Three days after the Russian invasion in Ukraine, Chancellor Olaf Scholz explained the implications of the shocking attack to the German parliament, the Bundestag: “We experience a watershed. And that means: Afterwards the world is no longer the same as before.” With the concept of a historic Zeitenwende he expressed his condemnation of Putin's “vicious violation of international law” and voiced his sympathy for the drastic suffering of the Ukrainians. The usually subdued North German Social Democrat waxed eloquent when claiming that the unleashing of “war in Europe” shattered half a century of “peaceful order” on the continent by returning to a power-political struggle for hegemony. Seeking to reassure the surprised and frightened German citizens, he vowed: “We accept the challenge which time has posed to us—soberly and resolutely.”1 The members of the Bundestag cheered this timely speech while the media debated the declaration's policy implications.
Scholz's proclamation of “a turning point in the history of our continent” suggested that the Russian aggression was a caesura that had changed the direction of historical development. He argued that instead of further progress toward peace and prosperity, the “cold-blooded military attack” by Moscow was dragging Europe back into an age of armed confrontations that had appeared to have been overcome with the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War.2 In order to dramatize the significance of such a reversal of trajectories, the German chancellor employed the concept of a caesura, used by historians to mark the end of an epoch and the beginning of a new era.3 For Germany the Ukraine shock meant a triple readjustment of abandoning the economic multilateralism in foreign policy, rejecting the peaceful downsizing of its military and repudiating the energy dependency on Russian pipelines. The chancellor's claim of a Zeitenwende signaled not only an end of Russophile Ostpolitik but also called for a rethinking of more than half a century of German policy and identity.4
The shock of the Russian invasion finally forced Berlin to rethink its Eastern policy and join a more general European reorientation toward a vigorous response. As one British editor pointed out, “Putin's recklessness is not just causing a revolution in Germany, but across Europe.” Almost overnight much of the bickering between the illiberal democracies and Brussels about the constriction of civil rights ceased since the threat of an expansionist Russia suddenly made common institutions like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) seem more important. Even in the United Kingdom, “the endless denigration of Brussels has stopped.” In working out sanctions and agreeing on supplying weapons, the West showed a “wholly unexpected level of resolve.” Led by Ursula von der Leyen, “the action has been quickest and most surprising” in the EU.5 By abandoning its special relationship with Russia, the German reversal facilitated the rapid development of a transatlantic response that stunned Putin by creating a unified Western stance. While the West fell short of direct participation, its reactions remained strong enough to help stiffen Ukrainian resistance.
The Russian attack of Ukraine was also a profound challenge for the theory of international relations since it discredited the assumptions of rational cooperation underlying a rule based, global peace order. Putin's war clearly showed that the German penchant for a multilateral and negotiated rule of law, supplemented by shared interests in trade, was ultimately unable to prevent armed conflicts. The American alternative of a democratic interventionism promoted by neoconservative theoreticians did not fare any better because it had failed to draw post-Soviet Russia into a Western dominated democratic system. Instead, structural realists like John Mearsheimer saw the Russian aggression as a validation of their power-political views that military might dictated the success or failure of states in international competition. Though some commentators rejected the revival of (neo-)realism, others called for a reevaluation of the role of power in international affairs.6 The Russian invasion therefore triggered an intense debate about whether “current assumptions of avoiding and solving international conflicts are outdated” that sought to draw theoretical lessons about whether force might be needed to uphold the survival of democracies.7
The chancellor's announcement raises the question of whether his speech was merely a rhetorical flourish or a program for actual changes in policy. Breaking with hallowed conventions required a fundamental rethinking of Germany's role in the world that had served the country well after the war and during unification. The policy changes announced by Scholz's pledge to join the Western countries in supporting Ukrainian resistance were bound to be controversial, since they threatened the close political and economic ties that had developed between Berlin and Moscow. Jettisoning the tradition of a non-military foreign policy of reliance on multilateral institutions and shared economic interests would also offend all those segments of popular opinion and scholarly analysis that were committed to peaceful conflict resolution. Finally, the rebuilding of military strength for active leadership in Europe would be expensive, create procurement difficulties and take time.8 To what degree did Putin's war shatter cherished German illusions and create a new realism in foreign policy?
Civilian Power
The Russian invasion of Ukraine was such a “reality shock” because it was “an attack on German identity” of pursuing its interests as civilian power (Zivilmacht) by cultivating peaceful relations.9 The Ukraine conflict revealed the impracticality of Berlin's reluctance to resort to power politics which resulted from the postwar transformation that had created a civilian mentality.10 The Federal Republic had learned to live with the burden of a past that included two lost world wars and an unprecedented Holocaust by internalizing the program of reorientation, formulated by the allied victors at the Potsdam Conference. After much internal conflict, the German elites accepted the three “Ds” of de-militarization, de-nazification, and de-cartelization because the Economic Miracle showed that they could prosper under a democratic regime.11 Moreover, the reshaping of identity won out because it was rewarded by acceptance into the Atlantic community, a Westbindung that provided security in the Cold War. While the distancing from the authoritarian, nationalist, and militarist legacy proved difficult, the democratic learning process was ultimately surprisingly successful.
