Sartre's phenomenological ontology discloses that understanding consciousness and its mode of being requires an analysis of its relation with other consciousnesses. The primordial manner in which the Other relates to consciousness is through the look. Sartre claims that consciousness tends to adopt a pre-reflective fundamental project that leads it to view the Other as a threat to its pure subjective freedom. This creates a conflictual social relation in which each consciousness tries to objectify the Other to maintain its subjective freedom. But Sartre also notes that consciousnesses can establish a social relation called the “we” in which each consciousness is a free subject. While certain commentators have noted that communication allows each consciousness to learn that the Other is not simply a threatening object but another subject, communication can only play this positive role if both consciousnesses have undergone a specific process called conversion. Only conversion brings consciousness to recognise, respect, and affirm the Other's practical freedom in the way necessary to create a we-relation. To support my argument, I spend significant time outlining what conversion and the social relations created post-conversion entail.
Julie Van der Wielen
Sartre's analysis of intersubjective relations through his concept of the look seems unable to give an account of intersubjectivity. By distinguishing the look as an ontological conflict from our relation with others in experience, we will see that actually intersubjectivity is not incompatible with this theory. Furthermore, we will see that the ontological conflict with the Other always erupts in experience in the form of an emotion, and thus always involves magic, and we will look into what the presence of the Other adds to such emotion. Emotions I have in front of the Other are directed toward my being-for-others, which escapes me by definition. This has a peculiar consequence when the imaginary is involved, which could help explain complexes such as narcissism and paranoia.
A Jewish Perspective
sages over the other – be they Gentiles, proselytes, uneducated people, women or priests. My analysis in this class was valid and well argued. However, it lacked the good will needed considering the Midrash as saying something which is beyond the self
of “integration” in the eastern part of Europe becoming a “deviation” from the “normal” history of Europe. National history, on the other hand, is taught in the last year of both basic and secondary education. More precisely, the current national
The Israeli-Arab-Palestinian Conflict as Reflected in Israeli History Textbooks, 2000-2010
Previous research on the way in which the Arab-Israeli conflict and the image of the Arab have been presented in Jewish history and civics textbooks established that there have been three phases, each typified by its own distinctive textbooks. The shift from the first to the third generation of textbooks saw a gradual improvement in the way the Other has been described, with the elimination of many biases, distortions and omissions. This article explores whether new history textbooks, published from 2000 to 2010, have entrenched or reversed this trend. With the escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the early 2000s, one might have expected that the past linear process of improvement would be reversed. However, textbooks written over the last decade do not substantially differ from those written in the 1990s, during the heyday of the peace process. The overall picture is, therefore, that the current textbooks do not constitute a fourth generation.
beliefs and sensitivities. These different re-conceptions can caution the teaching and reading of Merchant against casually generating racial bigotry on the one hand, and taking ethnocentrism for granted on the other. Such adaptation practices have
mechanisms that interweaves this variety of nationalities is the area's garment business, which developed upon the arrival of the first migrants. “The Other Side” expresses this context through the flawed memory of an elderly character who was born in Poland
Ronald E. Santoni
In a probing paper entitled "The Misplaced Chapter on Bad Faith, or Reading Being and Nothingness in Reverse," Matthew Eshleman challenges part of my intensive analysis of Sartre's "Bad Faith," arguing that bad faith is essentially a social phenomenon, and that social elements—the Other, in particular—play a "necessary role in making bad faith possible." Although I share many of Eshleman's interpretative points about the importance of the "social" in Sartre's account, I contend, here, with textual support, that Eshleman is too extreme, and slights the original bad faith to which human reality, in its very "upsurge" as consciousness or freedom, is "congenitally" (Spiegelberg) predisposed. My continued appeal to Sartre's concept of "initial," "fundamental," project, or "natural attitude" of consciousness to flee its freedom—what I have called ontological bad faith—becomes the crux of my critical counter-challenge to Eshleman's thesis.
New Science, the ‘Other’ and Imperialism in the Early Philosophical Transactions
, and the scientific observation of the ‘Other’ in distant worlds obliged travellers to use a more advanced technology, pay closer attention to cross-cultural issues, as well as to reflect more seriously on political life, ethnography and the natural
Technologies of the Other, Lenience, and the Ethics of Ethiopian Orthodox Fasting
‘technologies of the other’? Studies exploring the intersection of religious discipline and moral subjectivity have been conspicuously preoccupied with the intentional, ethical self-cultivation of individuals and groups whose religious life is characterized by