Wood and Flinders posit that intentionality and motivation are critical sites of analysis when determining whether an act is, or should be made out to be, political or apolitical. I agree with this assertion—both the intention behind an actor’s act, for example, what motivates the action, must be taken into consideration before such classifications are made. Yet, intentionality and motivation are more complicated and problematic than the authors make them out to be—especially online.
A Response to Flinders and Wood
Sartre on Pure Reflection in Response to Husserl & Levinas
's book, Sartre likely came to Husserl's texts by viewing them as having a concrete ontology at its foundation, whose keystone is the identification of the being of consciousness with intentionality. This concrete ontology, furthermore, takes priority over
Materialism with and without Marxism
Penny McCall Howard
the influential ecological anthropology of Tim Ingold, and uses ethnography of human-environment relations at sea to examine the gaps in how Ingold and others deal with political economy, human intentionality, and material results. Ingold has made a
Sartre's Practical Phenomenology
Blake D. Scott
practical consciousness. In other words, what I will argue is that the apparent problem of accounting for the intuition of absences is symptomatic of an excessively theoretical interpretation of Sartre's use of intentionality. The problem with this is
Daniel T. Levin and Caryn Wang
Levin and Simons (2000) argued that perceptual experience in film and the real world share a deep similarity in that both rely on inferences that visual properties are stable across views. This article argues that the perception and representation of visual space also reveal deep commonalities between film and the real world. The article reviews psychological research on visual space that suggests that we not only attend to similar spatial cues both in film and in nonmediated settings, but also that the rules for combining and selecting among these cues are similar. In exploring these links, it becomes clear that there is a bidirectional relationship between cognitive psychology and film editing that allows each to provide important insights about the other.
Eric James Morelli
I am not interested in examining the development of Sartre’s view of pure reflection or in extracting a general notion of pure or purifying reflection from Sartre’s entire corpus. Instead, I am interested in understanding with Sartre’s help an experience that his account of pure reflection in the second chapter of Being and Nothingness, ‘Temporality’, concerns, namely the experience of founding a phenomenological theory.
Constructing the Villain in Narrative Film
laudable. The article builds a “structure of antipathy,” an analytical framework that breaks filmic villainy into guilty intentionality, consequential action, and causal responsibility. Villains intend and desire bad outcomes (intentionality), bring about
Sartre and Barthes on Memory and Fascination
memory belie a more profound understanding of memory as an intentional consciousness, which has unique thetic and temporal structures. Sartre’s germane theory of memory includes a nuanced understanding of how memory relates to imagination and perception
Mobilities and Mobilizations in the Pacific
provenance of Pacific Island peoples continues to be a subject of debate. One key dispute questioned whether Islander ancestors could have sailed intentionally across the deepwater Pacific. These are very much settler questions, inquiries into whether ancient
A Sartrean Analysis
consciousness, intentionality, and emotions. In particular, I will discuss consciousness’s overall spontaneity and freedom as it relates to and connects with the body and facticity. Let us begin by introducing some basic Buddhist terminology and how such