Reunification reinforced the lesson that the Berlin Republic should be content with being a regional power, a European Mittelmacht, protected by the US nuclear umbrella and prospering by trade. Though denied a permanent seat in the security council of the United Nations (UN), Germany as a “trading power” preferred to pursue its interests through multilateral engagement in international organizations such as NATO. As a founding member of the Common Market, the FRG was willing to use its economic clout in the EU, but often let France take a public lead. Moreover, the democratized military of the Bundeswehr lacked nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, striving for an image of “citizens in uniform” and drastically reducing its size as a “peace dividend.” This transformation in the style and substance of policies sufficed to overcome the reluctance of the neighboring countries against restoring a national state with GDR accession to the FRG. The reunited country tread carefully with checkbook diplomacy, being criticized for its timid pacifism, a far cry from its previous assertiveness.12
Pursuing a policy of “commercial realism,” Germany had cultivated a special relationship to Russia that sought to surmount the historic hostility and draw Moscow into the democratic orbit through trade according to the slogan of Wandel durch Handel. To begin with, many Germans tried to overcome the bloody legacy of the “Great Patriotic War” which cost 27 million Soviet lives by building political and civil society contacts such as the Petersburg Dialogue. Though resenting the loss of the Eastern provinces and criticizing the Communist regime in the GDR, the Brandt government launched a new Ostpolitik that reassured Russia and its satellites that Germany accepted the postwar borders. Moreover, gratitude for permitting unification also made Mikhail Gorbachev more popular in the FRG than in his own country.13 Finally, there were close economic ties with major firms like VW and Siemens investing in Russia, while Germany became dependent upon Russian energy supply of oil and gas in order to facilitate its Energiewende away from coal. Assuming that a security partnership was in Putin’ s own self-interest, Berlin made more of an effort to understand Moscow's point of view than other Western allies.
Impressed by flourishing Poland, the German public knew little about Ukraine beyond contrasting memories of Stalinist starvation and Wehrmacht suffering. The country appeared to be still struggling to find its identity, since it was linguistically divided between Ukrainian speakers in the West and Russian speakers in the East with the center showing a mixture between both. Similarly, in religious terms. the Western provinces seemed largely Catholic while the Eastern regions tended to be Russian orthodox. Politically the country looked unstable, torn between a pro-Russian and a pro-Western orientation. On the one hand, there were powerful oligarchs whose wealth was based on corruption, but on the other, there were idealistic students and intellectuals who mobilized for democracy in the Maidan. From a German perspective, Ukraine looked like a fragile nation, full of promise, but somehow failing to live up to its potential.14 Considering Kyiv to be part of the Russian sphere, Berlin was also reluctant to go beyond offering an Eastern partnership as potential preparation for membership in the EU some indefinite time in the future.15
When Putin gave up on integration into the West in 2007, Angela Merkel grew more critical of Moscow but sought to salvage a constructive dialogue with Russia rather than opt for renewed confrontation. Criticized for its “inertia and reactiveness” by the United States, the United Kingdom, and its Eastern neighbors, Berlin reluctantly agreed to sanctions in response to the ill-concealed seizure of the Crimea and incursion into the Donbas during 2014.16 Searching to support the territorial integrity of Ukraine with diplomatic means, Germany joined France in trying to mediate the conflict, using economic leverage such as building the Nord Stream 2 pipeline rather than challenging Russia openly.17 The lengthy negotiations that resulted in the Minsk agreements in effect ratified the Russian seizure of the Crimea and Eastern Ukrainian territory, although they were clear violations of international law and broke the Budapest Memorandum and the Lisbon Protocol of the INF treaty with which Kyiv had turned over its nuclear warheads to Moscow in exchange for a guarantee of independence.18 Since this ill-conceived appeasement toward Putin had previously failed to preserve Ukrainian territorial integrity, the newly elected Scholz government now had to decide how it would react to an even more flagrant attack.19
Policy Reversal
Repeated in an article in Foreign Affairs, Scholz's appeal was therefore an effort to convince the public that the shocking extent of the Russian aggression required a fundamental departure from previous German policies.20 The central concept of a Zeitenwende was a fortuitous formulation that intended to dramatize the extent and importance of reversing the prior course. The image of a historic turning point quickly caught on among pundits in the media so as to be chosen the “word of the year” in the annual competition of the Gesellschaft für deutsche Sprache.21 On the one hand, the concept suggested a vigorous condemnation of Russia's invasion that made it impossible to continue the traditional cooperation with Moscow. And on the other hand, the term also implied a series of concrete measures to aid Ukraine in defending itself. Without denouncing its prior pacifism, the former brought Berlin into line with the responses of its allies while the latter broke with some fundamental taboos of the earlier decades. Beyond the Ukrainian war, the reversal signaled a shift from soft to hard power.22
Claiming “this war is Putin's war,” the German government sought to end the fighting, not just with stern rhetoric but also with practical measures such as stopping the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Like Paris, Berlin felt betrayed, since it had tried until the last minute to prevent the Russian invasion through intensive consultations with Moscow. In order “to deflect Putin from his bellicose course,” Germany joined other EU countries in “authorizing a package of sanctions of hitherto unprecedented size.” Hurting German trade more than that of its allies, these economic measures were designed to erode the Russian capacity to make war by isolating the country, reducing its oil revenues and punishing the elite of oligarchs in a personal fashion. At the same time, Scholz vowed, “we must support Ukraine in this desperate situation” by supplying “weapons for the defense of the country.” This promise broke a long-standing taboo of not sending arms into war zones. By providing defensive weapons, he would help Kyiv without fully participating in the war.23 With these measures Germany ended its special role.
