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Zhuoyao Li

Recent discussions by Martha Nussbaum and Steven Wall shed new light on the concept of reasonableness in political liberalism and whether the inclusion of epistemic elements in the concept necessarily makes political liberalism lose its antiperfectionist appeal. This article argues that Nussbaum’s radical solution to eliminate the epistemic component of reasonableness is neither helpful nor necessary. Instead, adopting a revised understanding of epistemic reasonableness in terms of a weak view of rationality that is procedural, external and second-order rather than a strong view that is substantial, internal and first-order can help political liberalism maintain an epistemic dimension in the idea of reasonableness without becoming perfectionist. In addition, political liberalism can defend a stronger account of respect for persons against liberal perfectionism on the basis of the revised understanding of epistemic reasonableness. Both arguments serve to demonstrate the strength of the political liberal project.

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Thaddeus Metz

In Cosmopolitan Justice1 Darrel Moellendorf defends several substantive theses about justice by appealing to the Kantian principle of respect for persons. He claims that respect for persons has the following rough implications (among others): it requires states to enact liberal legislation; it permits them to interfere with religious or otherwise perfectionist regimes; it forbids them from restricting immigration for perfectionist ends; and it requires them to permit secession. In this article, I do not question Moellendorf’s Kantian foundation; I accept that it is of the utmost importance not to degrade the dignity of rational agents. What I do here is question the inferences from this principle to the above conclusions.

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Does the City of Ends Correspond to a Classless Society?

A New Idea of Democracy in Sartre's Hope Now

Maria Russo

individuals, and they must act in order not to deny both their own freedom and the other's. As we have underlined, this can be connected to the Kantian idea according to which the respect for the moral law entails respect for persons, for their freedom and

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Revisiting the Menkiti-Gyekye Debate

Who Is a Radical Communitarian?

Motsamai Molefe

requirement of respect for persons, noting that those who are capable of a sense of justice are owed the duties of justice, with this capability construed in its sense of a potentiality which may or may not have been realized’ (176). A careful reader will

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Contemporary “Structures” of Racism

A Sartrean Contribution to Resisting Racial Injustice

Justin I. Fugo

applicable to all. Liberal humanism argues that respect for persons as individuals requires that all people be treated the same, ignoring such social differences as race because it is considered arbitrary. But arbitrary to whom? To those who are and have been