Few in Germany and the wider West, including prominent policymakers and analysts, had expected Russia to unleash a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.1 Russia's actions had seemingly given the lie to widespread assumptions about the benign effects of increasing economic interdependence, eschewing military means, and relying on multilateral diplomacy. All these assumptions underlaid German policy until days before the invasion,2 and Germany had consequently fallen short of using its full potential to deter the Russian aggression.3
In the aftermath of the attack, various scholars in Germany4 and elsewhere5 argued that Russian behavior had discredited mainstream thinking on the workings of international relations and given credence to the often maligned “realist school of thought.” German political scientist Herfried Münkler has since bemoaned that, in Germany, realist thought is often caricatured and smeared as intellectual war-mongering, calling for more realists in prominent academic positions.6
Realism is indeed not very popular in Germany. For example, the Teaching, Research, and International Policy (trip) Faculty Survey of 2017 found that only about 5 percent of German respondents named realism as their main theoretical approach.7 This was less than in any of Germany's surveyed neighbors like the Netherlands (about 6 percent), the United Kingdom (8 percent), Denmark (11 percent), France (11 percent), and Poland (32 percent). The relative share of respondents in the United States was more than thrice that of those in Germany (about 18 percent). Furthermore, in an evaluation of which international relations (IR) theories are implicitly represented in contemporary German school textbooks on society and politics, liberalism far outweighed realism, with relative shares of 68 and 15.7 percent, respectively.8
Against the calls for a renaissance of realism in Germany, prominent German scholars have argued that (neo-)realist theory actually does little to advance our understanding of the attack on Ukraine in 2022 and might indeed be harmful and counterproductive.9 This dispute over the merits and dangers of the realist tradition (Realismusstreit) raises two interrelated questions. To what extent can realism actually contribute to our understanding of the changing triangular relations between Ukraine, Russia, and Germany? And under which conditions does realism represent a harmful and misleading discourse? To answer these questions, I show that realist accounts can be situated on a conceptual spectrum, with realism-as-theory on one extreme of the spectrum, and realism-as-heuristics on the other. Applying this framework dissolves much of the (German) controversy on realism, as both sides turn out to be largely talking past each other. While many critics of realism rightfully point to the problems and dangers of realist heuristics, many proponents of realism correctly stress the analytical power of realist theories.
I develop this argument in five steps. First, I argue that the analytically most productive approach to realism is realism-as-theory. In this view, realism is a cluster of family-resemblant assumptions, proposed mechanisms, and areas of concern out of which specific causal theories can be derived. Such theories lend themselves to clear-cut tests and vetting. If found valid, they serve as more reliable tools for understanding the past, present, and future behavior of states than any approach that is not informed by theory, realist or not.
Second, I construct a basic and inclusive model of realist theory to test realism-as-theory's explanatory power with patterns of Russian, Ukrainian, and German foreign policy after the Cold War. I do so by drawing on open source data as well as on my own original research that includes fieldwork and interviews with relevant policymakers and experts in Moscow, Kyiv, Berlin, and Washington, dc.
Third, I establish that even this simple realist model provides helpful insights into the persistent aversion of Russian leaders to nato enlargement in Eastern Europe; patterns of Russian restraint and aggression toward Ukraine; Ukraine's more tacit policy between East and West prior to 2014; Ukraine's determinate, uncompromising stance toward Russia thereafter; and the changes from Germany's cooperative approach on Russia toward a more confrontative stance in 2014 and especially in 2022.
Fourth, with these explorative investigations, I also showcase that, while helpful, single theories, be they realist or not, are by themselves insufficient for comprehensively and correctly grasping all analytically and politically salient aspects of complex processes10 such as the triangular relations between Russia, Ukraine, and Germany.
Fifth, in contrast to the many uses of realist theories, I showcase how and why realist heuristics can lead to problematic beliefs about the nature of Russian-Ukrainian-German relations. Rather than invoking the merits of transparency, consistency, and empirical corroboration, heuristics appeal to authority, lending a veneer of legitimacy to propositions whose validity is not vetted. Consequently, such heuristics can result in avoidable and wrong political decisions. I showcase the problems of heuristic uses of realism with examples from German academia and policy.
This article does not advance any further claims. It does not seek to comprehensively evaluate all aspects of the triangular relationship, does not apply realism to other areas, does not conduct a historical or systematic survey of realism, does not discuss realism as normative thought, does not seek to reignite the paradigm wars of the 1990s, does not make claims about the relative prevalence of realist or other heuristics, and does not assert that realism cannot be productively specified in other ways than the one presented here.
I proceed by first distinguishing theories and heuristics as the two extremes on a spectrum of understanding causes and consequences in politics. I then outline both the diversity and common threads of realist thought. On the basis of this, I derive a basic and inclusive model of realism-as-theory, which, in the section thereafter, I apply to specific questions regarding the relations between Ukraine, Russia, and Germany since 1992. I then define, illustrate, and discuss the problems surrounding heuristics, focusing in particular on realist heuristics in German academia and policy. Lastly, I discuss the wider implications of these findings for analysis, policy, knowledge transfer, and the research community.
Theories and Heuristics
Both theories and heuristics serve the goals of understanding, explaining, and possibly dealing with a set of phenomena. As conceived here, theories and heuristics mark the two extremes of a spectrum that captures how we understand causes and consequences in politics. One side of the extreme is marked by causal theories. For the purposes of this article, I define such a theory as an account that simplifies, organizes, and explains a part of reality using explicit concepts that define its constituent entities, activities, causes, mechanisms, consequences, and scope conditions.11 Heuristics, on the other hand, are cognitive “rules of thumb” or mental shortcuts that allow for broader and quicker assessments of situations than theory-based analysis.
Theories and heuristics differ on various axes that are spelled out below and summarized in table 1. Theories are hard to use and have a limited explanatory range, but they can be highly valid and reliable. In stark contrast, heuristics are easy to use and can be applied virtually anywhere, but their validity and reliability are never ensured. While theories gain legitimacy through transparency, logic, and data, heuristics appeal to less tangible criteria, such as notions of “common sense.”
Theories and Heuristics as Ideal Types of Sense-Making
| Theories | Heuristics | |
|---|---|---|
| Basic characteristics | Accounts of how certain things are and work, based on explicit concepts, logic, and empirical vetting | Cognitive “rules of thumb” on how certain things are and work |
| Prerequisites for use | High, require considerable competence, time, and effort | Low, require little competence, time, and effort |
| Range of applicability | Narrow, explicitly defined | Broad, vague |
| Validity and reliability | Potentially high, can be critically examined | Unclear, cannot be critically examined due to vagueness |
| Source of legitimacy | Appeals to transparency, internal consistency, logic, and evidence | Appeals to “common sense” or presumed authority |
Compared to the many other existing takes on “theory,” the definition adopted here jointly features five advantages relevant for the argument. First, such theories can be formally modeled or informally defined in ways that render them readily vulnerable to conceptual critiques of their internal consistency, coherence, and compatibility with other accounts. Second, as they make unambiguous causal claims, such theories easily lend themselves to empirical vetting through testing. Third, if found conceptually valid and empirically sound, such theories provide a comparatively reliable pathway for forecasting, provided the theory's scope conditions are met in the case at hand.12 Fourth, by explicating operative factors, mechanisms, and scope conditions, such theories lend themselves to be combined with other theories, yielding eclectic and deeper explanations of specific cases.13 As a fifth advantage, this notion of theory is in line with the mainstream approaches to the study of international relations, specifically so with many scholars (possibly the majority of them) working under the realist label.14
Theories have helped to identify and explain many politically salient phenomena. In international relations and security policy, a prominent example are theories on democratic peace, which found that democratic states do not go to war against each other. Through careful specification and testing, these theories also established crucial scope conditions, for example, that the regularity does not apply to emerging or unstable democracies. Theories also established some of the causes of this phenomenon, such as shared values between democratic societies, heightened societal and economic interconnections, and higher accountability of political leaders to their constituents.15
The concept of heuristics originally comes from psychology and behavioral economics and was mainly used to explain decision-making.16 For the purposes of this article, heuristics are cognitive frames that organize and explain parts of reality—just like theories. However, heuristics differ in at least four consequential ways from theories. First, the concepts in heuristics are not sharply defined, if they are defined at all. Consequently, it is unclear to what extent a given heuristic is internally consistent, what its assumptions are, over which exact domain it claims validity, and if it is compatible with other heuristics or theories. Second, because of this ambiguity, heuristics cannot be subjected to rigorous testing. Consequently, their empirical validity cannot be assured with any legitimate confidence.17 Third, rather than claiming epistemic authority by pointing to transparency, logic, and empirical tests, heuristics tend to vaguely appeal to other factors such as “common sense” or to supposed authority, be it of “intellectuals,” “lessons of history,” or the supposed views and insights of “elder statesmen/women.”
