on understanding how comprehension is grounded in perceptual systems ( Zwaan 2014 ). This theme (sometimes referred to as embodied cognition) assumes that the