“Where Do We Find the Onset of the Wrong Twist?”

The roots of the specific radical deployment of the dichotomy between humans and nature is to be found in the Western Enlightenment. This era entailed the dawn of many revolutionary changes in all societal realms, among others the development of positivist science and technology. Holistic and relational paradigms were gradually pushed aside and taken over by paradigms in which the dichotomy between humans and the world around them played a decisive role. This particularly holds true for a specific paradigm that would later be called “utilitarian.”

The great philosopher, mathematician, and scientist René Descartes (1596–1690), a protagonist of the Enlightenment, profoundly influenced the modern understanding of rationality (Israel 2023a). In his ontological philosophy, a radical dichotomy was conceptualized between two essential “substances” of being: “res cogitans” (lit. “thinking thing”) and “res extensa” (lit. “extended thing”. “Deus” (God) remained the supernatural creator and orchestrator of all reality. This Cartesian so-called “subject–object dichotomy” refers to the ontological disconnection between the thinking humans and the rest of the world, that in our terminology is living and nonliving “nature”. Descartes, from his twofold ontology, developed specific epistemological propositions. Only the rationally thinking human would be able to fathom the workings of the rest of the world. By means of this special ability, they would be enabled to effectively intervene in their surroundings. Understanding the world could be achieved by means of applying mathematical equations as epistemological instrumentation. These views have been the seedbed of anthropocentrism; with this, the subsequent evolution of the natural sciences and related technologies became possible. Beyond the scientific-technological realm, the radical subject–object dichotomy has also become a constitutive, all-permeating point of reference in modern rational orientations. This has had far-reaching consequences in the socioeconomic, sociocultural, and sociopolitical realms. Not least, these consequences have reached into today's key socioecological questions, including the best way to create a “rightful place for nature.”

Questioning the Dichotomy

The (epistemological) unthinkability and (ontological) impossibility of Descartes's radical dichotomy, since it first saw the light of the day, has been a major theme of both philosophical and scientific argument. Take, for instance, the view of Arthur Schopenhauer:

Therefore, the world as representation, in which aspect alone we are here considering it, has two essential, necessary, and inseparable halves. The one half is the object, whose forms are space and time, and through this plurality of forms emerges. But the other half, the subject, does not lie in space and time, for it is whole and undivided in every representing being. Hence, a single one of these beings with the object completes the world as representation, just as fully as do the millions that exist. And if that single one subject were to disappear, then the world as representation would no longer exist. Therefore, these halves are inseparable even in thought, for each of the two has meaning and existence only through and for the other; each exists with the other and vanishes with it. They limit each other immediately; where the object begins, the subject ceases. The common or reciprocal nature of this limitation is seen in the very fact that the essential, and hence universal forms of every object, namely space, time and causality, reside a priori in our consciousness. (Schopenhauer [1819] 1969: 5–6).

Schopenhauer acknowledges the dichotomy between subject and object, although he is not radical in his interpretation. He emphasizes that the subject cannot do without the object, and vice versa. In saying so, he keeps insisting on the separation of the two. The suggestion is that mutual dependency does not mean that interrelated entities can exist as an insoluble unit. Knowing something is determined by the bridge that needs to be established between the subject and the object in question. It also means that the superiority of one over the other is not possible without entering a state of affliction. In utilitarian relationships, the bridge is shaped by establishing a “user-being-used relationship.” When a subject is able and legitimized to utilize the object solely to its own ends, it perceives itself as superior. What is then the nature of any assumed superiority? Can it ontologically be made plausible? Or is it disputable and only to be justified from specific normative views?

Spinoza's Views

In the following, Baruch Spinoza's (1632–1677) ontological thoughts are taken from Stefan Bollman's eloquent writings about Goethe, and they express a quite different perspective on the ontology of the relationship between humans and nature:

According to Spinoza, every existing thing is part of a whole, which is itself part of a still greater whole, and everything is contained in the greatest whole to be assumed, in God or Nature (“Deus sive Natura”). However, every existing thing is also something for itself, something that organizes itself in relation to the external on which it depends. In ethics, Spinoza uses the term “conatus” ( = striving to persist in its being) to define this selfhood of each individual. This also applies to man: although he is not a state within a state, as Spinoza polemically states, he is, like the stones, the plants, and the animals, part of the all-encompassing nature. In other words, no special provisions apply to him but the general laws of nature. His behavior, like all natural phenomena, follows the laws of causality, knowledge of which is sufficient to understand it. Nevertheless, man, like the worm, is not absorbed in being part of a larger whole that encompasses and conditions him. Rather, he has power of action (man gradually more than the worm) that enables him to maintain himself. In the striving of each individual to assert himself and to shape his own world, the second side of Spinoza's nature is revealed: it is not only lawful, but also creative. The greater the individual's degree of freedom, the greater his “circle of efficacy,” as Goethe calls it in his Supplements to Lavater's Physiognomy. (Bollmann 2021: 163; our translation)

