Returning to the rural township of San José de Apartadó (hereafter San José) in mid-2021 after an absence of four years, I was curious to see how this conflict area in northwestern Colombia, close to the Gulf of Urabá, had changed with the implementation of the Peace Agreement signed in 2016. The Peace Agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) guerilla purports to end more than 60 years of armed conflict, not only by reincorporating members of the guerrilla but also by addressing key causes of the conflict, such as land concentration and illicit crop cultivation. Given the goals of the Peace Agreement, peasant accounts and developments in San José are ambivalent to say the least. Although civil actors in the area confirm that the threat of military action has been virtually nonexistent since the guerrilla reincorporation in the spring of 2017, this is not without reference to several problematic, security-related circumstances. J.M.C., head of the San José Peasant Association (ACASA), which was founded in 2015, described the situation in 2021 as follows:
There used to be two armed groups competing for territory. Now it is only the paramilitaries, but they continue to kill peasants one by one. The increase in drug consumption is a delicate matter and has never been seen in San José before. It leads to social decomposition. Many young people are addicted, some start stealing out of desperation, others agree to join the paramilitaries or become informants. And there is a wave of child prostitution. There is so much disorder with these groups, it is impossible for the public forces not to notice. We have made public denouncements of alliances between paramilitary groups and the 17th brigade, which led to us being threatened to the point that we are forced to operate in a security scheme. (J.M.C., peasant leader ACASA, 04.08.2021, Apartadó)
When we finished talking about how “social decomposition” referred to by J.M.C. emerged not long after FARC's reincorporation and the takeover of territorial control by the paramilitary group AGC (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia), political leader E.L. drew my attention to another aspect:
There is another complicated issue. The Serranía de Abibe [where San José is located] is the lung of the entire Urabá region. It has water reserves, humidity, a lot of trees, all the wealth you can imagine. There are around one hundred applications for mining licenses. Whether we allow this or not, we will die. They are going to kill us anyway. If these applications are approved, the Serranía will dry up, the nature reserve will be destroyed. We are not interested in this economic development. We want social development, which is health, education, livelihood, decent housing, and opportunities for productive projects. This is what the Peace Community has always demanded. Development is not clearing a few paths here and there. What do we gain by having a paved road if we don't have enough breath to move? (E.L., Unión Patriótica, 04.08.2021, Apartadó)
E.L. belongs to the Unión Patriótica party that was persecuted in the 1980s and returned to the region in 2018, two years after the Peace Agreement. Remarkably, the circumstances of this joint interview were in line with the security-related developments it addressed. Although all of us were based in San José, the two socio-political leaders J.M.C. and E.L. asked me to meet outside the rural township in a busy, semi-anonymous shopping center in Apartadó, the capital of the municipality. In the company of armed bodyguards and surrounded by people rushing to the fitness center, doing businesslike things or strolling around shopping, we sat squashed at a small metal table, drinking coffee from paper cups and talking in hushed voices.
This short episode illustrates that the peace process has given rise to security-related developments, which are experienced as dangerous by the marginalized peasant population of the rural conflict areas. In terms of “traditional” security research (Buzan et al. 1997), authorized state institutions are supposed to reduce risks to the physical and public security of Colombian society (Lutz 2020). To this end, the agreed peace procedures for “human security” (Eriksen 2010) include land reform and economic programs. As stated by the two leaders mentioned earlier, the fact that security for the peasant population in San José is undergoing a shift rather than improving is due to the failure to implement the peace measures agreed upon but also refers to Goldstein's argument that security for some actors does not imply security for the population as a whole (Goldstein 2010): the reincorporation of FARC has encouraged mining companies to apply for mining licenses in the area or to make use of existing ones. If this happens, it would pose an existential threat to the peasant lifestyle of the local population. Bigo coined the term “(in)security” to refer to the mutually constituent relationship between security and insecurity and “to describe the unavoidable consubstantiality of insecurity inside security and of security inside insecurity” (2014: 201). Thereby, “(in)security” breaks with the dialectical opposition of security/insecurity and understands changing (in)security situations, like in San José, as a unique phenomenon. The episode also shows that threats and violence by illegal armed groups continue, forcing social leaders to resort to a mix of conventional security strategies such as bodyguards and alternative strategies such as hiding in the anonymity of a shopping mall. Finally, the statements of J.M.C. and E.L. likewise indicate that behind the security needs of the peasant population are notions of security from the margins (Naucke and Halbmayer, this volume), which they frame as social development or “dignified life.”
Following on from the introduction to this Special Issue (Naucke and Halbmayer, this volume), this article focuses on a peasant community that is socio-economically and legally marginalized1 in the sense of Tsing (1994), as their views (were heard once during the peace negotiations2 but) are not represented in the Peace Agreement and who were excluded from the planning of peace measures—such as the PDET process.3 That said, peasant populations have their own security ideas and practices to ensure their survival over time (Holbraad and Pedersen 2013). These are linked to notions of a desirable life (Kirsch 2016) and usually expressed as “doing security” (Diphoorn and Grassiani 2018). Thus, this article is based on the definition from the Special Issue introduction of Security from the Margins “as a set of discourses and practices concerned with the social reproduction of collectives who are marginalized, in which normative notions of a ‘good life’ worth living are negotiated and become visible in their performances and actions” (Naucke and Halbmayer, this volume). The ethnographic case of the Peace Community of San José presented here exemplifies and illustrates to a certain extent some of the conceptual considerations of the Special Issue introduction.
With this in mind, I would like to present three arguments in this article: first of all, the peace process does not necessarily improve the (in)security situation of peasant communities in conflict regions. It transforms it with somewhat ambivalent results, in part even worsening the situation. Secondly, peasant communities in conflict regions created alternative security strategies that enabled them to survive during armed conflict as well as in the current (in)security situation. Thirdly, these alternative strategies point to security notions of marginalized peasants that go beyond established understandings of security. The article is structured in two main sections. In the first section I will describe (in)security in the San José conflict area prior to the Peace Agreement and peasant security strategies, notably regarding land ownership and use. The second section explains the changing (in)security situation following the Peace Agreement and how peasants adapt their security strategies accordingly. In the conclusion, I explore how these security strategies from the margins are tied to socio-cultural notions of a “dignified life” and a peasant lifestyle. The article is based on ethnographic fieldwork I have conducted at various times since 20064 in the rural township of San José de Apartadó. The last two stays were in mid-2021 and mid-2022 as part of a research project on security issues in the Colombian peace process. This type of multi-temporal fieldwork allows me to reflect on long-term developments in a dynamic conflict area.
(In)Security and Peasant Security Strategies before the Peace Agreement
In this section, I will describe the (in)security situation in the San José conflict area and the security strategies of the Peace Community before the Peace Agreement. In doing so, I will not only identify the risks, but also elaborate on what is threatened from the peasant perspective and, conversely, what needs to be secured.
