This article explores the antagonism expressed by two different theoretical positions within medical anthropology towards the structural violence position: the culture as central approach and the post-structuralist approach. While medical anthropologists trained in cultural models of illness are disappointed by the lack of culture in the structural violence approach, medical anthropologists trained in post-structuralist models of illness take issue with what they perceive to be its moral and universalist claims. In order to explore these universalist claims, the author returns to the field of moral psychology and its understanding of universal morality by exploring the history of the Heinz dilemma. She then frames her own recent research on global pharmaceutical politics in Argentina and Mexico in the context of the Heinz dilemma, neo-liberal discourses of capitalism, and the theoretical positions available within medical anthropology.
Structural Violence, Moral Psychology and Pharmaceutical Politics
Constructing the Villain in Narrative Film
allegiance, animosity. I hope to help bridge this theoretical gap with the present article, which integrates cognitive film theory with moral psychology—a field that has traditionally focused much more on what we find immoral than on what we find morally
What marks the difference between modern and non-modern political philosophy? Such a question could be understood in two ways. On the one hand, it could be understood as a question concerning formal differences between modern and pre/non-modern modes of philosophising. On the other hand, it could be understood as a question about the changing nature of the object of the philosophical enterprise, namely a question concerning the historical differences between modern and pre-modern (domestic as well as international) politics. Contemporary political philosophy has focused primarily on meeting the first, formal, challenge. By failing to take proper account of the effects that major historical developments—especially the rise of commercial society and global market economy—have had on the character of political life, much of contemporary political theory tend to view its enterprise as essentially an extension to or an application of ethics. What is needed instead is a 'political economy'. Political philosophy must rise to this challenge if it wishes to help us contend with our present predicament. The final part of the article outlines a realist, non-moralistic, political philosophy which takes account of the interplay between human 'sentiments' and 'reason' in a commercial world order.
In this article I wish to discuss the problem of self-knowledge in Sartre’s early philosophy with regard to its consequences within the field of ethics. I shall not try to cover all aspects of self-knowledge in Being and Nothingness since all of the major doctrines expounded in that work concerning consciousness, identity, freedom and knowledge have implications for self-knowledge. I would be content if I could draw attention to aspects of Sartre’s thought which are interestingly different from other moral philosophies as well as from certain empirical conclusions it would seem natural to draw from Sartre’s own ontology in the sphere of moral psychology.
Political realism remains a powerful theoretical framework for thinking about international relations, including the war on terrorism. For Morgenthau and other realists, foreign policy is a matter of national interest defined in terms of power. Some writers view this tenet as weakening, if not severing, realism's link with morality. I take up the contrary view that morality is embedded in realist thought, as well as the possibility of realism being thinly and thickly moralised depending on the moral psychology of the agents. I argue that a prima facie case can be made within a thinly moralised realism for a relatively weak ally like Bosnia to enter the war on terrorism. An inflationary model of morality, however, explains how the moral horror of genocide in an ally's past may lead to a thickened moralised realism such that allied policy-makers question their country's entry into the war.
work. Nevertheless, some of the key issues addressed in Plantinga's book are deeply connected to the question of how we ought to conceive of our moral psychology, which is undoubtedly shaped by both nature and culture. This issue's book reviews are
(conscious) anticipatory state in the viewer, which is something that makes the startle all the more effective. In the same interdisciplinary spirit as the previous articles, Jens Kjeldgaard-Christiansen's article draws upon cognitive film theory and moral
Victor Jeleniewski Seidler
scholars argue that Hebraic texts just confuse the mind with the heart, there is a different kind of moral psychology at work – possibly more related to Eastern religious and spiritual traditions – that recognizes a relationship between heart and soul. It
constitutes the primary dimension of our ethical response to screen stories, and it may then precipitate deliberation and reflection, if these occur at all. I realize that the vogue in contemporary moral psychology is for “moral intuitionism,” the quasi
Daniel Lord Smail
example, Jonathan Haidt’s work of moral psychology, The Righteous Mind . 8 Haidt argues that all people are capable of having five moral senses. That much is a given. But the intensity of the moral sense is not fixed a priori. Instead, given cultures or