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The Deliberative Potential of Facultative Referendums

Procedure and Substance in Direct Democracy

Alice el-Wakil

deliberative democracy theorists inform the institutional design of the variety of direct democratic devices and establish criteria to assess their implementation in real-existing democracies, so that these institutions best realize their deliberative potential

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Judith Squires

Feminist critiques of deliberative democracy have focused on the abstraction, impartiality and rationality of mainstream accounts of deliberation. This paper explores the claim, common to many of these critiques, that these features are problematic because they are gendered, and that a more women-friendly account of democracy would embrace corporeality, contextuality and the affective. While acknowledging the merit of such a claim, the paper nonetheless suggests that the pursuit of social justice and democratic inclusion actually leads many feminists to embrace a modified account of deliberative democracy, albeit in a modified account form. This can be explained by the dialogical conception of impartiality offered by theories of deliberative democracy. The paper suggests that the embrace of deliberative democracy by feminist theorists is a positive move, to be more widely acknowledged. Moreover, once acknowledged, feminists have much to offer deliberative democrats in terms of considering what the pursuit of dialogic impartiality might entail. If conceived as demanding both a 'lack of bias' and 'inclusivity', attention needs to be focused squarely on the issue of inclusion, and the institutional and material conditions for securing inclusion in deliberation.

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Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Practice

Democratic Theory through an Agonistic Lens

Marie Paxton

ultimately distinct agonistic accounts. These elements render them appropriate for this article, which will consider democratic theory as a critique, a set of normative proposals, and, crucially, a bridge with public policy and institutional design or a

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Brian Orend

Dr Moellendorf’s book is a tightly argued, wide-ranging, well-written piece that is challenging, important and enjoyable. It is a sustained and reasonably comprehensive meditation upon global justice that is more thorough and more readable than the vast majority of comparable works. Truly it is a must for any one who takes global justice seriously. For my remarks, I wish to concentrate on his thoughts regarding justified wars and widespread institutional design at the cosmopolitan level.

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Dan Rabinowitz

Elinor Ostrom, joint winner (with Oliver Williamson) of the 2009 Nobel prize in economic sciences, was quickly recognized by anthropologists as an honorary member of the tribe, and as someone whose achievements are a tribute to the discipline (see Baumard 2009; Wutich and Smth 2009). A political scientist by training, Ostrom was not formally trained as an anthropologist or an ethnographer. This notwithstanding, her commitment to empirical field research and her preoccupation since the early 1970s with the role of collective action, trust, and cooperation in arrangements designed to enhance the management of common pool resources (CPRs) repeatedly directed her toward populations (indigenous groups at the margins of states) and issues (institutions designed and operated at the community level) usually associated with anthropology.

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Andrew Arato

Constitutional politics has returned in our time in a truly dramatic way. In the last 25 years, not only in the new or restored democracies of South and East Europe, Latin America and Africa, but also in the established liberal or not so liberal democracies of Germany, Italy, Japan, Israel, New Zealand, Canada and Great Britain, issues of constitution- making, constitutional revision and institutional design or redesign have been put on the political agenda. Even in the United States, given the new or renewed problems of our versions of presidentialism, federalism and electoral regime, Article V has come to be experienced as a veritable prison house, and judicial constitutionmaking (think of Buckley v Valejo) is often seen as much as a threat to, as the protection of, democratic mechanisms. And, most recently, in countries currently experiencing externally imposed revolutions1, namely Afghanistan and Iraq, constitution-making has turned out to be a central stake in the ongoing political process. We are living in an epoch in which the nations seem to be slouching, or being prodded, toward Philadelphia and Americans, as the heirs of Madison and MacArthur, are sorely tempted to try teaching others the secrets of its success as a supposedly continuous 200-year-old constitutional democracy. But to be an effective teacher, it is not enough to be in a position of political-military superiority. One must first relearn to learn and even to re-learn.

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Oded Haklai, Ronnie Olesker, Mira Sucharov, Ehud Eiran, and Ian S. Lustick

the jurisdiction of the one-state through advancing democratization and equality for all inhabitants . Institutional Design versus Social Realignment The book's argument has been interpreted by some as an endorsement of the ‘one-state solution

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Spencer McKay

). In the following sections, I explore some of the costs and benefits of popular vote processes in relation to democratic ideals of responsiveness, citizenship, and institutional design. Responsiveness and Representation The first section of

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Jeffrey D. Hilmer and Max Halupka

point. It is more important that he demonstrate how oppositional democracy is a superior to Mouffe’s agonistic theory. Mouffe is, curiously, largely dismissive of democratic movements (2013: ch. 6). Agonistic theory proposes a parliamentary institution

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Deliberation and Courts

The Role of the Judiciary in a Deliberative System

Donald Bello Hutt

. Perhaps the richness of the German and American jurisprudential debates simply distracts Habermas from a more wide-ranging consideration of issues concerning the separation of powers and institutional design’ (2007a: xv). Alexy follows an analogous