The Serranía de Abibe, which is 30 kilometers east of the Gulf of Urabá and the northernmost spur of the western Andes Cordillera, forms a natural mountain corridor for a network of mule trails that link the coca rich hinterland of the Córdoba Department to the export-oriented banana center of the Antioquia Department. The rural township of San José lies at the bottleneck of this corridor and is comprised of 32 hamlets spread across five hundred square kilometers and has a population of approximately six thousand people (in 2016). The San José area was first settled in the 1950s by displaced Emberá Katíos and mestizo peasants who had either fled civil war elsewhere in the country (La Violencia 1948–1954) or come in search of a better life (Uribe de H 1992: 115–116). In the 1960s, the peasant association ANUC (Asociación Nacional de Usarios Campesinos) strengthened formal peasant organization by training local leaders (Ramírez Tobón 1997: 40–42). These leaders established the village officially in 1970 and called it after the patron saint of peasants (Uribe de H 1992: 115–117). Shortly after, in 1973, the FARC guerilla chose the area to locate its 5th Front. The peasants were not the target of the guerrilla and more or less accepted its territorial control (Ortiz Sarmiento 2007: 132–134). The presence of FARC prompted the Colombian military to patrol the area more frequently. Unable to restrict guerrilla control, the military suspected the peasants of cooperating with the guerilla, leading to a peasant-military relationship marked by mutual distrust (Lanchero 2002: 44). In the 1980s, the area came under the influence of the UP (Unión Patriótica) political party mentioned in the introduction, which had been formed in 1984 during peace negotiations between the Colombian government and FARC. With the 1986 election, San José became a UP stronghold, culminating in the election of two village residents to the Municipal Council and one to the parliament of the Department (Ortiz Sarmiento 2007: 68–69). The appearance of paramilitary groups in the early 1990s saw FARC forced to reduce its quasi-governmental functions and intensify the socio-political control of the peasant population. Paramilitaries gradually spread across the entire Urabá region, persecuting residents in FARC controlled areas.5
(In)Security during the Conflict
In 1994, San José became a hotspot of the armed conflict. The military and paramilitaries entered the area regularly, engaging in skirmishes with the guerrilla and persecuting, displacing, and murdering the civilian population. By early 1997, the paramilitary group ACCU (Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá) had taken control of large parts of San José and pushed back the guerrilla into the higher areas of the Serranía. Numerous San José hamlets were abandoned, most residents fled the region. At this point, church organizations and (inter)national NGOs arrived to assist San José’s displaced residents (García and Aramburo Siegert 2011: 439). In conjunction with the residents who wished to remain, they developed the idea of a Peace Community, which was officially founded on 23 March 1997. According to its declaration, the Peace Community “is constituted by the civilian population of peasants and non-combatants [who] agree to refrain from direct or indirect participation in hostilities [. . .], refrain from carrying and/or possessing weapons, ammunition or explosive materials, [. . .] refrain from providing logistic support for the conflicting parties, [. . .] and refrain from appealing to any of the parties in conflict to resolve internal, personal or family problems” (CdP San José 1997, Art. 2 & 3).
For the next 20 years, until the reincorporation of FARC in 2017, San José would remain a hotspot of the armed struggle over territorial, social, and economic control between the guerrillas, the paramilitaries, and the military, including regular skirmishes, armed raids, and aerial bombardments. Armed conflict alone poses security risks to the region's civilian population, such as being caught up in combat, finding abandoned explosive artifacts or recruitment by armed groups. But an active neutrality stance, non-collaboration with armed actors and the defense of civilian rights brought persecution from all armed groups (to varying degrees) on the Peace Community. None of the armed actors accepted the independent position of the civilian population in this rural township. The number of human rights violations committed in the last 26 years in this peasant community, whose population fluctuated between six hundred and 1,500 people over the years, are in fact shocking: the community registered more than 250 murders, 11 massacres, and more than two thousand violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (Giraldo Moreno 2018). The figures alone bear witness to the existential threat to survival this peasant community faced.
The scenario becomes even more lethal when we take a closer look at the variety of threats and dangers armed actors posed to the Peace Community of San José (for a complete account, see Naucke 2020: 199–248): from 1997 to 2007, it was the victim of massive attacks by all armed actors. Most murders and displacements took place around this time, and houses, fields, and agricultural products were frequently looted or destroyed. Paramilitary groups and state security forces in particular committed crimes against humanity, including massacres, disappearances, torture, and the illegal detention of civilians. Although murders and massacres have decreased since 2008, they have not ceased completely, as the latest assassination of two community members in March 2024 illustrates. Between 2007 and 2017, community members increasingly faced trade bans on their agricultural products, which were enforced by paramilitaries and aimed at crumbling their economic revenues. They were confronted with stigmatization by the regional media aimed at destroying their credibility and prosecuted by state institutions aimed at weakening their organization. Some state officials, especially the military, did not shy away from attempts to threaten, bribe, or blackmail community members, forcing them to make public statements against the Peace Community (Naucke 2020). Javier Giraldo, a Colombian Jesuit priest and longtime companion to the Peace Community, has identified eight long-term strategies that armed actors and state institutions used in an attempt to destroy the Peace Community, including physical extermination, media degradation, ideological stigmatization, criminalization, social exclusion, and economic depredation (Giraldo Moreno 2018).
Puzzling in the context of this (in)security situation during the armed conflict is the disproportionality of the means used by armed groups and state institutions against the Peace Community, and the high cost to human life accepted by their members in the name of an independent stance. Why was such massive violence used against a small rural village? And where does its moral strength come from in the face of constant repression? The devastating attacks by armed groups and state institutions can be explained by the economic importance of the Serranía de Abibe and the Peace Community as a strategic obstacle standing in the way. The Serranía de Abibe is first of all vital to controlling informal trade routes between the Córdoba and Antioquia Departments for products such as cocaine, gold, and weapons. Therefore, San José is of strategic importance for all armed actors: whoever controls this area is in a position to control the entire Urabá region and a significant part of northwestern Colombia (Uribe de H. 1992). Secondly, the Serranía is the primary source of the water and sediment that makes the agro-industrial banana zone at the base of the Serranía so fertile. The agro-industry, which annually produces bananas worth approximately $600M (CCU 2017), has a vested interest in securing water sources by buying up lands in the Serranía mountains. Thirdly, the subsurface of the Serranía is rich in natural resources; accordingly, (inter)national companies and state institutions are extremely keen to exploit coal and mineral sources and convert primary forest into agro-industrial land (García and Aramburo Siegert 2011, 263–268).