Notably, a given heuristic can appeal to the legitimacy of theory-based research while not actually mirroring what that research would or would not claim about the issue at hand. Fourth, due to their very vagueness, heuristics can seemingly be applied to a wide range of different situations and contexts, providing simple, broad, and comprehensive interpretations, explanations, and recommendations regarding political phenomena.
Consequently, heuristics often allow their adherents to presume that they understand all relevant factual and moral aspects of a situation, when in fact they do not have good reasons to do so. Theories, on the other hand, claim much narrower applicability due to their explicit scope conditions and sharp concepts. Probably the most consequential and prominent example includes u.s.-American neo-conservatism, which partially builds on a crude reading of democratic peace theory and was an instrumental part in the u.s. invasion of Iraq in 2003.18
Furthermore, German politicians had often justified their comparatively cordial policy toward Russia with the label of “Wandel durch Handel” (change through commerce), suggesting that this approach facilitated Russian moderation and liberalization.19 This policy was supposedly backed up by complex interdependence theory,20 even though German-Russian trade relations hardly satisfied the theory's conditions for applicability of complex, symmetrical, multi-channeled socio-political entanglement.
To be sure, heuristics have their uses.21 Arguably, some unfounded assumptions are necessary whenever one tries to make sense of anything. As will be laid out in detail below, the argument here is simply that theory-based assessments provide a more solid ground for policy analysis, political debate, and geopolitical forecasting than heuristics do. Conversely, the use of heuristics can yield flawed assessments and potentially counterproductive policy recommendations.
Realism's Diversity
Put broadly, realism is a tradition of statecraft and political thought that focuses on issues of survival and power.22 Realist thinking is diverse and has a long history, and plenty of surveying scholarship exists on it.23
Realist thought encompasses many accounts that approximate the ideal types of causal theory and of heuristics as outlined above. Furthermore, “realism” can also encompass certain moral or empirical convictions (some self-ascribed realists make a point of valuing state sovereignty over human rights), as well as normative theories or interpretivist, critical, and even post-structuralist ways of making sense of the world.24
While there is arguably no paradigmatic essence to realist thought (see the next section), there are, as Wohlforth has argued, four central themes or propositions around which most realist accounts converge.25 First, politics largely occurs within and between human groups, rather than between individuals, as the liberal tradition often has it, or epistemic communities, as in constructivist thought. States are usually the key “group” here, due to their unrivaled potential to harm, predate, protect, and provide. Second, when acting politically, groups are largely driven by narrow self-interests that they will privilege over those of others, if need be. When it comes to states, the most crucial goods will be survival, national security, key resources, and wealth. Third, anarchy (the absence of reliable rule enforcement by a sovereign) strongly shapes international politics, inducing self-help behavior and rendering security and survival precarious. Fourth, in the context of anarchy, groupism and egoism bring forth power politics. Self-interested groups set in anarchy will tend not just to use their influence and resources to achieve their goals, but also to see the attainment of such influence and resources as an important goal in and of itself. Wohlforth has termed this fourth assumption realism's “signature argument,” which encompasses most of the realist tradition.
Realism-as-Theory
Realist thought includes many accounts that are causal theories as defined in the section on theories and heuristics. However, realist theories are often mutually exclusive to some degree. For example, “defensive realist” theories26 have long argued that prevalent features of the international system since about the end of World War II generally disincentivize aggressive expansionism, while “offensive realist” theories take the opposite view.27
Due to this heterogeneity, neither realists nor non-realists have agreed on a sharp paradigmatic core of the tradition,28 suggesting that there is actually none. Nonetheless, impactful studies whose theoretical assumptions are in line with much of the realist tradition continue to be published.29
To evaluate if and how realist theories can help to explain crucial features of Ukrainian, German, and Russian policy patterns (so-called plausibility probes), a simple and explicit realist theory is used here (henceforth called “realist model”). This model assumes that states generally act as if they were unitary actors that, if possible, seek to ensure their own military security, since military capabilities by other states represent a potentially lethal threat to all of their conceivable goals. The intentions of other states are presumed not to be knowable with certainty,30 although states can make “informed guesses” on probable intentions by observing how other states commit their resources.31 Because states interact in an anarchic environment, where no supreme authority reliably enforces contracts between states and punishes predation, states are hence assumed generally to favor self-reliance over dependency and to fear possible predation by other states. Furthermore, the realist model assumes that states generally weigh likely costs and benefits of policy options and then pick the one that promises to best suit this interest of military security.32
Crucially for our purposes, the model expects power politics in the realm of military security. Neighboring states with powerful capabilities, especially when acting in a way that is consistent with hostile intent, represent a potent threat, incentivizing states to engage in “balancing behavior.”33 Due to skepticism on intentions, states should prefer to be self-supporting in their military security by building up sufficient forces to defend themselves. If this is impossible or insufficient, they tend to seek alliances with other states to ensure their security.
When used for actual analysis, the assumptions of this model work as “antecedent conditions.” That is, the more a state can be shown to act as if it were, for example, a unitary actor prioritizing basic military security over other goals, the more the model's predictions should hold. If, however, such antecedent conditions are measurably absent, the model does not apply and should not be used for analysis, let alone projections into the future or policy recommendations.
The general assumptions and expectations of the realist model are largely congruent, and in many instances they are compatible with many (and probably the vast majority of) contemporary realist theories. The model fits all of the four criteria that Wohlforth has identified as characterizing most of realist thought: social groups rather than individuals as central actors (in our model, the state); groups pursuing narrow and potentially incompatible interests (military security); groups interacting in an anarchic environment; and groups whose interactions are frequently characterized by power politics.34
The model also shares basic assumptions that are common for the two most prominent forms of contemporary realist theorizing—structural realism (sometimes still called “neo-realism”) and neo-classical realism.35 The model is structural realist, closely aligning with the version proposed by Waltz,36 with the nowadays common adage of a weak rationality assumption, which serves to make more and more clear-cut predictions, especially on state behavior rather than just international outcomes.37 Nearly all of neoclassical realist theorizing explicitly builds on structural realism.38 Neoclassical realist accounts accept less parsimony than structural realism by adding further assumptions and variables in order to increase explanatory power over more confined domains.39
Realist Theory and Russian-Ukrainian-German Relations
As the following plausibility probes show, even the very basic model of realism-as-theory derived in the above section helps significantly to understand and explain key policy patterns in the Russian-Ukrainian-German relationship of the last three decades. Realism-as-theory also helps to uncover other “non-realist” causal factors at play by identifying mispredictions of the model as well as causal factors that the model does not account for.