Although in the beginning of his scholarly development he leaned on Descartes's thoughts, Baruch Spinoza gradually distanced himself from his contemporary. Stepping back from Descartes's dichotomy, in his Ethica (published, after his death, in 1677) he presents a radically different ontology of humans and all other modes of existence in the universe (Israel 2023a: 409–439). Humans are not an ontologically separate part of the whole of reality (“all there is”). Instead, they should be seen as a thoroughly integrated part of this whole. Quite distinct from the meaning of the notion of “nature” (expressing the radicality of the Cartesian disconnection), he refers to “all there is” and “all that works” as “Natura” (“Natura naturata” and “Natura naturans”). God no longer is seen as a supranatural essence. In his view, God is “all there is” (“Deus sive Natura”). The universal laws, which regulate the workings of “Natura”—in accordance with the state of the art of science at that time—concern relationships of causality. Conscious humans may possess “extras” compared to a worm, but “au fond” they cannot be seen as distinct from Natura and its universal laws. Spinoza's views regarding “Natura”—as we shall see below—come remarkably close to today's fundamental theories of physics. Spinoza's thoughts regarding the speciality of humans’ position in “Natura” are connected with ethical views regarding their special role in evolution (Israel 2023b). Extras such as rationality, virtuousness, freedom, creativity, and responsiveness, provide humans with particular abilities and responsibilities to engage in and shape personal lives, the development of societies, as well as their relationship with nature.

Scientific Refutation of the Dichotomy

The Cartesian subject–object dichotomy serves as an epistemological point of departure in positivist science. Another epistemological and ontological essential has long been the presumption of the ultimate “knowability” of reality as “objectivity.” However, it is precisely these two fundamental assumptions that appear to be most questionable. In fundamental physics, especially in quantum mechanics, it is fully accepted that the nature of what is discovered in reality depends on the nature of the applied epistemological approaches (e.g., methodologies, mathematics). Moreover, physical science is increasingly confronted with findings demonstrating that on a fundamental level not everything in reality can be explained, proven, and/or predicted. At the ultimate micro-level (of bits and qubits), it is even uncertain what the true nature of things is. The acknowledgment of objective states of reality is replaced by the acknowledgment of chance, uncertainty, and permanent change. The thinkability of an ultimate mathematically logical system has been undermined by the brilliant mathematician Kurt Gödel ([1962] 1992). By deploying strict logic, he demonstrates that the validity of any mathematical design, because of insurmountable problems of self-referentiality, can only be proven by an external alternative mathematical system. This implies an infinite quest for validity, thus demonstrating the impossibility of finding the absolute truth. All this has culminated in the conclusion that reality cannot be conceived as “objectivity,” that is, something that is knowable. The radical divide between the (human) subject and an (unchangeable) objective reality is not tenable. Applied designs, methodologies, and other research conditions, chosen and applied by researchers, co-determine the content of theories.

Meaningful Notions of Coexistence

Both in philosophical and in human and natural scientific discourse, the dialectical nature and the special role of humans in the dynamics and evolution of all reality has been the subject of ample discussion. Leo Kofler eloquently pictures the dialectical relationship between humans (“subjects”) and the rest of the world (“objects”):

The theory of the subject–object relationship can be summarized as follows: in his actions, the human individual (the subject) “produces” actions and relationships directed toward the achievement of concrete goals, which in their totality condense into an ordered system (object), which in turn confronts the human being as a system of conditions (subject) and determines him in his actions (whereby the human being in turn becomes an object). The objective character of “environment,” which is “produced” by man himself, thus becomes subjective in turn by degrading man to an object—but at the same time setting him new tasks and stimulating him to new activity that changes the circumstances—and to activity as a subject. The concrete content of this relationship (identity of the subjective and the objective) depends on the concrete character of social development itself. (Kofler 1954–1955: 44–45; our translation)

Elisabeth Weydt (2023) presents additional interesting notions of coexistence founded in the dialectical nature of the existence of humans and nature. Talking about nature as something that needs help from us to stay intact already expresses a “meaningful” quality in the relationship with it. The question is whether nature really needs help from humans, or whether humans are in need of help from nature. She interestingly adds that any kind of mutual dependency implies the acknowledgment of a mode of “equality.” We cannot and must not speak of the “right to exist” but only of the “right to coexist.” By introducing the concept of “right” into thinking about modes of coexistence, she makes an interesting turn toward “ethics.” She posits that the “meaningful,” as a subjective and normative human given, evolves in processes in the space between two opposites. By positioning and interpreting “meaning” in this way, she articulates how ethical forces become involved in dialectical processes. Both Koffler's and Weydt's interpretations implicitly target the point that the mutual dependency, involving human existence, cannot at all be detached from ethical questions. This holds true, even if they look at different subject matter: Kofler looks at subject–object relationships, whereas Weydt is concerned with the quality of the relationship between humans and nature, presupposing the duality of both parties.