The members of the Peace Community were always aware of these external economic interests and convinced of the role their community plays in the area, as the peasant women B.G. put it in 2008:
The Serranía del Abibe is very important for all armed actors. Because they can move through this mountain range to three departments: Córdoba, Antioquia, and Choco. It's covered in coal, and they've been wanting to exploit it since the 1980s. [. . .] And these rivers supply water to the banana industrial zone in Apartadó. [. . .] Still, what we have established here is a life project, life in every sense. Because we establish a life not only with our fellow human beings but also with nature, with the land, with ecology and the environment, and with flora and fauna. (B.G., 17.03.2008, San José)
For community members, the Peace Community is a life project, and its socio-cultural basis and its security strategies are closely tied to the notion of a dignified, peasant lifestyle, a specific human–environment relationship and access to land. Not only is the physical access to land threatened by military action but also legal land ownership itself is jeopardized by the constant risk of violent displacement.
Thus, the answers to the initial questions of this first section of what is threatened and needs to be secured from the Peace Community perspective is self-evident. The Peace Community upholds a peasant lifestyle, the cornerstone of which is the relationship to the land, and not least access to and ownership of land. It has a subsistence-oriented, solidarity-based and comparatively sustainable economy (with little to no destruction of the geo-physical environment). It defended this peasant lifestyle in the face of a hegemonic economic model pursued by the dominant political and economic and armed actors in the region, who are eager to appropriate the land and exploit its raw material. Illegal armed groups, agro-industrial enterprises and regional state institutions are of one mind when it comes to representing and promoting a neoliberal, export-oriented economy in the interests of their own enrichment at the expense of human and natural resources. During the period that saw San José as a hotspot of armed conflict (1997–2017), the threat to the survival of its peasant population came from all armed groups and the conflict dynamics they generated. At the heart of the armed conflict is the de facto access to and legal ownership of the land, and hence the lethal threat to the survival of the peasant population.
Peasant Security Strategies during the Conflict
To survive in a conflict zone despite massive persecution by all armed actors, the Peace Community developed diverse security strategies. Here, I will mainly outline these practices and logics that arise from its peasant lifestyle. The range of peasant security strategies is impressive and testifies to the creative potential of the margins, where “alternative forms of economic and political action are instituted” (Das and Poole 2004: 19) and can be understood—as Naucke and Halbmayer have pointed out in the introduction (this volume)—by analyzing them through the lens of positionality, temporality and visibility. In order to make their diversity more tangible, I will summarize them in four areas, simplifying their complexity in the process: firstly, socio-political organization; secondly the peasant economy; thirdly, collective daily strategies; fourthly, (inter)national solidarity (for a detailed account, see Naucke 2020).
The socio-political organization of the Peace Community is based on a shared vision of peasant community life, on common experiences, values and ideas of what a dignified peasant existence and a peasant human–environment relation should look like (to which I will return in the conclusion). Its organizational structure has its roots in self-governing structures that existed in the area long before the escalation of violence, such as the Balsamar peasant cooperative in operation from 1985 to 1996, although this continuity is rarely noticed (Aparicio 2012). A multitude of boards—general assembly, internal council, hamlet coordination bodies, and committees—demand and encourage the participation of the inhabitants in political decision-making processes. Leadership positions are filled in rotation by different people so as not to expose individual leaders to the risk of persecution or make the community's survival dependent on a few visible figures.
The peasant economy of the Peace Community is based on agricultural production in work groups and on solidarity work—a further development of peasant traditions of mutual support, such as convites or trocamanos (Sánchez 1977). The primary objective of the Peace Community economy is food security for its members, which is complemented by commercializing a number of products to generate income. Remarkable here is the shift in the peasant mode of production: Whereas previously the household was both the unit of production and consumption of agricultural products, when the Peace Community was established, it collectivized and diversified agricultural production through work groups (members of different households working together), thereby increasing solidarity among the residents and reducing the risk of having agricultural fields and products destroyed by armed actors. In a so-called peasant university, Peace Community members and allied communities exchange seeds and knowledge on various cultivation methods or uses of agricultural products, reducing dependencies and strengthening their autonomy vis-à-vis the agro-industry.
Since the collective daily security strategies of the Peace Community are too diverse to describe in detail here, I will confine myself to outlining practices of mobility, avoidance and appropriation. Community members relocate their houses or leave their hamlets when the presence of armed actors and hostilities increases and move back when the situation allows. Their mobility also includes multi-day humanitarian missions in the area to search for recruited, arrested, displaced, or murdered peasants. They undertake multi-week trips to Europe and the United States to generate support and solidarity. In addition to non-collaboration with armed actors, which is already a form of avoidance, the Peace Community declared a rupture with the Colombian legal system after years of impunity. In addition, it rejects mandatory military service and recruitment by illegal armed groups. Decisions on movements or community action, for example, are often made at the last minute and communicated to a bare minimum, ensuring they go unnoticed by outsiders. Strategic appropriation refers to discourses and figures in Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, with which community members argue in unavoidable encounters with armed actors or vernacularize, for instance, by declaring places in the Serranía de Abibe humanitarian zones, where civilians are protected according to International Humanitarian Law. The most important daily practice, however, is collective cultivation of the land, a strategy that has allowed the Peace Community to survive in this conflict area.
A final security strategy on which the Peace Community relies on (due to its marginal position) is its ability to generate (inter)national solidarity, as evidenced in legal proceedings, international human rights monitoring, an international solidarity network, and trade relations. A lawyer cooperative and Jesuit priest, for example, are active in Peace Community cases. Interestingly, they do not act on behalf of the Peace Community because of its rupture with the legal system, but in the “interests of society”—a particular figure of Colombian jurisprudence. Their charges, petitions and constitutional complaints have led in two Peace Community cases to a number of convictions of state institutions and the military in ordinary courts, the Constitutional Court, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The Peace Community relies on the support of three international organizations specialized in the professional accompaniment of human rights defenders at risk.6 In addition, there is the (inter)national network of solidarity organizations, city partnerships and individuals (journalists, photographers, academics), all of which—in a form of civil diplomacy—make urgent appeals, carry out political lobbying, or organize solidarity trips for community members to Europe and the United States. Finally, the Peace Community organizes the commercialization of its agricultural products through fair trade.
To sum up, the security strategies of the Peace Community can be explained by their positionality, temporality, and visibility as peasants in a rural conflict area. Vis-à-vis armed actors, the agro-industry, mining companies, and landowners, Peace Community members are in a marginalized position that forces them to diversify their strategies. This diversity is evident, for example, along the dimension of (in)visibility, when strategies in the field depend on not being recognized, while other strategies are designed to increase community visibility to the international community. These security strategies cannot be explained without an understanding of the rural temporalities of peasant realities, including their historical experience and their vision of what a peasant community and its relationship to the land should be like in the future.
Transforming (In)security and Peasant Security Strategies after the Peace Agreement
In this section, I describe the transformation of the (in)security situation in the San José area and discuss how the Peace Community adapted its security strategies after the Peace Agreement. The aim is to show how the threats to the inhabitants of this peasant community and their security strategies have changed since the reincorporation of FARC in 2017.
