Even where an act appears to be responsible, and satisfies all the conditions for responsibility laid down by society, the response to it may be unjust where that appearance is false, and where those conditions are insufficient. This paper argues that those who want to place considerations of responsibility at the centre of distributive and criminal justice ought to take this concern seriously. The common strategy of relying on what Susan Hurley describes as a 'black box of responsibility' has the advantage of not taking responsibility considerations to be irrelevant merely because some specific account of responsibility is mistaken. It can, furthermore, cope perfectly well with an absence of responsibility, even of the global sort implied by hard determinism and other strongly sceptical accounts. Problems for the black box view come in where responsibility is present, but in a form that is curtailed in one significant regard or another. The trick, then, is to open the box of responsibility just enough that its contents can be the basis for judgements of justice. I identify three 'moderately sceptical' forms of compatibilism that cannot ground judgements of justice, and are therefore expunged by the strongest 'grey box' view.
Dilemmas of, and concerning, US anthropology in the world
Virginia R. Dominguez
Paradoxes shape the relationship of the US anthropological community to its counterparts elsewhere and require new thinking about leadership that focuses on mutuality, responsibility, reciprocity, and pragmatism. Explored here are some key contradictions I see in ways of looking at the current, past, or plausible role of the US anthropological community and, in particular, the American Anthropological Association and its nearly forty Sections. Marked inequality exists among national and international anthropological organizations in size, finances, journal production, and conference attendance and often in perceived degree of importance, control, vibrancy, or agenda-setting. Yet this intervention argues for ways to mitigate that marked inequality, nonetheless, by refusing a binary us-them conceptualization and emphasizing creative pragmatism, mutuality, and responsibility. Unconventionally it even asks whether US anthropology should lead more in the world of anthropology than it currently does or lead less, and why both are worth exploring.
Ovarian Cancer Patients’ Perspectives on Delayed Healthcare Seeking
Susanne Brandner, Wiebke Stritter, Jacqueline Müller-Nordhorn, Jalid Sehouli, Christina Fotopoulou, and Christine Holmberg
health and responsibility, situating themselves and their healthcare seeking within a broader socioeconomic and political context. Patient-related Diagnostic Delays and the Question of Responsibility Most studies in the field of patient-related diagnostic
community activists and human rights lawyers in Ecuador, that corporations have responsibilities to their neighbours. In all four cases, these relationships are framed in terms of legal rights and obligations. In the first case, not only were the workers in
Peter Jones, Michael Butler, Taylor Smith, Matthew C. Eshleman, and David Detmer
Three articles analyze David Detmer’s first book on Sartre, Freedom as a Value. Peter Jones argues that Sartre uses freedom in only one sense, as freedom to choose, whereas Detmer argues that Sartre distinguishes between freedom of choice (“ontological freedom”) and freedom of obtaining (“practical freedom”). Michael Butler’s paper contends that under a Sartrean framework, any moral judgment we make regarding our own action is never final; the meaning and moral value of our past actions always remains reinterpretable in light of what unfolds in the future. Our interactions with other people reveal that we are responsible for far more than we had initially supposed ourselves to be choosing when we began our project, such that it is in fact impossible to ever finish taking responsibility completely. Taylor Smith and Matthew Eshleman tackle Sartre’s supposed “subjectivism” from the opposite angle. They agree with Detmer that Sartre’s belief that values are mind-dependent does not necessarily entail ethical subjectivism, but argue that even the early Sartre was more fully committed to a cognitivist view of normative justification than Detmer allows. Detmer’s replies to all three essays round out this section and this issue.
concrete existence, not a fixed essence or a categorical moral law, it does not free the authentic person from the responsibility of deciding whether to use violence. The project of authenticity cannot be detached from the concrete situation in which the
The Great Shell Game
‘The business of business is business,’ Milton Friedman, a leading figure of the Chicago School of economic thought, famously declaimed. In his 1970 article, ‘The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits’, he argued that
Corporate-Community Relations in the Colombian Mining Sector
influenced the content of Prodeco's corporate social responsibility (CSR) regime, defined here as the entirety of programmes, policies, practices, techniques, discourses and statements by which a corporation continuously defines, manages and governs its
Julia Eckert and Laura Knöpfel
Harm in the context of global capitalism is locally felt but transnational in the process of its production. In this special issue, we turn to struggles for corporate accountability to trace possible means of attributing responsibility in ways
A Defense of Lacanian Responsibility
of their work—that is, Sartre at his most humanist and Lacan at his most structuralist—I will attempt to defend Lacan against at least one of Cannon’s criticisms, which is that his work leaves no room for the kind of subjective responsibility