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Gerald F. Gaus

This essay analyses optimal voting rules for one form of deliberative democracy. Drawing on public choice analysis, it is argued that (i) the voting rule that best institutionalises deliberative democracy is a type of a supermajority rule. Deliberative democracy is also committed to (ii) the standard neutrality condition according to which if x votes are enough to select alternative A, x votes must be enough to select not-A. Taken together, these imply that deliberative democracy will often be indeterminate. This result shows that deliberative democracy is ill-equipped to provide guidance as to how actual political disputes are to be legitimately resolved.

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Does Democratic Theory Need Epistemic Standards?

Grounds for a Purely Procedural Defense of Majority Rule

Carlo Invernizzi-Accetti

view majority rule represents an “upper limit” because the same reasoning also applies to the comparison with any other collective decision-making mechanism. Consider, for instance, the case of super-majoritarian voting rules: these imply that fewer

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Christian Schweiger

strengthened the supervisory competences of the European Commission through the reversal of the qualified majority voting rule on excessive deficits. In practice, this meant that the Commission no longer required a qualified majority vote ( qmv ) mandate from

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Sophie Meunier

twenty-eight today, has diluted the voice and voting power of France within the European institutions. According to the qualified majority voting rules that govern formal decision-making in the Council of the European Union, France had 23.5 percent of the