(In)Security since Peace
The transformation of the (in)security situation in San José is marked by changes and continuities, particularly with reference to the paramilitary control and ongoing land conflicts. In short, whereas previously two illegal armed actors and state armed forces (and the conflict dynamics they generated) threatened the ownership and use of peasant land, now several state institutions, one illegal actor and the attendant conflict and peace dynamics are jeopardizing the ownership and use of peasant land for the Peace Community. This is because the economic interest in the Serranía de Abibe has not changed and the Peace Agreement does not regulate conflicting economic models (extractivist economy vs. peasant economy) in the context of resource-rich areas like San José. Consequently, the survival of the peasant lifestyle and peasant subsistence economy is in no way guaranteed (see Acuerdo Final 2016: 12). And while the intensified peace efforts of the current government under President Petro must be recognized, increasingly more analysts are pointing to the gap between these national efforts and the regional realities of rural communities, of which the Peace Community is an emblematic example (El Espectador 2024).
When asked about the shift in the (in)security situation in San José since the Peace Agreement, residents mentioned the decrease in armed confrontation. Consequently, the danger of being caught up in combat has been reduced since the reincorporation of FARC. This, however, is not due to the appearance of state institutions in the area, but instead to paramilitary control, as mentioned by the leader J.M.C. in the introduction to this article. This paramilitary control became evident in the imposition of new rules and control mechanisms communicated in meetings held by paramilitaries, as a Peace Community leader explained: “When the guerrillas left, the paramilitaries assembled everyone to inform them of their presence, of their intention to manage the coca business, and that they would solve possible family problems or land disputes. That's how they began to impose their regime. They also introduced new taxes. Shop owners had to pay taxes first, and then families were taxed due to heads of cattle” (G.T., 31.07.2021, San José—la Unión).
To monitor these rules, the paramilitaries set up a network of informants or “puntos” [points], who were spread throughout the San José area, as G.T. went on to explain: “They invited young people in these gatherings, saying they would pay eight hundred thousand pesos. They sent them to all the hamlets as ‘puntos’. Peasants were obliged to provide them with food and lodging, so that the puntos were present with a radio, watching everything” (G.T., 31.07.2021, San José—la Unión).
Even state institutions that had arrived in the area as part of the peace process were forced to adapt to paramilitary control. According to its own data7 from 2021, for example, the reincorporation agency ARN (Agencia para la Reincorporación y Normalización) looks after 76 reincorporated guerrillas in the San José area. According to the peasants, most of them are forced or willing to work with the paramilitaries. During my stay in mid-2021, two of these former guerrillas were recruited by paramilitaries and killed in combat in another part of the country, although they had been in the ARN state program for reincorporation. The ARN office in Apartadó knows about these cases but does not report them for one simple reason: “We may realize it, but we can't denounce them because they murder our staff entering the hamlets, it's as simple as that. [. . .] Denunciation is not an option. The law says that we have to, but if we do, it will cost us our lives” (Senior Official ARN, 27.08.2021, Apartadó). So, state programs in the area despite or because of paramilitary control fall short of the Peace Agreement objectives, as community member J.E. explained: “Now there are some institutions here to accompany the reincorporation process. There are projects that benefit people to some extent. But it is not as it should be. They approve a housing project, but they don't think about whether you have the land. There's a cattle project, but some people have nowhere to take in the cattle. Many of the projects are like that” (J.E., 26.07.2021, San José).
While paramilitary groups continue to recruit youth and ex-guerrillas, those who attempt to oppose paramilitary control are threatened, displaced or attacked, as evidenced by various assassinations of community members and neighbors in the area, as well as by a paramilitary attack on community leader G.G. on 29 December 2017. This attack was thwarted by community members, two paramilitaries were detained and handed over to the state authorities, but ultimately released by a custodial judge (Naucke 2020). Thus, paramilitary practices of violent public control have not changed since the reincorporation of FARC. Given that the Colombian military has a base in San José, this testifies to the historical relationship between military and paramilitary groups in the area.
As far as conflicts of land use and land ownership are concerned, it is necessary to take another look at the actions of local actors such as the paramilitaries and the regional administration and their entanglement. Paramilitary groups, for example, restrict agricultural cultivation, endangering peasant food security as detailed by community leader G.T.: “They forbid peasants to work more than two hectares of land. Not being able to work in agriculture is a way of asphyxiating peasants so that they will sell their land and leave to avoid problems. And to whom? To the paramilitaries” (G.T., 31.07.2021, San José—la Unión).
The local administration of the municipality contributes to the violent escalation of land disputes, for example, by informally declaring peasant land to be an invasion area as happened with the “Finca R.,” a Peace Community farm, where since 2018 several invasions took place. The need to make land available for settlement is a result of the massive wave of migration passing through the Urabá region and the Darién on the way to Central America and the USA (El Espectador 2023). That said, the fact that the local administration is releasing a piece of land for invasion, which, as we will see in a moment, is part of contested legalization cases, adds another layer to the existing land disputes.
In other “projects,” paramilitary actions coincide with the interests of the municipal administration, as in the case of illegal road construction. Paramilitaries force peasants to provide money and labor for rural road construction in the Serranía—officially a protected zone—using construction equipment from the 17th Brigade, but without the necessary environmental licenses or a public budget. While the Director of Corpouraba, the state institution that grants both environmental protection status and environmental licenses, has no information on paramilitaries in the area: “we have no knowledge of this” (Director Corpouraba, 19.08.2021, Apartadó), one Official in the Municipal Planning Secretariat welcomed this: “The municipality of Apartadó cannot open roads, at least not officially. It is easier if they [referring to paramilitaries] do it. Then we can improve them. The municipality can present a project to improve an existing road, but not to open a road. No one would approve that because of the environmental issues in the Serranía” (Official, Municipal Planning Secretariat, 27.08.2021, Apartadó).
Contrary to the interests of the peasant population and the declared implementation logic of the Peace Agreement, this “Public-Paramilitary Partnership” (a specific form of PPPs) prepares the area for mining activities, as community leader G.T. explains: “Paramilitaries begin to open the breaches, state machinery comes in, roads are legalized for just one purpose: to take the minerals out of our territories, that is what is going to happen” (G.T., 31.07.2021, San José—la Unión). There is a certain irony when peasants describe the impact of government policies designed to regulate land ownership. In San José, very little of the land is formalized. Even if land has been owned since the settlement of the area and sold by contract, it does not mean that the ownership was recorded in the Land Registry. Moreover, even the few formalized pieces of land are by no means safe from expropriation if the property tax was not paid during the conflict years. The regional tax office held the first official meeting pertaining to land in the area in 2017, at which the peasants were called upon to pay their tax debts. From the peasants’ perspective, this seemed absurd. Not only because property tax is one of the most commonly evaded taxes, notably by large landowners, but also because the peasants are victims of state crimes committed in the course of the armed conflict: “When we lost the farm 20 years ago, we lost everything. Now we are back and have to pay more than 50 million pesos in property tax. The state displaced me, killed my family, I lost everything, now I'm starting all over again, but it turns out I have a debt with the state. It's a way of getting rid of people, because if you can't pay, you have to sell the land or they will confiscate it” (J.E., 26.07.2021, San José).