At the same time, the German chancellor also announced a military rearmament that reversed the post-unification shrinkage of the Bundeswehr. Enjoying the “peace dividend” of being “surrounded by friends,” Berlin had abandoned the Cold War land defense posture in favor of a much smaller rapid intervention force, helping the UN or NATO missions like in Kosovo and Afghanistan. As a result of a freeze of its military budget, and the suspension of the draft, the Bundeswehr had drastically shrunk from about half a million to around 180,000 combat troops, which fell short of the French or British armed forces. The FRG therefore also failed to meet the NATO target of spending 2 percent of GNP on its military, much to the chagrin of Washington which considered Germany a “free rider” in defense. In order to revive a traditional land combat capability Scholz promised to work toward the 2 percent goal and called for a “special fund” outside the regular budget of one hundred billion euros in order to “invest significantly more in the security of our country” and shoulder a fairer share of the Western military costs.24
A final set of emergency measures sought “to do more in order to guarantee a secure energy supply for our country.” Since the FRG had stopped its anthracite coal production, was phasing out lignite, and decided to shut down its nuclear reactors, it lacked alternative domestic resources. Instead, Berlin had shifted over half of its natural gas and oil procurement to Russia, which provided a relatively cheap and seemingly dependable supply. When Moscow weaponized its energy exports by turning off the spigot, Germany suddenly lacked power for its industry as well as household consumption, making it vulnerable to blackmail. Temporarily halting its climate transition, Berlin had to decouple itself from Russia while also “pushing ahead the provision of renewable energies” which would also make it carbon neutral.25 But in the short run, alternative sources of gas and oil had to be found and reserves built up for the coming winter—all of which would drive up energy prices and fuel inflation. Because of its higher volume of trade, joining the Western measures against Putin cost Germany more than its neighbors.26
On the whole, Scholz's watershed speech was a stern message that the invasion of Ukraine would have drastic consequences for Germany by compelling it to leave the sidelines. As a Social Democrat and heir of Willy Brandt, the chancellor defended his party's prior effort at reconciliation with Russia but warned that “Putin's war signifies a caesura for our foreign policy” as well. Appeals for negotiations alone would be insufficient to restore peace as long as the Russian aggressors were unwilling to cease their invasion. To end the conflict “we must do everything for the cohesion of the EU, the strength of NATO, [and] for even closer relations to our friends, partners and likeminded around the world.” At the same time, the federal government would have to make a sustained effort to buffer the domestic consequences of the sanctions, while launching rearmament and providing energy security for the citizenry. The announcement of a historic turning point, “a Zeitenwende indeed,” tried to offer a conceptual bridge from a prior period of pursuing peace to a new era of getting ready for war.27
Public Response
The media reactions to Scholz's historic speech were generally favorable since many commentators recognized its importance and agreed with its recommendations. “His address marks a caesura,” commented Der Spiegel-online. “Scholz breaks with decades long and especially social democratic certainties in defense and foreign policy.” According to the Handelsblatt “nothing is any longer as it was before.” The Tagesschau emphasized the irony that it was a social democratic chancellor who threw many basic convictions overboard, which for long years had belonged to the DNA of the SPD and the Greens. Apparently, the chancellor had hit the right tone in reassuring the public through a “strong, resolute and courageous reaction.” From the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung to the liberal Süddeutsche Zeitung and the various TV channels, the commentators agreed that this was a “strong speech” by the chancellor, which could be called “historic.”28 Only some inveterate peace activists and Russophiles grumbled in their printed as well as internet commentaries about the policy reversal.
According to various opinion polls, the public generally supported Scholz's policy, but a substantial minority remained skeptical of direct German involvement. While three quarters blamed Russia for the war, a large majority also opposed active involvement in the conflict. Whereas over two fifths supported the delivery of weapons to Ukraine and even more applauded economic sanctions against Russia, almost one third opposed even such an indirect participation. More than two thirds were willing to help Ukrainian refugees, but a sizable minority worried about nuclear weapons, energy security and inflation, insisting on the need for more efforts to bring about peace. Moreover, a year after the Russian invasion the German willingness to make personal sacrifices started to decline, especially in East Germany where there was more sympathy for Moscow's propaganda claims due to its prior friendship.29 While most Germans wanted to help Ukraine, the government also had to consider that a pacifist minority as well as a populist group of Putin admirers remained opposed.
