For more than two decades I have been engaged with trying to understand the violent conflicts in Burundi and how Burundians live with and through violence. How do they experience violence, make sense of it, talk about it, try to predict it, and
The Shifting Temporalities of Long-Term Ethnographic Engagement with Burundi
Everyday Ethnic Identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina
. This came as a surprise to me during my fieldwork, and it also stands in opposition to structurally inspired anthropological analyses of war and violence. Such analyses have primarily focused on the inherent potential of violence and war to create
Sartre and the Ethics of Need
Love and Violence: Sartre and the Ethics of Need It could be argued that Jean-Paul Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason substitutes Being and Nothingness' s ontological account of interpersonal violence, arising from bad faith, for a
Ten Theses toward a Research Agenda for Scholars of Contention Today
eighteenth century made the violence of contentious politics more difficult to perceive ( Tarrow 1998 ). Violence, however, did not disappear. It underwrote the development of the modern nation-state and the public sphere upon which social movements would
Is Liberation without Freedom Possible?
ambiguous and almost apparently contradictory thoughts (in particular concerning the theme of violence), but also because Sartre himself would have invited us to proceed beyond his proposal, which, moreover, was made before he could deliver his final legacy
response from some in the political establishment and press. Both made similar contributions and both endured violence and abuse. Both were seen, in their day, as transgressing national and cultural borders, as being “visibly different.” The Hostile
Eliza Guyol-Meinrath Echeverry
In 2007, security personnel from the Canadian-based Hudbay Minerals Inc. Fenix mine, together with Guatemalan military and police forces, used destruction of crops and property, intimidation, physical assault, and sexual violence to evict the Q
The Case of Northern Ireland
This article examines the concept of violence in contemporary political theory focusing in particular on the possibility of rethinking the relationship between violence and democracy. Rather than seeing democracy and violence as contrasting concepts, it argues that democratic societies have always been founded on the basis of violent engagement at some level. And, of course, the modern state has always claimed the legitimate use of force as a key ingredient in its authority. The article contends that many contemporary democratic discourses have lost sight of the integral relationship between democracy and violence. Indeed it is frequently the case that discourses of democracy are couched in ethical terms as the obverse of violence. Ironically, this trend is often most apparent where societies are either making a transition to democracy or where a process of conflict transformation is taking place. The limitations of these approaches for our understanding of violence and democracy will be outlined in this article through an examination of contemporary political developments in Northern Ireland.
Ana Margarida Sousa Santos
the riots sparked by local elections in 2005. Discussing these past events, Mariano's friend spoke of his fear of further violence, remarking on the unfortunate location of his house in Nanduadua, one of the town's oldest neighborhoods where most of
Matthew C. Eshleman and Ronald E. Santoni
Can violence ever be justified or is violence necessarily oppressive? Is self-defensive counter-violence or “revolutionary violence” aimed at human liberation, which Sartre defended, necessarily in bad faith? These questions form the crux of the debate between Matt Eshleman and Ronald Santoni. Is violence by nature Manichean, making the Other into an “object” and evil antagonist, and thus dehumanizing and oppressing the Other? Or can violence be liberatory when it is directed at oppressors? Both authors—but especially Eshleman, and Santoni reluctantly—agree that some forms of violence (such as self-defense) do not involve bad faith, but disagree about whether or when revolutionary violence can be justified.