For the probes, I apply congruence analysis40 on open-source data as well as on my own original research that includes fieldwork and personal interviews with relevant policymakers and experts in Moscow, Kyiv, Berlin, and Washington, dc, between 2018 and 2022. These interviewees all worked with people or sources that gave them insights into the policy formation processes of the parties involved. As the matters discussed are obviously sensitive, the interviewees requested and were granted anonymity and non-identifiability.
The triangular relations between Ukraine, Russia, and Germany have undergone major changes since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.41 Table 2 shows that Ukraine and Russia experienced two periods of non-violent conflict (1992–1996 and 2005–2009), with peaceful periods in between; violent conflict from 2014 onward; and all-out war since early 2022. Until tensions with Russia rose in 2014, Germany did not have significant conflicts with either country.
Leaders of, and Conflicts between, Ukraine, Russia, and Germany, 1992–2022
 |
NATO Paranoia and the Sources of Russian Conduct
The realist model provides a clear-cut explanation of why Soviet and Russian leaders—Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Putin, and Medvedev—have consistently opposed eastward nato expansion. In the model, states like Russia should generally seek to prevent military alignments between their weaker neighboring states and other great powers. This is for two reasons. First, if an external great power extended effective security assurances to the small neighbor, the neighboring great power would face significantly higher risks and costs in bringing an intransigent small neighbor to heel. Assuming that, due to interdependencies, the behavior of weaker neighbors could augment or diminish a powerful neighbor's overall strategic standing, the powerful neighbor has incentives to ensure it could easily coerce the weaker neighbor into compliance, if need be. Second, given a fully fledged alliance, the powerful ally could deploy its forces on the territory of the nearby ally to directly threaten the powerful neighbor. Assuming that the threat of military capabilities scales with access and proximity, this would represent a deterioration in security, giving the powerful neighbor strong incentives to prevent such an alignment.
As nato includes the world's pre-eminent military power, the United States, the model expects Russian leaders to have consistently opposed Ukrainian nato membership. Indeed, this was generally the case. Since the early 1990s, Russian leaders have continuously objected to nato enlargement in Eastern Europe. This was notably already the case under Yeltsin, arguably the most liberal and pro-Western president Russia has ever had.42 With the Russian state consolidating its unity and coercive power, opposition to nato grew as well. This was made abundantly clear during Putin's speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007.43
The model also helps to explain why Russia increasingly put coercive pressure on Ukraine when ties between Kyiv and Western powers strengthened. In the model, such strengthening ties signify a higher short-term risk of a full-blown alliance for Russia. This should increase Russian efforts to wedge these ties, including, if less costly and risky measures fail, by the use of force.44 This was largely the case. From the model's perspective, the declaration of the 2008 nato Bucharest summit that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members of nato” solidified the strategic threat of eventual Ukrainian membership.45 However, the West did not credibly commit to defending Ukraine should Russia enact aggression in the meantime. Russian risk acceptance did measurably increase between its invasion of Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the war in Donbass since 2014, and the full invasion of Ukraine in 2022—all conflicts in which the issue of the target country's relation to nato played an evident role.46
Some self-identifying realists have argued or implied that “realism” provides an encompassing and sufficient explanation of major acts of Russian military aggression in 2014 and 2022 (for these accounts, and criticisms of them, see the section on heuristics). The realist model used here is too broad in its assumptions and mechanisms to support such claims.
However, as outlined above, the model does expect that if Russia commits major resources into a conflict, there should be evidence that, in doing so, Russia is motivated at least in part by the desire to preserve its military standing vis-à-vis nato. There is indeed some evidence to back up these claims. Sources close to Putin and Russian military leaders of the Crimea operation attest that the decision to annex Crimea in 2014 was largely made to secure an ongoing presence of the Black Sea Fleet on Crimea.47 Various scholars have argued that Russia's decision to engage Ukraine in a semi-covert and semi-proxy war over Donbas was motivated by the desire to establish leverage over Ukraine and thereby avert eventual nato accession.48
Some evidence also suggests that Russian perceptions of strengthening Ukraine-nato ties contributed to the Russian decision to invade in February 2022. On 10 November 2021, the United States and Ukraine signed a Charter on Strategic Partnership. The Charter's stated purpose was to underscore a joint commitment to Ukrainian reforms “necessary for full integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions.”49 Also consistent with the model, Russia issued draft treaties in December 2021 demanding legally binding assurances that Ukraine would never become a nato member and that nato infrastructure would be withdrawn from Russia's borders.50 Nearly two years into the full-scale war, Putin continued to publicly claim that nato activity caused Russian aggression.51
Yet it is evident that Russian behavior was not solely driven by the military-strategic motives that the realist model ascribes to these processes. First, there is evidence suggesting that the motives of Russian leaders for opposing nato enlargement did not consistently follow a strategic logic that uniformly reacted to the behavior of other states, as the realist model would have it. After having briefly welcomed nato enlargement in return for a privileged Russian position vis-à-vis the United States, Yeltsin shifted policies, opposing enlargement, not so much because of strategic considerations, but to gain domestic legitimacy.52 Putin stands in contrast to Yeltsin. As Michael McFaul has pointed out, anti-nato sentiment increased drastically under Putin.53 As the main Russia person in the u.s. National Security Council since 2009, and as US Ambassador to Russia from 2012 to 2014, McFaul interacted with Putin personally, stating in personal conversations with the author in early 2022 that Putin's avowed dislike and fear of nato seemed genuine.
Second, there is also evidence that Russian actions in 2014 were driven by many factors that the realist model does not account for. For example, the 2014 events originated not in disputes over Ukraine's alignment with nato but rather with the eu. Some realist arguments on the 2014 Ukraine crisis posited that the eu's latent power and slowly increasing security actions would render eu-Ukrainian alignment a strategic threat to Russia.54 However, while various Russian policymakers and experts I interviewed see eu policy as obedient to American wishes, this hardly reflects realities,55 and the development of this perception is exogenous to the realist model.
Furthermore, the fear of a “color revolution” spilling over into Russia and threatening the regime seems to have been a major cause for Russia's aggression.56 In late 2011 and early 2012, the Russian regime had just faced the largest protests since the 1990s.57 A poll of Russian elites in 2016 found 75 percent stating that the Ukraine conflict had been caused by u.s. attempts to foment a color revolution in Ukraine.58 These threat perceptions are not part of the realist model, as they did not emerge from state capabilities, but rather from pre-existing beliefs, sub-state socio-political interlinkages, and regime dynamics on both sides.
Fourth, there are significant aspects of the 2022 invasion that the model cannot explain. This includes the apparent massive miscalculations of Ukrainian resolve and capabilities by the Kremlin as well as an underappreciation of how united and resolute a Western response would be.59 The aftermath of the 2022 attack saw more sanctions against Russia, more support for Ukraine, and solidifying anti-Kremlin sentiments and policies within nato and the eu. Russia's elite could have easily foreseen these reactions by observing Ukrainian and Western reactions to the 2014 events.60 Serious bureaucratic dysfunctionalities, irrationality, ideological heuristics, intelligence failures, and rising risk acceptance played an overt role here.61
Understanding Ukraine's Long-Term Quest for Security
The realist model helps to understand why Ukraine, from the moment of independence, tended to seek Western protection from Russia, and did so in part for overtly security-related reasons. From the model's perspective, the immense arsenal of the neighboring Russian state represented a constant potential threat to the militarily inferior Ukraine. As the socio-economic affairs of both countries have long been strongly interlinked, Ukraine had reasons to fear that Russia might use its formidable power to coerce concessions out of Ukraine. Hence, it would be advantageous for Ukraine to enjoy effective protection provided by other great powers, particularly those that did not have any reasonable cause to prey on Ukraine as Russia had.