Most of the political parties, however, supported the change of course of offering diplomatic, economic and military support to Ukrainian resistance. The pro-Russian wing of the SPD led by Gerhard Schroeder had the greatest difficulty in coming around, because its members were reluctant to desert their own former chancellor. Surprisingly enough, the Greens rallied immediately to an anti-Putin stance, be it for ideological reasons of defending human rights, like foreign minister Annalena Baerbock, or for practical efforts to assure energy security, like economics minister Robert Habeck.30 The small FDP focused on keeping the regular budget balanced through creating a separate fund that would accept additional debt due to the emergency situation. More importantly, the chief opposition party CDU, led by Friedrich Merz, also agreed with the chancellor's new direction, since that practiced much of what it had demanded all along. Only many members of the post-communist Left and Sahra Wagenknecht's group as well as the rightwing Alliance for Germany (AfD), which admired Putin's authoritarianism, remained opposed.31
Changing fundamental political beliefs and personal identities nonetheless remained a difficult task that would not happen overnight. Though recognizing Russia as the guilty party, many pacifist commentators nonetheless feared “a widening of the war” that would involve Germany directly. In an open letter published in the feminist journal Emma, 28 intellectuals like its editor Alice Schwarzer, the film directors Alexander Kluge and Helke Sander, the social scientists Wolfgang Merkel and Harald Welzer as well as the writers Martin Walser and Julie Zeh voiced their concern about “a manifest risk of escalating this war into a nuclear conflict” that might turn into World War III. Another worry was “the amount of destruction and human suffering among the Ukrainian civil society.” To live up to its “historic responsibility,” Germany ought to refuse supplying heavy weapons and “rather contribute everything it could so as to reach an armistice as soon as possible, a compromise which both sides can accept.” This emotional appeal struck a chord, motivating tens of thousands of signatories within a few weeks.32
In another letter to chancellor Scholz, more “realist” intellectuals contradicted the pacifist initiative by claiming “the Ukrainian cause is our cause as well.” Inspired by Green politician Marieluise Beck and publicist Ralf Fücks, other intellectuals, authors, and scientists, like Daniel Kehlmann, Wladimir Kaminer, Marianne Birthler, and Wolfgang Ischinger, thanked Scholz for “supporting Ukraine by supplying weapons.” They argued that “whoever wants a negotiated peace which does not amount to the subjection of Ukraine under Russian demands must strengthen its defensive capacity.” These more moderate commentators argued: “It is in the German interest to prevent the success of Russian aggression. Whosoever attacks the European peace order, tramples international law and commits massive war crimes cannot be permitted to leave the field as a victor.” The “danger of nuclear escalation must be countered through credible deterrence.”33 Within a few weeks over 90,000 supporters signed this second appeal that supported the government's policy.
Foreign commentary on the German watershed proclamation was generally favorable as well because it offered the chance of inaugurating a new security system in the center of Europe. Represented by the sharp-tongued ambassador Andryi Melnyk, Ukraine wavered between gratitude for weapons and frustration about the slowness of their delivery. In contrast, Russia invoked World War II imagery to denounce German support and tarnished Ukraine with Nazi symbols although its president was Jewish and stemmed from Holocaust survivors. Western neighbors tended to hail “the dawn of the deterrence era in Germany,” since the ramping up of defense expenditures, troop strength and weapons procurement offered the potential of filling the security void that had existed due to Berlin's disarmament after unification.34 The British historian Timothy Garton Ash argued that “the West shouldn't worry about what would happen if Russia is defeated in Ukraine.” Other commentators marveled about the speed and depth of the reversal of German policies that opened up new possibilities of European defense cooperation.35
Implementation Problems
Implementing the new realist doctrine of deterrence turned out to be more difficult than expected. The government itself acted more slowly than anticipated, stressing “carefulness rather than speed.” Even the defense commissioner (Wehrbeauftragte) of the Bundestag criticized the sluggishness of the military upgrading. Habituated to decades of peace, the bureaucracy insisted on doing everything by the letter of the law rather than responding quickly to a national emergency. Moreover, arms manufacturers like Rheinmetall demanded long range contracts before gearing up their plants to refurbish surplus equipment or to expand production of new systems.36 Afraid of a potential nuclear escalation, the pacifist Left also dragged its feet, ignoring the desperate appeals of Ukrainian defenders and the warnings from historians like Heinrich August Winkler or retired generals like Klaus Wittmann that procrastination cost the lives of civilians.37 Many domestic and international commentators therefore complained about the hesitancy of the Germans to live up to their promises.
Instead of leading the European effort to supply Ukraine, the German government took care not to do more than its alliance partners. One reason was the fear of becoming involved as a direct belligerent due to the memory of the World War sacrifices. Another cause was the fact that sanctions hit Berlin harder than its Anglo-American allies, since German trade with Russia was considerably larger, which meant that the country had more to lose. Yet another consideration was the enormous cost of modernizing the Bundeswehr due to decades of prior neglect. Catching up threatened to blow apart the budget compromise of the SPD, Green and Liberal coalition, since the current amount of 1.3 percent of GNP was going to require a much greater expansion of expenditures than a projected raise to 1.44 percent in order to reach the NATO goal. Even the impressive one hundred billion euros of a special off-budget fund would not be sufficient unless the regular appropriations were increased as well, which clashed with the other spending plans of the government.38 Finally, the fragmentation of weapons’ systems procurement made their use, training and resupply of munition difficult.
At the same time personnel problems complicated the German response. Though Putin's friend ex-chancellor Schroeder was fairly isolated in the SPD, the left wing of the party remained skeptical of any involvement in Ukraine. In the Green Party the rivalry between foreign minister Baerbock's “feminist foreign policy” and economics minister Habeck's desperate search for new energy sources did not help either. Moreover, it was rumored that the Minister of Defense Christine Lambrecht had only gotten the job for the sake of gender balance in the cabinet. She turned out to be incompetent, was involved in various minor scandals and ultimately had to resign.39 Her popular successor Boris Pistorius was a former minister of interior in Lower Saxony who radiated more energy and quickly established a working relationship to the Bundeswehr.40 But the change of leadership complicated the necessary overhaul of the German military and strained relations with the allies.