The Peace Agreement revived several existing administrative procedures to regulate land ownership. These include legalization by possession, for example via purchase, or legalization by adjudication, based on more than ten years of peaceful occupation—both cases before ordinary courts. There is also legalization by restitution of land that was forcibly disposed during the conflict and is now being returned within the framework of the extraordinary “Victims and Restitution of Land Law” (Law 1448/2011). Land disputes are particularly complex in cases where the piece of land concerned is the subject of both possession and restitution proceedings, since decisions in restitution cases take prevalence over those in cases of possession.
The Peace Community can only assume that ownership of about 20 percent of their land is secure. The rest is subject to three possible scenarios. Firstly, the land is not formalized but the community is in the process of legalization by possession or adjudication. Secondly, it is formalized in the name of the community but being reclaimed by others in restitution proceedings. Thirdly, it is not formalized but undergoing legalization proceedings on behalf of the community and simultaneously being reclaimed in restitution proceedings. This naturally creates a great deal of insecurity among community members.
To illustrate the complexity that makes these land legalization proceedings so threatening, I will outline a specific case in the Peace Community. The “Finca R.” is located in the immediate vicinity of the San José village center. It belonged to the family of Ramón J., who owns large estates in the region and whose current head of family, César J., was member of the regional direction of the Colombian Federation of Cocoa Producers, FedeCacoa (Federación Nacional de Cacaoteros). In the early 1990s, Ramón J. sold the finca to the family of Pacho C., also a landowner. The finca was neither managed nor farmed by the Ramón J. or Pacho C. families, however, but by a manager named Ciano C. According to resident testimonies at a legal hearing on 5 May 2023, Pacho C. already abandoned the finca in the early 1990s. When violence escalated in the region and the Peace Community was formed in 1997, its members were unable to cultivate their lands in the hamlets. This prompted them to enter land that had lain fallow for some years and begin to cultivate it for food security: “People were distressed, there were so many of us, we needed to work. So that's when ‘Finca R.’ showed up. The owners were gone, the farm was abandoned, that's how it started” (A.T., 23.08.2021, San José). Over the years, the “Finca R.” became one of the Peace Community's most valuable agricultural lands. They had cultivated the land for more than 20 years without the former owners filing claims to it, which in turn, according to Colombian law, allows the Peace Community to legitimately claim “Finca R.” as its own property. In 2019, however, the Peace Community received notice that the land was being reclaimed in a number of land restitution proceedings: “In 2019, the Apartadó office of the Land Restitution Unit informed us that there are 17 requests for land restitution of the ‘Finca R.’ by three families: the Ramón J. family, the Pacho C. family, and Ciano C.’s son” (Y.A.—lawyer, 13.07.2021, Bogotá).
This is a typical example of current land disputes in rural conflict areas resulting from insecure historical land ownership and current legal proceedings to resolve insecure land ownership. Three parties who were either owners (Ramón J. and Pacho C. families) or possessors (Ciano C. family) of “Finca R.” in the past are reclaiming the land from the current possessor (Peace Community), which is now claiming ownership. It seems that the Peace Community did not evict the former owners, nor did it enter the land by force. Several residents in the area testified that the finca was already abandoned in the early 1990s, long before the Peace Community was founded. The Ramón J. family claims they were forced to sell the finca, while the Pacho C. family claims they were forced to leave the region. This issue must now be resolved in a restitution proceeding. But these legal events do not take place in power-free spaces. It is important to note that in this—not unusual—instance two large land-owning, prosperous families are reclaiming land from marginalized peasants (who are also victims of state crimes). And of course, these proceedings do not take the purpose of land ownership into account, whether it is crucial to subsistence, identity and people's livelihood or merely an asset for speculation: “During a judicial inspection in January [2021], we met with the Ramón J. family and their lawyer José R., who is now the regional ombudsman. At the hearing, Ramón J.’s son, said to José R.: ‘Ask them to conciliate.’ Conciliation is the agreement between the parties. If we conciliate, they put a price on the land, we pay and that's it. We were clear on that, no way. But what does that show? It shows they are not interested in the land as their life project in the way it is for peasants” (Y.A.—lawyer, 13.07.2021, Bogotá).
The purpose of land restitution and the socio-economic position of the land reclaimers do not qualify as legal decision-making criteria. Since this is the case and restitution decisions have prevalence over decisions of possession, current jurisprudence may lead to the displacement of peasant families from land they have lived on for decades and to which they have ownership claims, without entitlement to alternative land. Ironically, this means that key instruments of the Peace Agreement, such as land restitution, may well contribute to further concentration of land in conflict areas such as San José, which is one of the key causes of conflict that the Peace Agreement purports to resolve. And although the socio-economic position of land reclaimers may not be a criterion for legal decision-making, it is in fact precisely this relatively powerful position that allows landowners to influence reclaiming proceedings, as the following illustrates:
When we finished the inspection, he [José R.] suddenly resigned and immediately appointed Luz M. as the new legal representative. [. . .] On the same day of the next inspection, José R. was appointed ombudsman. It's crazy, yesterday he was the legal representative of the landowners and today he is the regional ombudsman. And on top of that, Luz M. is his wife. Now as a public official, he gets access to certain information. [. . .] Arguing with some Constitutional Court orders referring to the community, he asked last month to be informed about restitution requests pertaining to Peace Community land. Someone from the Restitution Unit called me and said: “There has been a change of officials and we need you to send us the polygons. The ombudsman asks for this type of information.” (Y.A.—lawyer, 13.07.2021, Bogotá)
In other words, José R. is using his position as regional ombudsman to obtain information about land restitution proceedings that may be relevant to landowners whom he previously represented and who are now represented by his wife.
To complicate matters further, another proceeding in the Colombian transitional justice system almost succeeded in expropriating the “Finca R.” Interestingly, the Ramón J. family justify their claims by arguing that the guerrillas forced them to sell the land. To prove this, their legal representatives called on a former guerrilla member to testify. Alias “Samir” was commander of the FARC 5th Front until he was demobilized in November 2008, long before the current reincorporation process. He was not demobilized in the strict sense of Decree 128/2003, which was in effect at the time. Instead, he simply remained illegally in the 17th Brigade facility, putting himself at the disposal of the military. Now “Samir” is involved in transitional justice trials and during one “Justice and Peace Law” trial (Law 975/2005) in 2022, he claimed that Pacho C. was a guerilla straw man and that the guerillas had given “Finca R.” to the Peace Community, which culminated in the judge's ruling to have the “Finca R.” confiscated. Fortunately for the Peace Community, an appeal was filed, suspending the orders, including the one that ordered the prosecutor's office to initiate a process of ownership extinction. In effect, these trials in the transitional justice system allow the state itself to become a potential actor in depriving peasants of their land.
