In 2011 numerous 'Occupy' and anti-austerity protests took place across Europe and the United States. Passionate indignation at the failure of political elites became a mobilizing force against formal political institutions. In Greece a mass movement known as the Aganaktismeni (the Indignant) became the main agent of social resistance to the memorandum signed by the Greek government, the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. The Greek movement did not take the form of a social movement sharing a collective identity. Left-wing protestors played a prominent role. Protestors embracing right-wing populist frames also participated actively in collective mobilizations, while segments of the extreme right attempted to manipulate rage to their advantage. During the Greek Indignant movement civil society remained a terrain contested by conflicting political forces. This unique feature of the Greek movement posed a completely different challenge to the principles of diversity and inclusiveness than the one debated within the Spanish Indignados and the Occupy protests. Furthermore, it illustrates that rage and indignation may spark dissimilar forms of political contention. Hence, rage and indignation do not merely motivate ‘passive citizens’ to participate in collective protest. They are linked to cognitive frames and individual preferences, which influence protestors’ claims and mobilizations’ political outcomes. Accordingly, advances in democratization and inclusive citizenship are only one of the possible outcomes of mobilizations prompted by rage and indignation.
The Case of the Greek Indiginant Movement
The social construction of student activists and the limits of student engagement
critiques, their dissent against the current state of our political, economic and social worlds will be taken seriously? When will their rage be seen as reasonable? In another post-Referendum article published in the Financial Times , the headline read
Interpreting five homicides in the South African lowveld
This article points to the limitations of utilitarian theories of violence, as evident in the works of anthropologists who insist that all acts of violence either serve instrumental purposes (such as advancing one's own position) or expressive purposes (such as communicating key social ideas). Against the totalizing claims of such theories, the article observes that most homicides that occurred in the South African lowveld village where I conducted fieldwork research were the unanticipated consequence of men striking out in moments of anger. Although not the purposeful outcome of calculated conduct, these homicides were not however random. The high incidence of homicide can be explained in terms of Sahlins's concept of conjunctive agency, and by the co-presence of structural conditions of deprivation, ideologies of masculine domination, the wide prevalence of firearms, and the social enactment of rage.
From Haute-Frêne to Hautefaye
Alain Corbin is a historian of astonishing range.1 Two of his works, The Life of an Unknown and The Village of Cannibals, exemplify the breadth of his historical vision. The latter reconstructs a murder that takes place in the village of Hautefaye in 1870, while the former recovers the lost world of a forgotten man who, as it happens, died within a few years of that event. The Village is thus a study of what Corbin calls, in the preface to The Life, “a fortuitous event” that casts “a brief and lurid light on the myriads of the disappeared.” But such events were, as Corbin reminds us, “exceptional, products of a paroxysm offering momentary access to an underlying reality without telling us much about the torpor of ordinary existences.” The torpor of ordinary existences: the phrase is striking, and it is not only an apt description of the life of Louis-François Pinagot but also an important clue to what Corbin believed was missing from the reigning schools of French historiography.
Act VI Part II Beatrice hated Mr. Lear. In fact the only person she hated more than Mr. Lear was Benedict and that was only because she hated everything about Benedict – especially his face. Her current rage, however, was because Mr. Lear had turned
to war, a symbol of human suffering, and a repository of rage. French ruin images come from two main sources: the army photographic corps (the official Section photographique de l’armée) and two large Paris-based commercial photo agencies, the Agence
Marisol Ruiz and Evelyn N. Castro Méndez
*Second review is in Spanish
L. Mesa Delmonte, Ed. (2012). El pueblo quiere que caiga el régimen: Protestas sociales y confl ictos en África del norte y en Medio Oriente (The people want the fall of the regime: Social protests and confl icts in Northern Africa and the Middle East). México: El Colegio de México.
Wright, Robin. (2011). Rock the Casbah: Rage and rebellion across the Islamic World. Nueva York: Simon & Schuster.
What will be the future of war? No-one can tell for sure, and so there is much speculation and many contending views. In this article I discuss one of those views, the notion that war of the future will primarily be a protracted form of terrorism, insurgency, and low-intensity conflict within 'failed' states and civilizations, which will sometimes lapse into ethnic cleansing and genocide. It will be 'dirty war'. The antagonists will be rage-filled 'warriors'. War will be fought in the wastelands of the Third World. Wars will occur because of state failure, rather than because of state strength and expansion. They will feature 'irregular' forces rather than the disciplined hierarchical armies that have been the defining characteristic of recent Western military history. Frequently, the military forces of developed societies will be drawn into these conflicts. This is a plausible view of the future, one that is influential in Washington, and a number of serious academics2 subscribe to it.
Public debate in Germany, particularly in the western German
media, grew heated in 1991 and 1992 over the role of intellectuals in
East German society and their collaboration with or resistance to the
Stasi. Sparks flew with particular intensity when Wolf Biermann,
former East German dissident musician and poet, accused Sascha
Anderson, erstwhile East German dissident poet, of being a Stasi
informant and an “asshole” (while there was some disagreement
over the latter charge, the former, at least, turned out to be accurate).
As the debate raged, some observers commented that it seemed
more a clash of male egos than a serious attempt to analyze the past.
In a 1993 book on the dissident literary community, a West German
commentator suggested the Stasi debate was a conflict among “three
egomaniacs … [Wolf] Biermann, [writer Lutz] Rathenow, [Sascha]
Anderson.” East German author Gabriele Stötzer-Kachold had
made a similar suggestion in 1992.
Reading Muslim Masculinities through Muslim Femininities in Ms. Marvel
Shenila S. Khoja-Moolji and Alyssa D. Niccolini
In this article we examine the production and operation of the character, Kamala Khan, a Muslim American-Pakistani superheroine of the Ms. Marvel comic series, to glean what this reveals about Islam and Muslims, with particular attention to representations of Muslim masculinities. We argue that Ms. Marvel's invitation to visualize Muslim girls as superheroes is framed by a desire to interrupt rampant Islamophobia and xenophobia, yet, in order to produce such a disruption it relies on, and (re)produces, stereotypical conceptualizations of Muslim masculinities as mirrored in men who are conservative, prone to irrational rage, pre-modern, anachronistic, and even bestial. However, as the series progresses we notice the emergence of representations of complex and complicated Muslim masculinities that cast doubt on these tired, hackneyed ones, thus making way for a comic to undertake the pedagogical work of resistance. We see this graphic novel, like the shape-shifting Kamala herself, as wielding potentially dynamic and transformative power in social imaginaries.