Indeed, Ukraine sought external protection early on. Kyiv relinquished its share in the Soviet nuclear arsenal only when it received security assurances and significant economic support from the United States in the Budapest Memorandum of 1994. Ukraine first declared its goal to join nato under the supposedly pro-Russian president Leonid Kuchma in 2002. Especially since the mid-2000s, Ukraine pushed hard for nato accession.62
The realist model also helps to explain Kyiv's decisions in the face of Russia putting direct pressure on it. The model expects that the more Russian actions directly threaten Ukraine's security, the more Ukrainian leaders should presume that Russia has aggressive intentions. Consequently, Ukraine should double down on its bid for Western protection and refuse to give concessions to Russia so as not to weaken its current standing and open itself to follow-up demands.
Russia indeed threatened Ukraine prior to 2014. Ukraine's mid-2000s push for nato membership was preceded by extensive Russian interferences in the 2004–2005 Ukrainian presidential election campaigns,63 and correlated with major economic sanctions that Russia put on Ukraine.64
Congruent with the realist model, Ukraine did not acquiesce when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and started a semi-covert war in the Donbass region in 2014. Rather, Kyiv sought to take back Donbass and intensified its nato aspirations. Ukraine enacted a bill canceling its non-block status, and President Petro Poroshenko announced nato membership as a goal. The Ukrainian parliament made nato membership an official state goal in June 2017, and, correspondingly, amended the Ukrainian Constitution in 2019.
Ukraine's position also stiffened with the full invasion in February 2022. In March, amid intense fighting, but before news of Russian war atrocities had surfaced, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy offered Ukraine stopping its nato aspirations in exchange for a settlement with Russia, but only if it received solid guarantees of direct Western military support in case of renewed Russian aggression.65 Evidently, Ukrainian leaders hoped to enjoy security assurances akin to nato Article 5 provisions while simultaneously allaying Russian fears of forward nato troops and infrastructure.
While the realist model helps to understand some evident patterns and motives in Ukraine's foreign policy, it is, by itself, insufficient to accurately understand Ukraine's overall behavior. For example, shifts in Ukraine's domestic politics strongly influenced its foreign policy. Before 2014, Ukraine's nato aspirations were strongest starting in 2005, when the pro-Western Orange Coalition replaced the comparatively Russia-friendly Kuchma administration. Rather tellingly, Ukraine again shifted course massively, when, in 2010, Victor Yanukovych became president, quickly ending Ukraine's nato aspirations.66 As the military-strategic standing of Ukraine had remained unchanged, the realist model would not have expected these policy shifts.
Similarly, even a cursory comparison of Ukraine's nato policy with that of other states with similar structural incentives up until 2021 shows the crucial role that domestic politics and variations in socio-political ties to Russia play in determining foreign policy. While all of them were weak states neighboring Russia, the Baltics states sought and acquired nato membership early on, while Finland and Belarus did neither (for evidently different reasons).
The Drivers of German Ost-Politik
The realist model helps to explain why German foreign policy long privileged good relations with Russia over those with Ukraine. Provided that neither state poses a direct threat to Germany's security, the model expects Berlin to generally favor good relations with major economic and military powers over those with lesser capabilities. This is because more capabilities generally translate to a higher threat in case of bad relations, but more mutual benefit in case of good relations.
Indeed, Russia has long commanded more economic and military capabilities than Ukraine. Moreover, Russia has long had significant sway in global conflicts, whereas Ukraine has not. Russia's nuclear arsenal is formidable, and its conventional forces have significantly higher power projection capabilities than those of Ukraine.67 Lastly, Russia and Germany have traded extensively. For example, from 2013 to 2020, Germany alone made up 20 percent of Russian exports in natural gas.68 Of course, Ukraine also had some economic potential for Germany, especially as a source of cheap and skilled labor and as an emerging market. However, in 2021, the Russian share in Germany's overall trade volume exceeded that of Ukraine by a factor of more than seven.69
In line with the realist model, Germany's Russia policy, compared to that of other states, has long been characterized as particularly cordial, focusing on increased trade, minimizing conflict over third parties, and seeking to bind Russia into international institutions.70 This applies in particular to the period from the early 1990s to the early 2010s. At times, this policy was significantly more in line with Russian interests than with those of Ukraine. For example, Germany lobbied against granting Ukraine a nato Membership Action Plan at the 2008 Bucharest Summit.71
The realist model also goes a long way in explaining how and why Germany's views and policies toward Russia changed since the early 2010s, moving from an accommodating policy to a more confrontative one. The model expects that the more Russian capabilities and actions represent a potential or imminent threat to Germany's security, the more Germany should seek to diminish Russian power and freedom of action, which would include support for Ukrainian intransigence toward Russia. Of course, the model expects the mere existence of Russia's formidable armed forces to cause some strategic concern in Germany. However, Germany alone has long matched Russia on several key indicators of aggregate power,72 with nato further augmenting conventional and especially nuclear deterrence when it comes to Germany's own state security. Compared to the Cold War, Moscow's forces are weak and far away from Berlin. Thus, it can be inferred that the realist model would not expect Germany to completely give up cooperation with Russia, but to increasingly include elements of balancing when Russia acts aggressively toward states that are significant for German security interests.
Again, German behavior is roughly in line with the model. Indeed, before 2014, German foundational policy documents and expert assessments did not depict Russia as a major security problem.73 However, when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and started its semi-covert war in Donbas, German society and elites changed views on Russia, perceiving it more and more as a threat.74 While taking the lead on EU sanctions against Russia75 and sending troops to Lithuania to reassure the nato member by providing tripwire forces for deterrence, Germany likewise agreed in 2015 to the construction of Nord Stream 2.76 Germany was also a driving force behind bringing Ukraine and Russia to the negotiating table in the so-called Normandy Format, on the basis of the Minsk accords. As they allowed Russia to freeze in the conflict, these accords largely accommodated Russian interests and were intensely disliked by the Ukrainian side.77
However, there is also abundant evidence that German foreign policy toward Russia and Ukraine has not solely, or even mainly, been driven by the narrow strategic motives ascribed by the realist model. For example, Germany's self-perception as a civilian power goes some way in explaining its cooperative approach toward Russia before 2014 and the mixture of largely economic and diplomatic balancing with continued engagement between 2014 and 2021.78 Business lobbies have also long had had a crucial impact on Russo-German relations.79
Renowned realist scholar Stephen Walt has suggested that Germany's reluctant policy in the immediate run-up to the 2022 invasion represented a prudent and “realist” policy of restraint.80 In late 2021 and early 2022, Germany came under severe criticism for not joining other nato members in supplying Ukraine with arms and not explicitly threatening to cancel Nord Stream 2 in case of an invasion.81 Germany then undertook major policy shifts within a few days, cancelling Nord Stream 2, sending arms to Ukraine, and announcing major increases in defense spending. But this happened only when the Russian invasion was basically already under way.82
While, for Walt, German behavior represented a calculated policy of restraint by Berlin's elite to best safeguard the security of Germany and others, it has been established that, rather than by realist calculations and strategic planning in terms of state security and power, German decision-making had been messy, reactive, and largely driven by office-maintaining behavior of German elites, Allied pressure, and changing popular views within Germany.83
Realist Heuristics in Germany
A comprehensive survey of realist heuristics in Germany would require a book-length study. However, for our purposes, it suffices to exemplify some consequential examples of realist heuristics.
