Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe , which charts the change of politico-social language in German-speaking Europe, was humanism . The concept emerged in the beginning of the nineteenth century and was associated with a larger semantic field of human
In this article, I motivate for the view that the best account of the foundations of morality in the African tradition should be grounded on some relevant spiritual property – a view that I call 'ethical supernaturalism'. In contrast to this position, the literature has been dominated by humanism as the best interpretation of African ethics, which typically is accompanied by a direct rejection of 'ethical supernaturalism' and a veiled rejection of non-naturalism (Gyekye 1995: 129–43; Metz 2007: 328; Wiredu 1992: 194–6). Here primarily, by appeal to methods of analytic philosophy, which privileges analysis and (moral) argumentation, I set out to challenge and repudiate humanism as the best interpretation of African ethics; I leave it for a future project to develop a fully fledged African spiritual meta-ethical theory.
Susan Stedman Jones
This paper explores the nature of Durkheim’s theoretical language concerning the whole and the individual. I look at the questions of holism and individualism throughout his thought, but I particularly focus on ‘L’individualisme et les intellectuels’, where he enters the debate over the Dreyfus affair, espousing the language of intellectual and moral right. I examine the historical and philosophical background of this and the tensions between individualism and socialism, within neglected aspects of French political history. Here a new language of individuality and right was forged, not simply through the pressure of events, but through a re-thinking of socialist holism from within a philosophical tradition.
In this article, I argue that Motsamai Molefe's critique of Kwasi Wiredu's humanistic interpretation of traditional Akan ethics in his 2015 Theoria article titled ‘A Rejection of Humanism in African Moral Tradition’ overlooks the fact that the
Migrant Experiences in the Quest for Well-Being
Anne Sigfrid Grønseth and Robin Oakley
The articles in this volume reinforce the power of ethnographic humanism, of anthropology in action. The focus is on the relationship between macro political forces and their influence on the varied experiences of health in advanced industrial capitalist contexts. Our approach views migrants as capable agents negotiating new lives for themselves and confronting the challenges they face. We strongly advocate socially informed policy that offers at minimum recognition to migrants as full fledged members of the new society that they have voluntarily or involuntarily migrated to.
From the Renaissance to the Early Enlightenment
Jeffrey D. Burson
William J. Bouwsma speaks of the sixteenth century as the “waning of the Renaissance,” a period during which the notion of empowering human nature through rhetoric, arts, and letters, so characteristic of Quattrocento civic humanism, was shaken by
preparation for history—or what came to be known as prehistory —was thus a direct precipitate of Enlightenment humanism. Yet many contemporary scholars proclaim the days of humanism to be over or at least numbered. We are entering, they say, a new era of post
David E. Cooper
Among the general educated public, the question whether humanism and science are antagonists would receive various answers, primarily because the question itself would be variously taken. There are those who, echoing F.R. Leavis’s retort to C.P. Snow’s call for ‘two cultures’, would insist that science has little or no place alongside humane studies in the education of the civilised person. But there are those – members, perhaps, of the British or American Humanist Association – who would insist that humanism in the modern world just is scientific humanism. The appearance of a necessary opposition between these two groups would, however, be illusory. The followers of Leavis have in mind by humanism the pursuit of the literae humaniores and their descendants, such as history. This is the humanism intended when the word was coined, early in the nineteenth century, to refer to the pursuits of the Renaissance umaniste. Members of the BHAor AHAhave something different in mind: humanism as a practical concern with human well-being which eschews religious and other ‘supernaturalist’ doctrines. Clearly a humanist in this second sense need not exclude science from a central place in education. Conversely, a Leavisite humanist need not subscribe to the antireligious viewpoint of Humanist Associations.
Non-racialism is examined in relation to the concepts of race, generic humanism and universalism in order to establish conditions under which non-racialism can be implemented as an emancipatory concept. Denial of the salience or even the existence of the concept 'race' and also tendencies to organise on the basis of race essentialism are examined. It is accepted that race does not exist at an ontological level, in that it is not required for the constitution of the human subject. But race does exist historically and socially. To ignore its existence in addressing the question of non-racialism would be to deny the validity of the experience of racial inequality. At the same time, organisation on the basis of race, while sometimes motivated by strategic considerations, carries the danger of slippage and a permanent racialised identity. The post-1994 period is seen as opening the road to universalism and thus removing the basis for strategic essentialism.
Sartre lecteur de Brice Parain
que « Roquentin, ainsi, semblait avoir prévu et dénoncé par avance un certain devenir de Sartre », Jean-Paul Sartre. Un demi-siècle de liberté (Bruxelles : De Boeck, 1998), 111. Voir aussi Id ., « Sartre's Critique of Humanism », in French