Typical of German reluctance and eventual concession was the heavy weapons debate. In order to be able to counterattack Russian forces, Ukraine desperately requested armored vehicles from the West. Berlin was willing to supply anti-aircraft and light infantry tanks, but initially balked at sending its top-of-the-line Leopard 2 tanks which were reputed to be some of the best in the world. On the one hand, Vladimir Putin threatened the use of nuclear weapons, and on the other, Scholz did not want Russians fighting against German tanks, which recalled memories of World War II. Other NATO countries that were also using the Leopards pressured Berlin to permit sending them to Kyiv in a circular exchange for receiving newer models from Germany. The issue was finally resolved when President Biden offered to make American Abrams tanks available which allowed Scholz to claim that Germany was not acting alone.41 While it took months for 18 new Leopard 2s to arrive, many older models were quickly recommissioned and crews trained on Bundeswehr sites, offering concrete help as well as a symbolic boosts to Ukrainian morale.42
In the reception of refugees, Germans were more united, since they agreed to offer a humanitarian welcome. The fighting at the Eastern border, the bombardment of the entire country, and the atrocities of regulars and Wagner mercenaries pushed a wave of Ukrainians to flee, making as many as 10 million people scramble for safety. They were mostly women and children since many men stayed behind to fight and the elderly refused to move. While refugee numbers tended to fluctuate, Poland ignored past hostility and received about nine hundred thousand newcomers, but Germany also welcomed over one million, housing the most refugees of any country. Drawing on earlier experience, ties to relatives and cultural kinship of fellow Europeans, many Germans opened their private doors to strangers or manned public reception centers. Tens of thousands of children who knew no German crowded into German schools. Increasingly many refugees managed to get jobs and were ready to stay, while some also moved further West. Grateful for all the help, other migrants nonetheless wanted to return home where the systematic destruction of infrastructure rendered rebuilding difficult.43
One important sign of a change in strategic culture initiated by the Ukrainian war was the adoption of a national security strategy in the summer of 2023. For the first time since reunification, the German government attempted not just to follow NATO doctrine but also to define its own defense interests in a comprehensive military, economic, and political fashion so as to guide decisions of various ministries. A first goal was an active, “robust” defense in order to achieve deterrence by an increased commitment to military spending. A second aim was “resilience” in defending democratic values such as human rights by defeating spying and cyberattacks. A third dimension was “sustainability” in regard to climate change, energy sources and food supply. Though somewhat vague, this ambitious agenda created a framework for dealing with rivals such as China and Russia. The opposition foreign policy expert Norbert Röttgen criticized the paper for lacking concrete measures as well as funding pledges, but more charitable commentators saw it as the beginning of a public debate about national security that opened a new policy dimension.44
Measured by the ambitious rhetoric, the change in strategic culture through the Zeitenwende turned out to be a slow and laborious process. For much of the German public, it was difficult to understand that Ukraine was defending its democratic values and that military means were necessary to deter an aggressor. One source of criticism was the gradual pace of the increase in military spending to reach the NATO 2 percent goal, lest the drastic reordering of the budget priorities would blow the Ampel coalition apart. While weapons procurement was speeded up under the more energetic minister Pistorius, the negotiation of purchase orders remained frustrating due to bureaucratic hurdles. Each time Ukraine requested a major new kind of hardware from the West like F-16 fighters or Taurus cruise missiles from Germany, Berlin first seemed to drag its feet before yielding and supplying the item. Berlin's Eastern neighbors were especially frustrated by the slowness of its response.45 And yet with 30 billion dollars, Germany provided more lethal military assistance to Kyiv than any other European country, and thus performed rather better than its public image.
Future Prospects
In combating the Russian invasion, Chancellor Scholz has changed from a hesitant supporter of Ukraine to a key promoter of European resistance to Putin's aggression.46 In February 2023 he justified his cautious but resolute approach in the Bundestag by stating: “Our ‘never again’ means that Putin's imperialism must not succeed,” so that war of aggression would not return as political means. While he expressed sympathy for critics of arming Ukraine who clung to a “culture of restraint,” he also insisted that there were no signs that negotiations could succeed because neither belligerent was ready to stop the fighting. Claiming “you can't negotiate with a gun pointed at your head,” Scholz embraced the Ukrainian cause as moral imperative more clearly than ever before.47 Scholz's deliberate approach was therefore an attempt to inaugurate a policy reversal in the teeth of considerable Leftist and AfD opposition.48 Moreover it was a resolute signal to Putin not to count on German pacifism in order to win the war.
On the one hand, the German chancellor justified his military and economic support of Ukrainian defense against Russian aggression. Drawing on the lessons of German history, he emphasized that “our European peace order is capable of armed defense.” In the “fundamental conflict about whether to create peace with more weapons or not due to [Germany's] own past,” he clearly came down on the side of the former. “There are situations in which resistance is safety.” Thereby he emphatically rejected the “mobilization for peace” of thousands of Berliners who followed the Leftist politician Sahra Wagenknecht and the feminist Alice Schwarzer in the German capital.49 At the same time Scholz also disagreed with the pro-Russian nationalists who accused him of martial rhetoric and claimed, “this is not our war.” In contrast to the horror scenarios of a “hot fall” or “angry winter” he claimed, “we have come well through the winter—even without Russian gas deliveries.” Instead, Germany had shown a new speed in shifting more quickly to renewable energies.50
On the other hand, Scholz also defended the gradual pace of German support for Ukraine against the domestic and international criticism from anti-Russian commentators. Making sure “that NATO does not become part of the war,” he nonetheless reaffirmed the “two percent goal” of military spending that required a hefty increase in the budget. He understood that the Ukrainian leaders were frustrated with Berlin's hesitation, always asking for even more lethal systems than the anti-tank and air defense weapons they received. Nonetheless Scholz pointed out that the German military aid of 2.6 billion euros was the second highest sum after the United States and “an appropriate amount for our country.” Though CDU leader Friedrich Merz complained about the “lack of speed in the renovation of the Bundeswehr,” the chancellor countered that “the German delivery of weapons has been increased step by step during the last twelve months.”51 The new realism in German policy would not be a magic solution but rather a gradual reorientation of priorities, amounting to an irreversible strategic shift.