In the German-speaking sphere, arguably the most prominent self-declared realist arguments on the Russo-Ukrainian war have been put forward by Johannes Varwick, Professor for International Relations and European Policy at Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg. From the start of the full-scale Russian assault on Ukraine in February 2022 to February 2023, Varwick was among the top 10 expert invitees to German TV talk shows on prominent public channels.84 Making his case in writing, and referring back to his public statements on the conflict, Varwick penned an article titled “Is the Theoretical School of Realism Fit for Explaining the Russian War against Ukraine?” for sirius, a German-language scholarly journal for strategic analyses.85
While Varwick acknowledges realism's heterogeneity in this article, he nonetheless presents the “school of realism” as featuring consistent elements, predictions, and policy recommendations. For example, he affirmatively quotes a “realist creed” put forth by Robert Kaplan, a writer and journalist.86 Kaplan's creed includes five unspecified aphorisms, ranging from “Order Comes before Freedom” to “Not Every Problem Has a Solution.” Although clearly suggested, it is unclear if and how these propositions flow from realist theories, if and how they are uniquely tied to realist theories, and if and how they are even compatible with many realist theories.
Whether intended or not, Varwick's writing also evokes the sense that “realism” reflects learned and tested wisdom by practitioners, legitimizing it over other “theoretical schools.” For example, Varwick “states” that a “policy-proximate” (praxisnahe) variant of realism is popular among writers, journalists, and former practitioners. In support, he quotes short and vague statements imbued with realist tropes by German diplomat Rüdiger Lüdeking and Horst Teltschik, a former adviser to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Varwick also suggests that “realism” has many quiet friends in politics, quoting an uncorroborated proposition by Gerard Toal, that “few politicians articulate and robustly defend political realism in public … though many may hold [realist] views in private.”87
When it comes to explaining Russo-Ukrainian conflict dynamics, Varwick affirmatively quotes John J. Mearsheimer's arguments. Varwick claims that these arguments flow from the offensive realist theory Mearsheimer proposed in 2001.88 To be sure, Mearsheimer's writings on Russo-Ukrainian relations are full of realist tropes.89 However, contrary to Varwick's assertions, I am unaware of Mearsheimer ever making the claim that these arguments are directly and solely based on his own offensive realist theory.90 In this context, it is noteworthy that Mearsheimer has at various occasions applied his own theory explicitly to other contemporary political issues,91 and that he has, on other occasions, stressed that other factors can also strongly affect international politics or even supersede the mechanisms of his own theory.92
Furthermore, Mearsheimer's public assertions on Russia's aggressions against Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, rather than being based on one or more explicit causal theories, comprised many causal claims that were merely suggested or implied, used vague and loaded terms, and made some uncorroborated or provably false empirical claims.93 These assertions include the characterization of the February 2014 events in Kyiv as a “coup.”94
Varwick elaborates on Mearsheimer's claims on the drivers of Russo-Ukrainian relations, providing some additional data points. However, similar to Mearsheimer,95 Varwick definitely departs from Mearsheimer's arguments on offensive realism when introducing Russian perceptions as an explanation independent of material policies and facts.96
Turning to policy recommendations, Varwick (debatably) claims that Russia's demands in early 2022 had been rejected “completely” and argues that this should not have been done. Rather, the nato accession perspective for Ukraine, as issued in 2008, should have been revoked. Varwick also invokes realism to continue to call for a “Finlandization” of Ukraine, wherein both Ukraine and nato would cut ties completely. Varwick does not discuss whether and why nato would have conceivably pursued such a policy, and if such a policy would have actually pacified the conflict.97
This omission is particularly problematic, as realist theories provide a plethora of arguments that such a nato policy would have been unlikely to occur, let alone result in the desired consequences. For example, even the simple realist model developed above would expect nato members that are, like Ukraine, located close to Russia (and hence vulnerable to military aggression by Russia) to lobby hard for binding Russian resources in Ukraine and ensuring that nato agreements, be they on membership perspectives or common defense clauses, be adhered to. Seeing that nato decisions require unanimity, it is unclear why Varwick invokes realism to imply that this nato policy would have been feasible. Furthermore, unilaterally granting concessions in the face of military threats would require optimistic expectations about Russia being satisfied after successful blackmail, a rather blatant violation of Mearsheimer's own theoretical assumptions on the general pessimism with which states should engage matters of security policy that Varwick cited to explain the conflict to begin with.
Varwick does at some point acknowledge that Russia's aggression against Ukraine is evidently also driven by non-realist factors, naming “developments in domestic politics” and an increasingly imperialist and chauvinist ideology.98 However, he does not discuss if and how these findings qualify his own arguments on the conflict. Crucially, the realist case for “Finlandizing” Ukraine arguably assumes that Russian aggression stems mostly from concerns about Ukraine's nato affiliation. Remove the affiliation, the implied argument probably goes, and Russian aggression will subside.
Hence, Varwick proposes a policy recommendation, even though he elsewhere endorses views that put the assumptions of the recommendation's underlying arguments into question. A more explicitly theory-based discussion would have qualified, if not rejected, the case for “Finlandization,” as there is evidence that some of the antecedent conditions (in this case, the quest for military security ranking highest on the Kremlin's agenda) are not present or are only partially present.
Beyond the expert and scholarly community, realist heuristics are used by some people in Germany's political sphere. In a 2013 policy paper, Alexander Gauland, the soon-to-be leader of the far-right AfD party, called for a return to Bismarck's Reinsurance Policy toward Russia in the nineteenth century, invoking realist tropes by stating that Germany could be friends with another state “even if the latter's inner order does not align completely with [Germany's] own.”99
Moreover, right after the start of the invasion, on 27 February 2022, seven federal representatives of Die Linke (a German far-left party) voted against the delivery of German arms to Ukraine. In an accompanying statement, they attested “significant co-responsibility” for the war to “a policy in the last years, above all driven by the United States.” They stated that this had been predicted by George Kennan in 1997.100 Kennan had been the main architect of US containment strategy against the Soviet Union and is usually considered an eminent realist.
The Linke statement invoked the supposedly self-sufficient authority of Kennan, ignoring that his statement was made before Putin's ascension to power and the emergence of major pro-Western political movements in Ukraine. It also ignored that Kennan's loathing of socialism, support for a US-led order in Europe, and embrace of military means as a tool for statecraft would certainly have stood in sharp contradiction with the rest of the Linke letter.
On the Virtues of Theory and the Dangers of Heuristics
This article submits that theories trump heuristics when it comes to analyzing, forecasting, and proposing recommendations on politically salient issues. Theories can be realist or non-realist—just like heuristics. Hence, distinguishing theories from heuristics allows one to move beyond the largely unproductive dichotomies of “realism” versus other “schools of thought.” When specified as theory-based analysis, realism provides explicit causal mechanisms and scope conditions, yielding falsifiable hypotheses about past conduct and, if empirically vetted, informed expectations for future developments.101 This helps to identify politically salient processes, to understand their causes, and to reflect on the best policy instruments to engage them. Importantly, realism-as-theory helps to think beyond established and widespread narratives on relations between Russia, Ukraine, and Germany. While other aspects play a role as well, realist theories help to identify long-term skepticism among the Russian elite toward nato. They highlight that, next to Yeltsin's domestic considerations and Putin's personal convictions, there are likely also structural factors at play that transcend the individuals and regimes at the helm of Russia. This finding should inform any scenario on a post-Putin Russia and its relations with Ukraine and the West.
Furthermore, realist theories help to explain Ukrainian behavior, highlighting that, among other factors, genuine security concerns have driven Ukraine's increasingly pro-Western policy as well as its sharp and determined resistance toward Russian military aggression since 2014, and particularly since 2022. This should caution Western policymakers interested in helping Ukraine and fostering peace to expect major unilateral concessions from Ukraine toward Russia.