These developments—limitation of agricultural production, illegal road construction and invasions supported by the municipal administration, tax payment demands, and diverse land legalization proceedings—accelerated the process of turning land into an object of speculation and investment. Far from being the basis of peasant identity and subsistence, land is instead being commercialized and commodified, intensifying existing land disputes in the process: “People take advantage. People that sold voluntarily now say: ‘they forced me.’ But it is not because they want to come back to cultivate the land. Instead, they claim the land and sell it again, either to the state or someone who will pay a lot of money. Because of these developments, land is going up in price” (J.E., 26.07.2021, San José).
To summarize the changes and continuities of the transforming (in)security situation in San José, it can be concluded that although armed confrontation has been reduced, paramilitary groups continue to control the area by violent means, unchallenged by the military. State institutions and peace program actors either come to terms with the paramilitary presence and fail to achieve their goals, as the example of the ARN reincorporation agency shows, or they work with the paramilitaries out of a common interest, such as illegal road construction. Overall, land disputes and land lawsuits are on the rise, also because the paramilitaries are forcing peasants to sell their land, exacerbating peasant insecurity. Land is at the heart of post-peace agreement developments in San José. It is the pivot around which paramilitaries, state institutions and the peasant population oscillate, and from the latter's perspective looms largest on the scale of threats. In this sense, peasants in conflict areas like San José see the peace process almost as a continuation of armed conflict by other means.
Transforming Peasant Security Strategies
In light of this transforming (in)security situation, how have the security strategies designed by the Peace Community during the armed conflict changed? Due to the prevailing threat to the survival of the Peace Community, many of their established security strategies are still in place. The new threatening situation, such as the land restitution measures of the peace process, have had a twofold effect: firstly, the introduction of new security strategies; and, secondly, the intensification of existing security strategies.
Given the many restitution proceedings about land, the Peace Community decided to reduce its earlier rupture with the Colombian legal system and to pursue as a new security strategy the formalization of its lands via ordinary legalization proceedings based on more than ten years of peaceful possession: “At one point the community said: ‘Okay, we have to confront this. If we are the opponents, on one hand, then we have to be the claimants, on the other.’ [. . .] So, we presented the first ownership case on the ‘Finca R.’. Of course, if it is requested in land restitution, we need to formalize it” (Y.A.—lawyer, 13.07.2021, Bogotá).
Thus, the “Finca R.” is the subject of two land legalization proceedings, one in an extraordinary restitution process and the other in an ordinary formalization process. In the restitution process, the Peace Community is the opponent and the Ramón J., Pacho C., and Ciano C. families are the claimants. In the formalization process, the Peace Community is the claimant, and the Ramón J. and Pacho C. families are the opponents.8 In other words, the same actors meet regularly in reversed roles in two different legalization proceedings about the same piece of land.
This renewed cooperation with the legal system carries risks for the Peace Community, which ultimately result from regional forms of clientelized statehood (see Naucke 2023). For example, the Peace Community provided information for the ordinary legalization proceeding, such as maps of land that did not exist in the cadastre. When the information was presented to the court, land restitution demands immediately doubled: “To gain clarity about their properties, the Peace Community hired engineers to do the topographic mapping, to have polygons of the properties. There was a time when we said: ‘Well, we have to take another step and provide information’ and the polygons were delivered. After that there were no longer 17 but 39 restitution requests. We are convinced this is because the information was leaked” (Y.A.—lawyer, 13.07.2021, Bogotá).
Intensifying existing security strategies in the context of land formalization includes activating the Peace Community's international solidarity network. Since the hearings are public and have been held virtually since Corona, it is easy for international observers to participate. The first thing that stands out is the unmistakable strategy of the Ramón J. family's legal representation of postponing the hearings to delay the ordinary proceeding:
Hours before the hearing in March 2022, the judge rescheduled it for July. In July, lawyer Luz M. presented a rescheduling request four days before the hearing. Her explanation was that she had another hearing at the same time. The court order scheduling her other hearing was dated September 2021. In other words, when our hearing was rescheduled in March 2022 to July, she already knew about the other hearing but kept quiet. What is the strategy? To delay the proceeding because at the same time she's pushing to speed up the process before the Land Restitution Unit. (Y.A.—lawyer, 17.08.2022, Bogotá)
When the hearing in the ordinary formalization proceeding finally took place in May 2023, the judge surprisingly filed a verdict declaring the Peace Community to be the legitimate owner of “Finca R.” Luz M. immediately appealed on the grounds that the presence of international observers had intimidated the witnesses. This first court ruling does not give the Peace Community much security, however, since the appeal means it has to go through the legal system again. Furthermore, the extraordinary restitution proceeding is ongoing and takes precedence over the ordinary formalization process.
In order to bolster the peasants’ chances in the restitution process, the Peace Community pursued the new security strategy of heightening the profile of the case and by extension its visibility: “We asked the Land Restitution Unit to recognize the case as emblematic and they did. This means it gained greater attention. Now officials from the Bogotá office are geo-referencing, so there will be more eyes on it at the national level. [. . .] Another aspect is that once the case was recognized as emblematic, we sought to have the Peace Community recognized as a collective political subject. Again, the Land Restitution Unit has recognized it” (Y.A.—lawyer, 17.08.2022, Bogotá). Thus, in contrast to many other Peace Community strategies that saw invisibility as crucial and unlike security strategies during the armed conflict that sought international visibility only, its current security strategies in the context of land legalization are about increasing national visibility.
Another existing security strategy that is highly relevant in this context is intensifying the peasants’ core business: agricultural production. A decisive assessment criterion in restitution and formalization proceedings concerns the cultivation and use of the land, that is, the perseverance, intensity and expertise with which the land is cultivated: “These land plots belong to us because we work them. For example, “Finca R.” is allotted to members of the community. They have cocoa in groups, they have plots wherever you go. We did an inventory of how many hectares, how many cocoa and banana plants, how many fruit trees, how much grazing land, how much we leave as reserves, forests and water sources, how many springs and how many houses there are, if there is a memorial and so on. This is a great help in legal proceedings” (G.T., 01.08.2021, San José—la Unión). Hence, agricultural production as the backbone of the peasant lifestyle is not only essential for the survival of the Peace Community in the subsistence economy sense but also crucial to ensuring land ownership in the legal sense. Again, and before summarizing these transformations, it should be repeated that due to the ongoing violent control of the area by paramilitaries, the Peace Community continues to implement security strategies established during the armed conflict as previously described. That alone testifies to the prevailing threat to the peasants in San José.