Although the outcome remains far from clear, the war in Ukraine has served as a wake-up call for Germany and Europe as a whole. Putin's ruthless aggression has pointed out that Berlin could no longer just depend upon the United States for security, Russia for energy and China for export trade. Its post-violent moratorium from Realpolitik was insufficient for coping with the challenges of developing a sufficiently powerful defense of its own, finding new sources of renewable energy and diversifying trade away from Beijing.52 At the same time Europe as a whole needed a Zeitenwende as well in order to deepen its integration. Calling for a “strategic autonomy,” French President Macron kept pointing out that the EU had to transform itself from “a peace power to muscular geopolitical protagonist.” Finland's and Sweden's decisions to join NATO were steps in the right direction. As one journalist argued, “the war forced a learning process in a hurry,” initiating a realist rethinking that would take years to complete. It was not enough to make announcements, but “the Zeitenwende must be a lasting” change.53
Fearing that the war of attrition was turning in Moscow's favor, chancellor Scholz reiterated in the Wall Street Journal that “a Russian victory in Ukraine would imperil us all.” In his own country Scholz sought to maintain aid for Kyiv: “We shall not flag in supporting” Ukraine.54 In February 2024 the German government therefore signed a bilateral security agreement with Kyiv. In the EU, Berlin pressed hard for more financial means for Ukraine and finally persuaded Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban to agree to another aid package of 50 billion euros.55 During a visit to the United States, Scholz also appealed to the US Congress to overcome internal bickering and release a new aid package in order to help Ukraine fend off the Russian onslaught. Especially after Republican ex-president Trump devastatingly denounced NATO, this German pressure was vital for holding the Western coalition together.56 The Ukrainian war had forced Berlin to unlearn the postwar lesson of pacifism by realizing that military power might also be “needed in the pursuit of security and strategic objectives.”57
A new political realism would also require a redefinition of the meaning of Ukrainian victory, which might offer a path toward ending the struggle. In order to mobilize its own population and maintain international support, Kyiv has insisted on the recovery of its entire occupied territory, including the Donbas and the Crimea. But with the failure of its counter-offensive in the summer of 2023 this goal has become rather unrealistic. Instead, Chancellor Scholz has suggested a more flexible formula: “Russia should not win and the Ukraine must not lose.” Concretely that meant “preservation of statehood and independence, economic viability as well as deterrence of future Russian aggression.” The foreign policy specialist Thorsten Benner therefore argued that denying Putin the conquest of the entire Ukraine and integrating Kyiv into Western institutions would not be a surrender but rather a more realistic aim that could open the door to a compromise peace. So as to be seen as “a peace chancellor,” Scholz has suggested a pragmatic endgame: “Our goal must be that the Ukraine can defend its sovereignty, its freedom and its wish to live in a democratic country.”58
Notes
“Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz am 27. Februar 2022,” in Reden zur Zeitenwende, Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (Berlin, September 2022).
Ibid.
Martin Sabrow, “Zäsur und Zeitenwewnde: Der Umbruch von 2022,” Tagesspiegel, April 23, 2023; and idem, Zeitenwenden in der Zeitgeschichte (Göttingen, 2023). Cf. Malte Thießen, “Corona und die Geschichte der Gegenwart: Zeitenwenden (in) der zeithistorischen Forschung,” Clio online, 18 April 2023.
Franziska Davies, “Ende der Ostpolitik? Zur historischen Dimension der ‘Zeitenwende’,” https://www.bpb.de/shop/zeitschriften/apuz/krieg-in-der-ukraine-2023/518833/ende-der-ostpolitik/.
Patrick Wintour, “The Week Where Decades Happened: How the West Finally Woke Up to Putin,” The Guardian, 4 March 2022; Hardy Ostry et al., “Geeint in der Krise: Zeitenwende mit strategischem Kompass,” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, March 2022.
Roland Czada, “Realismus im Aufwind? Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik in der ‘Zeitenwende’,” Leviathan 50 (2022), 216–238; Harald Edinger, “Offensive Ideas: Structural Realism, Classical Realism and Putin's War on Ukraine,” International Affairs 98 (2022): 1873–1893.
Johannes Varwick, “Transatlantische Sicherheit in der ‘Zeitenwende’,” Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft, Politik 71 (2022), 287–298; Michael Zürn, “Macht Putin den (Neo-)Realismus stark? Leviatan 50 (2022), 395–412; Joachim Schild, “Das Ende der europäischen Naivität,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 June 2022.
Sidney Gennies, “Ein Land ringt mit der neuen Identität: Deutschland ist aufgewacht, doch was folgt daraus?” Tagesspiegel, 17 February 2023; Steven Erlanger and Erika Salomon, “Berlin's History Is an Obstacle To Aiding Kyiv,” New York Times, 23 January 2023.