Lastly, realist theories help to ask critical questions of Germany's own conduct in the past. For example, while Germany provided some support to Ukraine after 2014, it also reinforced the construction of direct pipelines with Russia, decoupling the Russo-German energy transit from the eventuality of the Ukrainian transit being endangered by a future Russo-Ukrainian clash and increasingly negating a deterrent threat that had been at Ukraine's disposal. Considering current sentiments, it bears remembering that most Germans were against sanctioning the pipelines until right before the full invasion of 2022.102 German policymakers and scholars often referred to Germany's civilian security culture to explain these policies. Realist theories highlight that parts of this altruistic and dovish rhetoric and framing might be self-serving and obscure that some selfish and “strategic” motives are also at play.103
Conversely, as the example of realism shows, explicitly theoretical approaches also allow one to identify the limits and flaws of causal claims through conceptual critique and empirical tests. Furthermore, a theoretical lens helps to uncover the danger of heuristics in international relations, especially when it comes to explaining politically salient events in the past, forecasting future developments, or formulating policy advice on the basis of these assessments and forecasts. As illustrated with the critique of heuristic-based calls for “Finlandizing” Ukraine, the treatment of realism as theory helps to identify and avoid pitfalls like monocausal projection and mistaking assumptions as true rather than empirically contingent conditions for projections to actually play out.104
Indeed, analysis, forecasts, and policy advice regarding complex, ongoing political issues need to consider all potentially operative factors and careful considerations of how they might interact under the specific conditions at hand.105 Theory-based thinking helps these demanding tasks, while heuristics confound them.
While some heuristics are avoidable and should be replaced with more focused and transparent discourse, some uses of heuristics have legitimate, even necessary functions. For us as scholars, there is an unavoidable tension between our core business of theory-based research and the heuristics through which we communicate with non-specialist audiences. Scholars should make sure that the recommendations they give are ultimately grounded in proper theory and data and come with an explicit flagging of their respective level of certainty. Indeed, as the example of anticipating the Russian attack of 2022 exemplifies, such recommendations fare better than those grounded in simple heuristics.106
Consequently, it should become established practice to refer to actual studies on which one's intervention in public discourse is based.107 Scholars should also be ready to defend their recommendations in front of other scholars. This requires that scholars step out of their ivory towers to corroborate or critique public statements given by their peers.
Acknowledgments
For their suggestions, comments, and feedback, the author gives thanks to Payam Ghaledar, Jule v. Köhlerwald, Butter Greenbay, Stephen Szabo, Dan Hamilton, Matthew Specter, the SAIS research group on transatlantic relations, the Riesiko Colloquium at Goethe University Frankfurt, the anonymous reviewers for German Politics and Society, and the reviewers and panelists at the DVPW Thementagung in November 2022 in Hamburg. The author also thanks the editors of Zeitschrift für internationale Beziehungen (ZIB) and Nomos for permitting the publication of this article, which is an extended and upgraded version of a German-language article published in ZIB. Part of this research was made possible within the framework of the research project “Regional Research Center Transformations of Political Violence” (01UG2203A), funded by Germany's Federal Ministry of Education and Research.
Notes
Jonas J. Driedger and Mikhail Polianskii, “Utility-Based Predictions of Military Escalation: Why Experts Forecasted Russia Would Not Invade Ukraine,” Contemporary Security Policy 44, no. 4 (2023): 544–560. This article is partially based on Jonas J. Driedger, “Realismus als Theorie und Heuristik: Die ukrainisch-russisch-deutsche Dreiecksbeziehung seit 1992,” ZIB Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 30, no. 1 (2023): 85–108, https://doi.org/10.5771/0946-7165-2023-1-85.
Jonas J. Driedger, “Inertia and Reactiveness in Germany's Russia Policy: From the 2021 Federal Election to the Invasion of Ukraine in 2022,” German Politics and Society 40, no. 4 (2022): 135–151.
Jonas J. Driedger, “Did Germany Contribute to Deterrence Failure against Russia in Early 2022?,” Central European Journal of International and Security Studies 16, no. 3 (2022): 152–171, https://doi.org/10.51870/TLXC9266.
Cf. Roland Czada, “Realismus im Aufwind? Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik in der ‘Zeitenwende‘,” Leviathan 50, no. 2 (June 2, 2022): 216–238, https://doi.org/10.5771/0340-0425-2022-2-216; Johannes Varwick, “Taugt die realistische Theorieschule zur Erklärung des russischen Kriegs gegen die Ukraine?,” SIRIUS—Zeitschrift für Strategische Analysen 7, no. 1 (2023): 72–79, https://doi.org/10.1515/sirius-2023-1007.
Cf. John J. Mearsheimer, “John Mearsheimer on Why the West Is Principally Responsible for the Ukrainian Crisis,” Economist (25 March 2022), https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2022/03/11/john-mearsheimer-on-why-the-west-is-principally-responsible-for-the-ukrainian-crisis; Stephen M. Walt, “An International Relations Theory Guide to the War in Ukraine,” Foreign Policy (blog) (8 March 2022), https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/08/an-international-relations-theory-guide-to-ukraines-war/.
Deutschlandfunk.de, “ Wie verändert der Krieg die Nachkriegsordnung?” (28 February 2022), https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/wie-veraendert-der-krieg-die-nachkriegsordnung-herfried-muenkler-politikwissens-dlf-aa52b7e0-100.html.
Daniel Maliniak et al., “TRIP 2017 Faculty Survey,” TRIP {Teaching, Research, and International Policy) Project, Williamsburg, VA (Global Research Institute, 2017), https://trip.wm.edu/.
Dominik Jenne, Realität oder Ideologie? Implizite Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen in Schulbüchern für den Politik- und Geschichtsunterricht der Sekundarstufe (Opladen, 2017), 100–103.
Bernd Ladwig, “‘Realisten’ und Realisten: Eine Replik auf Roland Czada,” Leviathan 50, no. 3 (2022): 381–394, https://doi.org/10.5771/0340-0425-2022-3-381; Ulrich Schneckener, “Blendwerk und Blindstellen,” Politikum 8 (2022): 18–25; Michael Zürn, “Macht Putin den (Neo-)Realismus stark?,” Leviathan 50, no. 3 (2022): 395–412, https://doi.org/10.5771/0340-0425-2022-3-395. For examples in the Anglosphere, see Jan Dutkiewicz and Jan Smolenski, “Epistemic Superimposition: The War in Ukraine and the Poverty of Expertise in International Relations Theory,” Journal of International Relations and Development 26 (2023): 619–631, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-023-00314-1; Tereza Hendl, Olga Burlyuk, Mila O'Sullivan, and Aizada Arystanbek, “(En)Countering Epistemic Imperialism: A Critique of ‘Westsplaining’ and Coloniality in Dominant Debates on Russia's Invasion of Ukraine,” Contemporary Security Policy 45, no. 2 (2024): 171–209.
A similar argument was recently made by Thomas Diez and Andreas Hasenclever, “Raus aus den Silos!,” ZIB Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 31, no. 2 (2024): 15–45, https://doi.org/10.5771/0946-7165-2024-2-15.
Cf. Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, 1997), 1–48, esp. 9; John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “Leaving Theory Behind: Why Simplistic Hypothesis Testing Is Bad for International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 3 (2013): 427–457.
Philip E. Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know? Rev. ed. (Princeton, 2017); Driedger and Polianskii, “Utility-Based Predictions of Military Escalation.”
Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions,” Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 2 (2010): 411–431, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592710001179.