However, and to summarize, the transforming (in)security situation also requires the adaptation of security strategies, which change along the marginal security dimensions described in the introduction to this Special Issue, namely positionality, temporality, and visibility (Naucke and Halbmayer, this volume). During the conflict, it was strategically beneficial to remain distant to state institutions, as evident in the declared rupture with the Colombian legal system. As a result of the peace process and its key elements, such as land restitution, there is now a strategic need for the Peace Community to seek contact to state institutions. It is likewise vital to render visible its own marginal position, a move that should not be misinterpreted as renewed trust in the Colombian legal system. While many of the Peace Community's residents benefited from invisibility strategies during the conflict, some strategies now have the explicit goal of increasing public attention, both nationally and internationally, in order to reduce the almost powerless position of marginalized peasants vis-à-vis large landowners in legal procedures. Nor should the increase in land legalization processes be misconstrued as evidence of a more peaceful settling of land disputes. These legal proceedings go hand in hand with and occasionally stimulate violent practices, as shown by various assassinations9 and the rise in invasions at “Finca R.” following geo-referencing by the Land Restitution Unit. Important for survival and rarely recognized as a security strategy are the long-term, solidarity-based forms of agricultural production that have evolved over decades. Not only have they guaranteed peasant food security before and after the Peace Agreement, but they are now of vital significance in land legalization proceedings, thus cementing the basis of the peasant lifestyle. All of these developments point to the fluidity, creativity, and innovation of marginalized actors’ security strategies in the face of violent, oppressive, and exclusionary mechanisms of the margins (Tsing 1994), which have continued to operate throughout the peace process.
Conclusion: Dignified Peasant Life
So far, I have shown that the peace process in the conflict area of San José has until now failed to reduce the insecurity of its marginalized peasant population. On the contrary, the (in)security situation is undergoing a transformation that sees constant threats in the form of paramilitary control and violence, and new threats associated with the peace process itself, such as diverse land legalization proceedings. I have also shown that the peasant population of San José created numerous security strategies during the conflict, which can be summarized as a high degree of internal socio-political organization, a solidarity-based peasant economy, collective daily strategies, and (inter)national solidarity relations. In the transforming (in)security situation in San José, many of these strategies are still crucial to survival. New threats arising from legal proceedings make it necessary to adapt established security strategies to new circumstances, notably evident in the context of ongoing land legalization procedures.
Thus, on the one hand, the article demonstrates how state peacebuilding policies and dominant economic models of rural development can become threatening to marginalized rural actors. At the same time, it exemplifies that a marginalized peasant community can also be an autonomous security actor, a phenomenon that would not have been recognized as such in most of the anthropological security literature (Diphoorn and Grassiani 2018; Ghertner et al. 2020; Maguire et al. 2014). Yet, the security strategies of this marginalized actor are so diverse and complex that they subvert the boundaries, or stability, of concepts that have mundane security practices as their subject matter, such as “vernacular” or “everyday security” (Crawford and Hutchinson 2016; Jarvis 2019; Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2016). Exploring security from a marginal perspective and focusing on positionality, temporality and visibility, as proposed in the introduction to this Special Issue (Naucke and Halbmayer, this volume), makes it possible to understand the dynamics and complexities of this transforming (in)security situation. Reflecting on the positionality of peasants in the rural context, for example, allows us to recognize both agricultural production and land legalization proceedings as strategies to secure land ownership. Sensitivity to rural and peasant temporalities emphasizes the relevance of long-term peasant practices and organizational forms that have evolved historically but are central to envisioning the future. Attention to issues of visibility in the context of security measures reveals that although the invisibility of avoidance practices is crucial to the survival of a peasant community, in some instances visibility is key, as evident in legal strategies.
It is worth noting that Peace Community security strategies are the result of a particular notion of marginalized security, one that is framed in terms of a ‘dignified life’ and closely linked to the land as the fundamental basis of peasant identity and the peasant lifestyle. From this perspective, de facto access to and legal ownership of land is jeopardized and needs to be secured. For peasants, land is not simply a means of production or the economic backbone of their existence, as it is for other rural actors such as mining companies or the agro-industry. The relationship between peasants and their land exceeds the economic dimension and is expressed by Peace Community members in terms of symbolic kinship or homologation, as the following statements show:
The land for us is like a mother who feeds us. We sow but she produces and gives food. We must love her very much and that's the reason we don't want her to be taken away. (B.G., 03.09.2013 San José)
What does the land mean to me? Does it matter to me, do I need it, am I a part of it? They have always tried to separate us from the fact that we are nature. If we follow the version that nature is there and I am here, then we feel the land, water, air, trees, animals as something apart, as something that I can dominate or accommodate to what I want. So, I'll treat it as my property. But I am nature, I am life, I am water, I am tree, I am all that. I defend the tree because it is part of me, I defend water because I am water, I defend minerals because as a human being I also need minerals, right? So, the community seeks to be in communion with the land because I am part of it, I carry its colors, I carry its forms, I carry its curves, I carry its ups and downs and overflows. (B.A., 29.08.2021, San José)
These statements convey the intimate relationship of belonging and dependence that peasants create with the land they inhabit and cultivate. Land—the ability to cultivate and manage it sustainably, to live from and with the land, to walk and dwell on the land, to embody and immerse themselves in the land—is the most important marker of peasant identity and existence. The described joint existence articulates the specific human–environment relationship peasants have with their land. For them, the importance of collective land ownership and land use goes far beyond mere materialistic survival strategies. It transcends the naturalistic or “modern” conceptions of land as a resource for exploitation or an object of speculation, implicit in the politics of the state, paramilitaries or landowners. Yet, it is not the land alone, but its association with ideas of a “dignified life” that gives rise to the security strategies of the Peace Community, as the following statement shows: “On land as productive as this, the peasantry that has health, education and electricity needs absolutely nothing else. Because the land gives us everything. Demanding that from the Colombian state was what brought us persecution. We believe that our fight is just and that the peasantry deserves to live in a dignified way. [. . .] We do not agree with this neoliberal system because of its injustices. We demand that peasants live a dignified life in Colombia” (J.E., 20.03.2008, San José).
Similar to what political leader E.L. stated in the opening vignette, having basic human needs satisfied, being able to live in peace and security on their own land with the freedom to reject the neoliberal economic model that does not cater for a peasant subsistence economy broadly captures the peasant vision of the “dignified life” pursued by the Peace Community. Indeed, the Peace Community not only demands such a life but its residents also already create it themselves in their daily lives: “Despite the violations we have suffered as the Peace Community, we believe in the possibility of a dignified life that differs from the ideas of the state or of armed actors. The anguish of the peasants of San José has yielded a vision of how we want to live. We can generate dignified life” (G.G., 14.08.2015, San José).
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, [grant no HA 5957/13-1] “Competing (In)Securities. Frictions of Violence Transformation and Peace Building in Colombia (2019–2024).” I would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions. On March 19, 2024, Nallely Sepúlveda and Edinson David, two members of the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó and long-time research partners, were assassinated on a community finca that they defended against an illegal road construction. This article is written in memory of them and their struggle to protect the peasant lifestyle, their land, and environment.