Payam Ghalehdar, “Zivilmacht Deutschland?” Zeitschrift für internationale Beziehungen 30 (2023), 67ff.
James J. Sheehan, Where Have All the Soldiers Gone?: The Transformation of Modern Europe (Boston, 2008); Kathleenn J. Nawyn, “‘Striking at the Roots of German Militarism’: Efforts to Demilitarize German Society and Culture in American-Occupied Württemberg-Baden, 1945–1949” (Diss. Chapel Hill, 2008).
Daniel S. Hamilton, “Zeitenwende im Kopf,” Internationale Politik, 24 February 2023; Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945–1995 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
Herfried Münkler, “Die selbstbewußte Mittelmacht,” Merkur 60 (2006): 847–858; William Glenn Gray, Trading Power: West Germany's Rise to Global Influence, 1963–1975 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2023).
Konrad H. Jarausch, The Rush to German Unity (New York: Oxford University Press 1994); Stephen F. Szabo, “Germany's Commercial Realism and the Russia Problem,” Survival 56 (October–November 2014), 117–128.
Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010); and Karl Schlögel, Ukraine: A Nation on the Borderland (London: Reaktion Books, 2018).
Liana Fix, “Between Guilt and Responsibility: The Legacy of Spheres in Germany,” Washington Quarterly 45 (2022): 75–91.
Jonas J. Driedger, “Inertia and Reactiveness in Germany's Russia Policy,” German Politics and Society 40 (2022): 135–151; and idem, “Did Germany Contribute to Deterrence Failure against Russia in Early 2022?,” Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, 16 (2022): 152–171.
Jakub Eberle and Vladimir Handl, “The 2021 Federal Election and Its Implications for German-Russian Relations,” in The German Federal Election 2021: Negotiating a New Era, ed. Ross Campbell and Louise K. Davidson-Schmich (New York: Springer Link, 2023), 223–250.
“Der gescheiterte Friedensplan: Was steht im Minsker Abkommen?” Deutsche Welle, June 15, 2022. Cf. Peter Eltsov, The Long Telegram 2.0: A Neo-Kennanite Approach to Russia (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2020).
Kristian Atland, “Destined for Deadlock? Russia, Ukraine, and the Unfulfilled Minsk Agreements,” Post-Soviet Affairs 36 (2020): 122–139.
Olaf Scholz, “The Global Zeitenwende: How to Avoid a New Cold War in a Multipolar Era,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2023.
Michael Hesse, “Kanzler Scholz liefert mit ‘Zeitenwende’ Wort des Jahres 2022,” Frankfurter Rundschau, 9 December 2022; Angela Mehrer, “Turn of Phrase: Germany's Zeitenwende,” European Council on Foreign Relations, 15 August 2022.
Bernhard Blumenau, “Breaking with Convention? Zeitenwende and the Traditional Pillars of German Foreign Policy,” International Affairs 98 (2022): 1895–1913.
Bundesregierung, “Rede von Bundeskanzler Scholz an der Karlsuniversität Prag,” 29 August 2022; Ilka Wölfle, “Scholz’ Grundsatzrede – Zeitenwende für Europa?,” DGUV Forum, October 2022.
Jörg Fleischer, “Scholz: Auftrag der Bundeswehr lautet: Landes- und Bündnisverteidigung first,” Bundeswehrtagung, 26 September 2022.
Scholz, Regierungserklärung.
Stephen G. Gross, Energy and Power: Germany in the Age of Oil, Atoms, and Climate Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 2023).
Scholz, Regierungserklärung. Cf. Eric Langenbacher, “Introduction: A Zeitenwende Indeed,” German Politics and Society 40 (summer 2022): 1–26.
All quotes are from Benedikt Dittrich, “‘Zeitenwende’: Wie Scholz’ Regierungserklärung bewertet wird,” Vorwärts, 28 February 2022.
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, “Peace Versus Justice: The Coming European Split Over the War in Ukraine,” ECFR June 2022; “Ukraine-Krieg: Bewertung der Ukraine-Politik von Deutschland im Februar 2023,” Statista, 3 February 2023; “Ukraine-Krieg: Unterstützungsbereitschaft der Deutschen bröckelt,” Ipsos, 13 February 2023; “Die Unterstützung für die Ukraine bröckelt nur leicht,” Bertelsmann Umfrage, 1 December 2022; Alexandra Dienes, Simon Weiße and Christos KatsIoulis, “Zeitenwende im Kopf: Kontinuität und Wandel in der deutschen öffentlichen Meinung,” FES security radar, 27 February 2023.
Christiane Lemke, “Germany's Feminist Foreign Policy as Part of the Zeitenwende,” American Institute of German Studies, spring 2023.
Rene Cuperus and Luuk Molthof, “Germany and the Ukraine War: Zeitenwende With the Brakes On,” Clingendael Institute, October 2022.
All quotations from Alice Schwarzer, “Der offene Brief an Kanzler Scholz,” Emma, 29 April 2022.
All quotations from “Die Sache der Ukraine ist auch unsere Sache!.” Change.org; “Neuer offener Brief widerspricht Schwarzer und Co: Ukraine kämpft auch für unsere Sicherheit,” Die Welt, 4 May 2022.
