more insight and more understanding about the human condition. Sartre knew this––not just the later Sartre but also the earlier Sartre of Being and Nothingness . Existential psychoanalysis would certainly not have been possible without the prior
Thoughts on Sartre, Lacan, and Contemporary Psychoanalysis
This essay compares Sartre's existential psychoanalysis with Freud's psychoanalysis and Binswanger's Daseinsanalysis. On the one hand, Sartre's psychoanalysis, despite the pure phenomenological interpretation of the factical self (in the first part of Being and Nothingness), is ultimately metaphysically founded on the concept of 'human reality' (in the fourth part of the book), so that this psychoanalysis cannot be identified with the way of interpreting existence in the Daseinsanalyse. On the other hand, Sartre's phenomenological interpretation of the factical self implies that Freud's analysis of psychical phenomena is false, because the self 'is strictly to the degree that it signifies' (Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions) and is 'coextensive with consciousness' (Being and Nothingness).
One of the basic intuitions guiding Sartre's phenomenological works is that phenomena cannot be reduced to essences that are separate from appearances. Such a separation leads to a type of semiotic profusion that Sartre criticizes in L'Etre et le néant by evoking the example of Proust. Sartre's ontology must avoid this infinite proliferation of meaning without falling into a type of essentialism where things are merely what they appear to be. Sartre's references to Proust demonstrate not only the pitfalls of essentialism and unlimited semiosis, but also why Sartre found it necessary to invent existential psychoanalysis as a response to the twin phenomenological challenge of situating intentional meaning neither on the side of the object, nor of the subject, but somewhere in between. The unsatisfactory nature of Sartre's solution is palpable in the contradictions we discover in his observations on Proust.
Hazel E. Barnes
While Sartre scholars cannot fairly be described as being opposed to science, they have, for the most part, stayed aloof. The field of psychology, of course, has been an exception. Sartre himself felt compelled to present his own existential psychoanalysis by marking the parallels and differences between his position and traditional approaches, particularly the Freudian. The same is true with respect to his concept of bad faith and of emotional behavior. Scholars have followed his lead with richly productive results. But we may note that the debate has centered on psychic and therapeutic issues, aspects of what Sartre called le vécu or lived experience, rather than on the findings of cognitive science or neuroscience. Although all existentialists and phenomenologists accept as a central tenet the fact that consciousness is embodied, there has been virtually no concern with the biological substratum. But the study of consciousness cannot be restricted within its own narrow confines—unlike, say, Greek grammar, which can be learned without reference to the rules of Arabic. At some point, there must be established an organic foundation for the behavior of the conscious organism.
Although Sartre denounces Descartes' two principles, he nevertheless draws inspiration from him. No doubt this is close to being paradoxical; we shall have to be no less paradoxical in our explanation. For although the text entitled “Cartesian Freedom,” which introduces a volume of selections from Descartes, , confers some coherence on this apparent non-sense, once the texts surrounding this work have been taken into account, we have to conclude not only that this text predates , even though it was published afterwards, but that it is a collection of Descartes' writings on Sartre, even though it is a writing by Sartre on Descartes. For beyond the Sartrean analysis of the Cartesian analyses of the , we find Sartre's existential psychoanalysis of his predecessor, in which takes place not a transference, but a counter-transference.
French S'il déclame contre les deux principes qui sont ceux de Descartes, Sartre se réclame pourtant de lui. Sans doute n'est-il pas à un paradoxe près. Reste qu'il nous faudra ne pas l'être moins pour expliquer le sien. Car certes, le sens du texte qu'il intitule « La li berté cartésienne » et qui articule ce volume de morceaux choisis qu'est Descartes 1596-1650 confère quelque cohérence à cet apparent non-sens. Mais une fois présenté de cette œuvre le paratexte, il nous faudra affirmer non seulement que celle-ci se lit avant L'être et le néant quoiqu'elle ait été publiée après, mais, plus encore, qu'elle est un ensemble d'écrits de Descartes sur Sartre quoiqu'elle soit un écrit de Sartre sur Descartes. C'est qu'outre l'analyse sartrienne des analyses cartésiennes de la Méditation quatrième, on y trouve une psychanalyse existentielle par l'auteur de son devancier, à l'occasion de laquelle a lieu non pas un transfert, mais un contre-transfert.
Edited by David Detmer and John Ireland
Sartre, Freud, and Lacan. She also provides an invaluable update of her own work and practice in relation to Sartre’s existential psychoanalysis (her groundbreaking book, Sartre and Psychoanalysis , was published in 1991), as well as assessing the
A Defense of Lacanian Responsibility
similarity of this conception of the goal of analysis to the goal of Sartre’s existential psychoanalysis in Being and Nothingness . For Sartre, the goal of existential analysis is to bring to light the “fundamental project” as a way to comprehend an
Sartre believes distinguishes his existential psychoanalysis from the Freudian paradigm. But how can Sartre explain an inferiority complex in terms of a choice? Why would anyone choose inferiority? To answer these questions, let us consider his analysis
Robert Boncardo, Jean-Pierre Boulé, Nik Farrell Fox, and Daniel O'Shiel
has a strong focus on Sartre's philosophical works, other aspects of Sartre's oeuvre are not disregarded or left fallow. Craig Vasey's ‘Sartre's fiction’ surveys Sartre's literary output, Stuart Charmé's ‘Existential psychoanalysis’ offers a thoughtful
phenomenological ontology it claimed to be, but rather a work on existential psychoanalysis. The Critique was an oeuvre about anthropology or sociology, very far away from classical philosophy. Whereas Sartre saved his affiliation with philosophy by extending the