This article investigates civic-political and cognitive participation as they play out in democratic theory. Its core purpose is to develop a conceptual-normative critique of the presupposition in liberal democratic theory that these logics are mutually reinforcing and complementary. This misunderstanding of a theoretical ambivalence contributes to inhibiting constructive assessment of epistocratic*technocratic frameworks of democratic interpretation and theory. I demonstrate that these logics circulate contrasting views of democratic power and legitimacy and should be disentangled to make sense of liberal democratic theoretical and political spaces. This critique is then fed into a political-epistemological interrogation of post-truth and alt-facts rhetorical registers in contemporary liberal democratic life, concluding that neither logic of participation can harbor this unanticipated and fundamentally nonaligned way of doing liberal democratic democracy.
Grounds for a Purely Procedural Defense of Majority Rule
Epistocracy The second notable disadvantage of epistemic theories of democracy, compared to the purely procedural justification of majority rule I offer here, lies in the fact that the former might actually give more grounds for justifying what Estlund calls
aristocracy or epistocracy that adherents of democracy should not fail to engage with. Nevertheless, as I have tried to show, those who believe that democracy means that the many are in principle worthy to rule in common under no circumstances can endorse