Notes
Until July 2023, peasants were not recognized as legal subjects in the Colombian constitution, even though about 30 percent of the population consider themselves peasants.
A Community leader was one of 60 victims who were allowed to travel to Havana for the peace negotiations in 2014. Each victim had 15 minutes to describe its perspectives on the Colombian conflict to the negotiating parties. The Peace Community does not see itself represented in the Peace Agreement, which was repeatedly expressed in the phrase: “This peace will not benefit us” (J.E., 05.06.2017, San José de Apartadó).
The Territorially Focused Development Programs (PDET) are a participatory planning instrument that, within the peace process, seek to transform the territories most affected by the armed conflict, see https://www.renovacionterritorio.gov.co/especiales/especial_pdet/.
I spent several weeks and months in the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó at different intervals in 2006, 2008, 2013, 2015, 2017, 2021, and 2022.
For a detailed historical account of the rural township of San José de Apartadó and the Uraba region, see Naucke 2020, 2023.
Peace Brigades International, Fellowship of Reconciliation, Palomas of the Community of Pope John XXIII.
Personal communication with Senior Official of the ARN office Apartadó, 27.08.2021.
The Ciano C. family is not an opponent in the ordinary legalization process because the Peace Community recognizes the possession of the Ciano C. family as well as three other families of some parts of the “Finca R.”
A driving force behind a social media campaign attacking the Peace Community for opposing an illegal road construction through the finca, where two community members were murdered in March 2024, is César J. of the Ramón J. family.
References
Acuerdo Final. 2016. “Acuerdo Final para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y Duradera,” entre el Gobierno Nacional de Colombia, y las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia.
Aparicio, Juan R. 2012. Rumores, Residuos y Estado en “La mejor eesquina de Sudamérica.” Una Cartografía de lo “Humanitario” en Colombia. Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes.
Bigo, Didier. 2014. “Afterword. Security: Encounters, Misunderstandings and Possible Collaborations.” In The Anthropology of Security: Perspectives from the Frontline of Policing, Counter-Terrorism and Border Control, ed. Mark Maguire, Catarina Frois, and Nils Zurawski, 189–205. London: Pluto Press.
Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. 1997. “Introduction.” In Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 1–20. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
CdP San José. 1997. “Declaración Relativa a La Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartadó.” http://www.cdpsanjose.org/node/138.
Crawford, Adam, and Steven Hutchinson. 2016. “Mapping the Contours of ‘Everyday Security’: Time, Space and Emotion.” The British Journal of Criminology 56 (6): 1184–1202.
Das, Veena, and Deborah Poole, eds. 2004. Anthropology in the Margins of the State. Santa Fe: School of American Research Press.
Diphoorn, Tessa, and Erella Grassiani. 2018. Security Blurs: The Politics of Plural Security Provision. New York: Routledge.
El Espectador. 2023. “Defensoría alerta un aumento del 445 percent en migración de menores por el Darién.” August 16. https://www.elespectador.com/colombia/mas-regiones/defensoria-alerta-un-aumento-del-445-en-migracion-de-menores-por-el-darien/.
El Espectador. 2024. “‘Las élites han bloqueado lo que Petro ha querido hacer’: Padre Javier Giraldo.” May 4. https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/paz-y-memoria/las-elites-han-bloqueado-lo-que-petro-ha-querido-hacer-padre-javier-giraldo/.
Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. 2010. “Human Security and Social Anthropology.” In A World of Insecurity: Anthropological Perspectives on Human Security, ed. Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ellen Bal, and Oscar Salemink, 1–22. London: Pluto Press.
García, Clara Inés, and Clara Inés Aramburo Siegert. 2011. Geografías de La Guerra, El Poder y La Resistencia. Oriente y Urabá Antioqueños 1990-2008. Bogotá: CINEP/PPP-ODECOFI.
Ghertner, D. Asher, Hudson McFann, and Daniel M. Goldstein, eds. 2020. Futureproof: Security Aesthetics and the Management of Life. Durham: Duke University Press.
Giraldo Moreno, Javier, ed. 2018. En Las Entrañas Del Genocidio. El Estado Colombiano En Plan de Exterminio de La Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartadó, (Antioquia Colombia). Bogotá: CINEP.
Gobierno Nacional de Colombia, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia. 2016. “Acuerdo final para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera.”
Goldstein, Daniel M. 2010. “Toward a Critical Anthropology of Security.” Current Anthropology 51 (4): 487–517.
Holbraad, Martin, and Morten Axel Pedersen, eds. 2013. Times of Security: Ethnographies of Fear, Protest and the Future. New York: Routledge.
Jarvis, Lee. 2019. “Toward a Vernacular Security Studies: Origins, Interlocutors, Contributions, and Challenges.” International Studies Review 21 (1): 107–126.
Kirsch, Thomas G. 2016. “On the Difficulties of Speaking Out against Security.” Anthropology Today 32 (5): 5–7.
Lanchero, Eduar. J. 2002. El Amanecer de Las Resistencias. Bogotá: Códice.
Lutz, Catherina. 2020. “Foreword.” In Futureproof. Security Aesthetics and the Management of Life, ed. D. Asher Ghertner, Hudson McFann, and Daniel M. Goldstein, vii–xii. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Maguire, Mark, Catarina Frois, and Nils Zurawski, eds. 2014. The Anthropology of Security: Perspectives from the Frontline of Policing, Counter-Terrorism and Border Control. London: Pluto Press.
Naucke, Philipp. 2020. Klientelisierte Staatlichkeit in Konfliktregionen. Eine Ethnographie der Begegnungen einer kolumbianischen Friedensgemeinde mit staatlichen Institutionen. Bielefeld: transcript.
Naucke, Philipp. 2023. “Beyond State Absence—Clientelised Statehood in a Colombian Conflict Region.” History and Anthropology 35 (4) 732–753.
Ortiz Sarmiento, Carlos Miguel. 2007. Urabá. Pulsiones de Vida y Desafios de Muerte. Medellín: La Carreta.
Ramírez Tobón, William. 1997. Uraba: Los Inciertos Confines de Una Crisis. Bogotá: Primera Plana.
Sánchez, G. 1977. Las Ligas Campesinas en Colombia (Auge y Reflujo). Bogotá: Tiempo Presente.
Tsing, Anna Lowenhaupt. 1994. “From the Margins.” Cultural Anthropology 9 (3): 279–297.
Uribe de H., María Teresa. 1992. Urabá: ¿Región o Territorio? Un Análisis En El Contexto de La Política, La Historia y La Etnicidad. Medellín: Universidad de Antioquia.
Vaughan-Williams, Nick, and Daniel Stevens. 2016. “Vernacular Theories of Everyday (in)Security: The Disruptive Potential of Non-Elite Knowledge.” Security Dialogue 47 (1): 40–58.