Cf. Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science; William C. Wohlforth, “Realism,” in Oxford Handbook of International Relations, ed. Duncan Snidal and Christian Reus-Smit (Oxford, 2008), 131–149; Mearsheimer and Walt, “Leaving Theory Behind”; Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics (Oxford, 2016).
See, for example, Bruce M. Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York, 2001).
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability,” Cognitive Psychology 5, no. 2 (1973): 207–232, https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9; Gerd Gigerenzer and Wolfgang Gaissmaier, “Heuristic Decision Making,” Annual Review of Psychology 62 (2011): 451–482.
Of course, heuristics can be specified and operationalized as causal theories. These theories can then be tested, but they are not heuristics anymore.
Brian C. Schmidt and Michael C. Williams, “The Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War: Neoconservatives Versus Realists,” Security Studies 17, no. 2 (2008): 191–220; Piki Ish-Shalom, Democratic Peace: A Political Biography (Ann Arbor, 2013); Chengxin Pan and Oliver Turner, “Neoconservatism as Discourse: Virtue, Power and US Foreign Policy,” European Journal of International Relations 23, no. 1 (2017): 74–96. Arguably, a good pre-Iraq invasion example of this is Michael McFaul, “The Liberty Doctrine,” Hoover Digest (30 July 2002), https://www.hoover.org/research/liberty-doctrine.
See, for example, Jonas J. Driedger, “Bilateral Defence and Security Cooperation despite Disintegration: Does the Brexit Process Divide the United Kingdom and Germany on Russia?,” European Journal of International Security 6, no. 1 (2021): 86–108.
Cf. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston, 1977).
Cf. Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, “Heuristic Decision Making.”
Jonathan Haslam, No Virtue Like Necessity: Realist Thought in International Relations since Machiavelli (New Haven, 2002).
See, for example, Ken Booth, ed., Realism and World Politics (London, 2011); Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge, 2000); Stefano Guzzini, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold (London, 1998); Haslam, No Virtue Like Necessity; Carlo Masala, “Realismus in den Internationalen Beziehungen,” in Handbuch Internationale Beziehungen, ed. Frank Sauer and Carlo Masala (Wiesbaden, 2017), 141–175; Matthew Specter, The Atlantic Realists: Empire and International Political Thought between Germany and the United States (Stanford, 2022); Wohlforth, “Realism.”
See, for example, J. Samuel Barkin, Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory (Cambridge, 2010).
Wohlforth, “Realism.”
See Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, 1991); Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, 1999).
See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 1st ed. (New York, 2001).
See Kevin Narizny, “On Systemic Paradigms and Domestic Politics: A Critique of the Newest Realism,” International Security 42, no. 2 (2017): 155–190; John A. Vasquez, “The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition,” American Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (1997): 899–912; Wohlforth, “Realism.”
For example, see Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age (Ithaca, 2020); Sebastian Rosato, Intentions in Great Power Politics: Uncertainty and the Roots of Conflict (New Haven, 2021); Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, Rising Titans, Falling Giants: How Great Powers Exploit Power Shifts (Ithaca, 2018).
Brian C. Rathbun, “Uncertain about Uncertainty: Understanding the Multiple Meanings of a Crucial Concept in International Relations Theory,” International Studies Quarterly 51, no. 3 (2007): 533–557; Rosato, Intentions in Great Power Politics.
These “informed guesses” are often referred to as “costly signals.” Cf. Vesna Danilovic, “The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 3 (2001): 341–369.
This is a presumption of “thin” rationality. See Frank C. Zagare, “Rationality and Deterrence,” World Politics 42, no. 2 (1990): 238–260.
Cf. Joseph M. Parent and Sebastian Rosato, “Balancing in Neorealism,” International Security 40, no. 2 (2015): 51–86.
See “Wohlforth, “Realism.”
Ibid.; Ripsman et al., Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics. Usually, classical realism is also named as a basic category of realist thought. However, classical realism either predates modern social science theorizing on international relations (e.g., Machiavelli), deliberately eschews it (like the work of Jonathan Kirshner), or has midwifed it (like Hans J. Morgenthau); cf. Haslam, No Virtue like Necessity. Classical realism still serves to inspire theory building. See, for example, Sten Rynning and Jens Ringsmose, “Why Are Revisionist States Revisionist? Reviving Classical Realism as an Approach to Understanding International Change,” International Politics 45 (2008): 19–39.
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, 1979).
Cf. Colin Elman, “Horses for Courses: Why nor Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?,” Security Studies 6, no. 1 (1996): 7–53; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics; Ripsman et al., Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics.
See, for example, Ripsman et al., Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics.
For example, Randall L. Schweller, “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism,” in Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, ed. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge, MA, 2003), 311–347; Ripsman et al., Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics.
Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, Causal Case Study Methods: Foundations and Guidelines for Comparing, Matching, and Tracing (Ann Arbor, 2016), 280–292.
Cf. Jonas J. Driedger, “Conflict between Russia and Its Neighbors since 1992: The Cases of Belarus and Ukraine,” UPTAKE Working Paper 10 (2018), https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/69112.
Sergey Radchenko, “‘Nothing but Humiliation for Russia’: Moscow and NATO's Eastern Enlargement, 1993–1995,” Journal of Strategic Studies 43, no. 6–7 (2020): 769–815.
Vladimir V. Putin, “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy” (10 February 2007), Munich, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034.
Cf. Elias Götz, “Neorealism and Russia's Ukraine Policy, 1991–Present,” Contemporary Politics 22, no. 3 (2016): 301–323.
NATO press release (2008), “Bucharest Summit Declaration—Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_8443.htm.
Cf. Jonas J. Driedger, “Risk Acceptance and Offensive War: The Case of Russia under the Putin Regime,” Contemporary Security Policy 44, no. 2 (2023): 199–225.
Daniel Treisman, “Why Putin Took Crimea: The Gambler in the Kremlin,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 3 (2016): 47–54, here 49–50, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-04-18/why-russian-president-putin-took-crimea-from-ukraine.
See, for example, Roy Allison, “Russian ‘Deniable’ Intervention in Ukraine: How and Why Russia Broke the Rules,” International Affairs 90, no. 6 (2014): 1255–1297, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12170.
Antony J. Blinken and Dmytro Kuleba, “U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership” United States Department of State (10 November 2021), para. 2, https://www.state.gov/u-s-ukraine-charter-on-strategic-partnership/.
Russian Federation, “Agreement on Measures to Ensure the Security of The Russian Federation and Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” (17 December 2021), https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790803/?lang=en; Russian Federation, “Treaty between The United States of America and the Russian Federation on Security Guarantees” (17 December 2021), https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790818/?lang=en.
Russian Federation, “Results of the Year with Vladimir Putin” (15 December 2023), http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/72994.
Radchenko, “‘Nothing but Humiliation for Russia.’”
Michael McFaul, “Putin, Putinism, and the Domestic Determinants of Russian Foreign Policy,” International Security 45, no. 2 (2020): 95–139.
Götz, “Neorealism and Russia's Ukraine Policy,” 313–314.
Cf. Jonas J. Driedger, “The Stopping Power of Sources: Implied Causal Mechanisms and Historical Interpretations in (Mearsheimer's) Arguments on the Russo-Ukrainian War,” Analyse & Kritik: Journal of Philosophy and Social Theory 45, no. 1 (2023): 137–155.
Allison, “Russian ‘Deniable’ Intervention in Ukraine.”
Ibid., 1289.
Sharon W. Rivera, James Bryan, Brisa Camacho-Lovell, et al., “Perspectives on Foreign and Domestic Policy: 2016 Hamilton College Levitt Poll,” Arthur Levitt Public Affairs Center, Hamilton College (Clinton, 2016), 7, 12, 20, https://www.hamilton.edu/news/polls/2016-russian-elite.