Rachel Tausendfreund, “Zeitenwende: The Dawn of the Deterrence Era in Germany,” German Marshall Fund, 28 February 2022.
Timothy Garton Ash, “The West Shouldn't Worry About What Would Happen If Russia Is Defeated in Ukraine,” National Post, 28 January 2023.
Judy Dempsey, “The West's Race Against Time in Supporting Ukraine,” Carnegie Europe, 21 February 2023; “Jahresbericht vorgestellt: Wehrbeauftragte Högl kritisiert Tempo der Zeitenwende als ‘zu behäbig’,” Tagesspiegel, 14 March 2023.
Heinrich August Winkler: “Es geht auch um unsere Freiheit,” Handelsblatt, 24 February 2023; Klaus Wittmann, “Die verlorenen Monate für die ukrainischen Streitkräfte,” Die Welt, 2 February 2023.
Florian Dorn, Niklas Potrafke, and Marcel Schlepper, “Zeitenwende in der Verteidigungspolitik? 100 Mrd. Euro Sondervermögen für die Bundeswehr – (k)ein großer Wurf,” ifo Schnelldienst, April 2022, 37–45.
“German Defense Minister Resigns After Blunders,” BBC News, 16 January 2023.
Loveday Morris, “Pistorius Interview with the Washington Post,” Washington Post, February 16, 2023.
David E. Sanger, Eric Schmitt, and Helene Cooper, “Pledging Tanks Biden Paved Way to Fortify Kyiv,” New York Times, 26 January 2023; Claudia von Salzen, “Scholz genehmigt Leopard-Lieferung: Wie es zum Kurswechsel der Bundesregierung kam,” Tagesspiegel, 24 January 2023.
Christopher E. Schuetze, “This Tank Is Very Old But Ukraine Believes It Can Be Very Useful,” New York Times, 1 September 2023.
“Befragung Geflüchteter Ukrainer: Mehr als ein Drittel der Kriegsflüchtlinge wollen langfristig in Deutschland bleiben,” Spiegel, 15 December 2022.
Steven Erlanger and Christopher E. Schuetze, “Germany Adopts a National Security Strategy: Critics Call It ‘Weak’,” New York Times International, 15 June 2023.
Bastian Giegerich and Ben Schreer, “Zeitenwende One Year On,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 65, no. 2 (2023): 37–42; Christopher F. Schuetze, “Germany's Vow to Revitalize Its Military Is ‘Fizzing Out’,” New York Times, 30 November 2023.
Julius Betschka, “Waffenhilfe für die Ukraine: Scholz’ Verwandlung vom Zögerer zum Antreiber,” Tagesspiegel, 30 January 2024.
“Scholz bilanziert ‘Ein Jahr Zeitenwende’,” Tagesspiegel, 3 February 2023; Christopher Ziedler, “Regierungserklärung zum Krieg: Scholz definiert das deutsche ‘Nie wieder’ neu,” Ibid., 3 February 2023.
ARD-Deutschlandtrend, “Knappe Mehrheit der Deutschen gegen ukrainische Gebietsabtretungen an Russland,” 2 March 2023; Tristan Fiedler, “Mehrheit der Europäer für Verhandlungen mit Russland statt Waffenlieferungen,” Tagesspiegel, 21 February 2024.
Lea Schulze et al., “‘Aufstand für Frieden’ in Berlin: Tausende strömen zur Kundgebung von Schwarzer und Wagenknecht,” Tagesspiegel, 24 February 2023.
See footnote 47.
Kenneth Maher, “Time for Direct NATO Involvement in Ukraine,” ken.maher @kennethmaherauthorbooks.com; Bojan Pancevski, “When Russia Invaded Ukraine, Germany Promised to Rearm: One Year Later, It Is Having Second Thoughts,” Wall Street Journal, 2 March 2023.
Czada, “Realismus im Aufwind?,” 216–238.
Anna Sauerbrey, “This Was the Year Everything Changed in Germany,” New York Times, 24 December 2022; Judy Dempsey, “Russia's War on Ukraine is Changing Germany,” Carnegie Europe, 7 March 2023 and idem, “The War in Ukraine Is About Europe's Future,” ibid., 29 August 2023.
Olaf Scholz, “A Russian Victory in Ukraine Would Imperil Us All,” Wall Street Journal, 7 February 2024; “Wir werden in der Unterstützung nicht nachlassen,” Tagesspiegel, 16 February 2024.
“Orban gibt Blockade auf: EU beschließt neue Ukraine-Hilfen über 50 Milliarden Euro,” Tagesspiegel, 1 February 2024.
David E. Sanger, “NATO Weighs Isolation After Trump Outburst,” New York Times, 12 February 2024; “Ohne Sicherheit ist alles andere nichts,” Tagesspiegel, 1 February 2024.
Roger Cohen, “War in Ukraine Has Changed Europe for Good,” New York Times, 26 February 2023; “Regierungserklärung vor EU-Gipfel,” Tagesspiegel, 16 March 2023; Konrad H. Jarausch, Embattled Europe: A Progressive Alternative (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2021).
Thorsten Benner, “Zwei Jahre russischer Angriffskrieg: Warum die Ukraine einen möglichen Sieg neu definieren muss,” Tagesspiegel, 20 February 2024; and Matthew Karnitschnig, “Germany's Ukraine Policy Is Incoherent for a Reason,” Politico, 7 March, 2004.