Driedger and Polianskii, “Utility-Based Predictions of Military Escalation.”
Driedger, “Bilateral Defence and Security Cooperation”; Jonas J. Driedger and Ulrich Krotz, “Preference Constellations in EU-Russian Crisis Bargaining over Syria and Ukraine,” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 62, no. 2 (2024): 487–507.
Cf. Driedger, “Risk Acceptance and Offensive War”; Driedger and Polianskii, “Utility-Based Predictions of Military Escalation”; Elias Götz and Jørgen Staun, “Why Russia Attacked Ukraine: Strategic Culture and Radicalized Narratives,” Contemporary Security Policy 43, no. 3 (2022): 482–497.
Driedger, “Conflict between Russia and Its Neighbors,” 18–19.
Jonas J. Driedger, “Russian Active Measures against Ukraine (2004) and Estonia (2007),” in Russian Active Measures—Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow, ed. Olga Bertelsen (Stuttgart, 2021), 177–213.
Driedger, “The Stopping Power of Sources,” 141–142.
See more in “Mixed Signals from Ukraine's President and His Aides Leave West Confused about His Endgame” (18 March 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/03/18/russia-ukraine-peace-negotiations/.
Andrew Wilson, The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation, 4th ed. (New Haven, 2015).
Katarzyna Zysk, “Russia,” in The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces, ed. Hugo Meijer and Marco Wyss (Oxford, 2018, online ed.), 88–106, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198790501.003.0005.
Kirsten Westphal, “German-Russian Gas Relations in Face of the Energy Transition,” Russian Journal of Economics 6, no. 4 (2020): 418, https://doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.6.55478.
See more details in Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz, “Fakten zum deutschen Außenhandel” (2021), https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Aussenwirtschaft/20240813-faktehttps://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Aussenwirtschaft/20240813-fakten-zum-deutschen-aussenhandel-2024.html.
Driedger, “Bilateral Defence and Security Cooperation,” 98–99; Stephen F. Szabo, Germany, Russia, and the Rise of Geo-Economics (London, 2015).
Tuomas Forsberg, “From Ostpolitik to ‘Frostpolitik’? Merkel, Putin and German Foreign Policy towards Russia,” International Affairs 92, no. 1 (2016): 21–42, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12505.
Driedger, “Bilateral Defence and Security Cooperation,” 97; Driedger and Krotz, “Preference Constellations,” 4.
Driedger, “Bilateral Defence and Security Cooperation,” 96.
Ibid., 99–101.
Driedger and Krotz, “Preference Constellations.”
Driedger, “Bilateral Defence and Security Cooperation,” 100–105.
Kristian Åtland, “Destined for Deadlock? Russia, Ukraine, and the Unfulfilled Minsk Agreements,” Post-Soviet Affairs 36, no. 2 (2020): 122–139, https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2020.1720443.
See, for example, Jakub Eberle and Vladimír Handl, “Ontological Security, Civilian Power, and German Foreign Policy toward Russia,” Foreign Policy Analysis 16, no. 1 (2020): 41–58, https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/ory012; Hanns W. Maull, “Reflective, Hegemonic, Geo-economic, Civilian …? The Puzzle of German Power,” German Politics 27, no. 4 (2018): 460–478. However, see Payam Ghalehdar, “Zivilmacht Deutschland? Eine Neubewertung der Zivilmachtforschung,” ZIB Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 30, no. 1 (2023): 67–84, https://doi.org/10.5771/0946-7165-2023-1-67.
Szabo, Germany, Russia, and the Rise of Geo-Economics.
See Stephen M. Walt, “The Gold Medal for Foreign Policy Goes to Germany,” Foreign Policy (blog) (7 February 2022), https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/07/the-gold-medal-for-foreign-policy-goes-to-germany/.
Driedger, “Did Germany Contribute to Deterrence Failure against Russia?”
Driedger, “Inertia and Reactiveness in Germany's Russia Policy.”
Ibid.
Marcus Welsch, “Russlands Aggression gegenüber der Ukraine in den deutschen Talkshows 2013–2023: Eine empirische Analyse der Studiogäste,” Ukraine-Analysen, no. 289 (2023): 18, https://doi.org/10.31205/UA.289.02. Carlo Masala, a prominent proponent of realist theory, was also often featured but did not tie his own arguments explicitly to realist thought.
Varwick, “Taugt die realistische Theorieschule zur Erklärung des russischen Kriegs gegen die Ukraine?”
Robert Kaplan, “The Realist Creed” (blog) (19 November 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2014/11/25/the-realist-creed/.
Varwick, “Taugt die realistische Theorieschule zur Erklärung des russischen Kriegs gegen die Ukraine?,” 73.
Ibid., 73–74.
Driedger, “The Stopping Power of Sources,” 138–139.
On this, see also Harald Edinger, “Offensive Ideas: Structural Realism, Classical Realism and Putin's War on Ukraine,” International Affairs 98, no. 6 (2022): 1873–1893, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac217.
See John J. Mearsheimer, “Can China Rise Peacefully?,” National Interest (25 October 2014), http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204.
Cf. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York, 2007); John J. Mearsheimer, Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (New Haven, 2018); John J. Mearsheimer, “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order,” International Security 43, no. 4 (2019): 7–50.
For an extensive critique, see Driedger, “The Stopping Power of Sources.”
John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault,” Foreign Affairs (18 August 2014), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault; Mearsheimer, “John Mearsheimer on Why the West Is Principally Responsible for the Ukrainian Crisis.”
Driedger, “The Stopping Power of Sources,” 151.
Varwick, “Taugt die realistische Theorieschule zur Erklärung des russischen Kriegs gegen die Ukraine?,” 74.
Ibid., 76.
Ibid., 78–79.
See Alexander Gauland, “Thesenpapier Außenpolitik ” (10 September 2013), https://web.archive.org/web/20140706142931/http://www.alternativefuer.de/thesenpapier-aussenpolitik/.
Sahra Wagenknecht, Sevim Dagdelen, Sören Pellmenn, et al., “Erklärung zur Abstimmung über den Ukraine-Antrag von SPD/CDU/CSU, Bündnis 90/DIE GRÜNEN und FDP am 27.02.2022” (27 February 2022), https://www.sahra-wagenknecht.de/de/article/3154.erklärung-zur-abstimmung-über-den-ukraine-antrag-von-spd-cdu-csu-bündnis-90-die.html.
Cf. Driedger and Polianskii, “Utility-Based Predictions of Military Escalation.”
Driedger, “Inertia and Reactiveness in Germany's Russia Policy,” 140, 144.
Compare, for instance, with Ghalehdar, “Zivilmacht Deutschland? Eine Neubewertung der Zivilmachtforschung.”
Hendl et al., “(En)Countering Epistemic Imperialism”; Dutkiewicz and Smolenski, “Epistemic Superimposition.”
Cf. Driedger and Polianskii, “Utility-Based Predictions of Military Escalation”; Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment; Beach and Pedersen, Causal Case Study Methods, 275–278, 308–313, 335; Sil and Katzenstein, “Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics.”
Driedger and Polianskii, “Utility-Based Predictions of Military Escalation.”
Cf. Jonas J. Driedger, “How Putin's Increasingly Risky Decisions Shape Russia's Wars,” Contemporary Security Policy (blog) (12 January 2023), http://contemporarysecuritypolicy.org/how-putins-increasingly-risky-decisions-shape-russias-wars/; based on Driedger, “Risk Acceptance and Offensive War.”