Evolutionary Thermodynamics and Social Quality Theory

In a study by Jaap Westbroek and colleagues, the similarity of evolutionary and developmental processes in human existence and nature were explored (Westbroek et al. 2020). The first part on physical theory was inspired by Spinozian comprehensive philosophy regarding the wholeness of “Natura.” In the first section of the study, from a natural scientific perspective, evolutionary thermodynamics (ET) is identified, conceptualized, and explained as an ontological principle through which the dynamics and evolution of nature evolve. The ET conceptualization—in a nutshell—states that entities in nature exist and are able to evolve to higher levels of order because they find forms of coexistence with other entities to which they constructively relate. Through such relational processes, higher forms of order can be materialized. The driving force that keeps these evolutionary dynamics going is entropy. Entropy refers to the immanent fundamental tendency in reality to transit from states of heterogeneity (order) into states of homogeneity (disorder). Being subjugated to maximum entropy is to dissolve into chaos. Through the creation of heterogeneity (form, order, information), there is a possibility to escape the immanent threat of entropy maximization. This ontological designation of ET indicates that the evolution of Natura is only possible through dialectical relationships. Without coexistence, single entities (be it molecules, living organisms, humans, or societies) are not thinkable and cannot evolve into higher states of order. If they do not coexist in processes of creating order, they are doomed to vanish into entropic maximization (disorder, chaos).

In the second part of the study, the evolutionary nature of ET is extended to the realm of human existence. Social quality theory is referred to as an interesting architecture of ontological and epistemological frameworks to explain and analyze personal and societal developmental processes in similar dialectical ways (Nijhuis and Van der Maesen 2021). “The social,” being the ontological foundation of the theory, is conceptualized as “the dialectic between processes of human self-realization and the formation of collective identities” (IASQ 2020). The theory holds a certain affinity with the ontology of “historical dialectical materialism” (Herrmann et al. 2012). Unlike Marxist ontology, viewing the evolution of human existence as the outcome of dialectical processes between societal contradictions, the “individual” and “societal configurations” are conceived as the two dialectical poles, carrying equal weight in developmental and evolutionary processes of human existence. The overarching point of orientation concerns the dialectical processes determining the social quality of the circumstances of daily human life. In the analytical framework, processes between three sets of factors (objective/conditional, subjective/constitutive, and normative/ethical) are constitutive for a specific degree of social quality. Through the so-called “procedural framework,” influences from four societal dimensions (sociopolitical/legal, socioeconomic/financial, and sociocultural/welfare, and socioenvironmental/ecological) come into play. These codetermine processes and outcomes in terms of social quality.

Currently, many interesting extensions into the realm of to the relationships between humans and nature are being elaborated. In IASQ Working Paper 11, the particular importance of “overall sustainability” transcending the limitations of “environmental sustainability” is clarified (IASQ 2012). The conditional factor of “eco-reality” represents the ecological workings of the physical and biological environment. “Eco-consciousness and eco-equilibrium” are referred to as normative orientations to socioecological questions. The overarching concept of overall sustainability reaches significantly beyond the environmental/ecological dimension. Political/legal, economic/financial, and cultural/welfare processes are included as co-decisive societal forces. Deployed in an orchestrated way, the social quality frameworks comprehensively cover a wide scope of processes between persons and (societal and ecological) conditions, as well as the influences from diverse societal realms. With its architecture, the theory facilitates a thorough and comprehensive understanding and analysis of the full-scope workings of socioenvironmental/ecological complexities.

Bridging the Gap between Physics and Human Science

We, in line with the conclusions of this article, argue that ET and social quality theory demonstrate the similarity of ontological/epistemological foundations of the natural and human sciences. The establishment of a common ontological denominator could—by bridging the existing paradigmatic gap—facilitate the cooperation between these scientific realms, which as we argued is needed for comprehensive analyses and understandings of and approaches to socioecological complexities. The unification of natural and human scientific approaches would be fully in the spirit of Spinozian views on Natura. In his Ethica, Spinoza provides further leads for interpreting the workings between human beings and natural reality (Spinoza [1678] 1938; see also Israel 2023b).

What we have called “human extras”—for example, rationality, virtuousness, freedom, creativity, feelings of responsibility, and agency—constitute special driving forces, determining our interaction with nature. Herewith, human ethical values have been located as a central part of the dynamics of the evolution of “Natura” as a whole. The quality of intersubjective discursive societal processes and relationships, in which configurations of values evolve, are thus part of the agenda. Along this path, the importance of relationality is shown to be deeply meaningful for both humans and nature.

The “Eclipse of Reason”

Max Horkheimer argues (1947) that, in modernity, rationality, as a configuration of human orientations, has largely been reduced to an instrument for achieving practical goals set by specific agencies, rather than a means of understanding objective truth. He contends that this “eclipse of reason” has led to the rise of authoritarianism as well as to the dominance of a manipulative “economic and culture industry” that serves the interests of those in power. This implies that both “knowing” itself and the evolvement of orientations to “act” are deployed to serve the interests of particular groups in society. He asserts that, to counter this trend, it is necessary to develop a critical, substance-oriented form of reason that is grounded in a commitment to human needs, emancipation, and the pursuit of a more just society. He refers to the overestimation of the “instrumental” subject–object relationship and the decisive role of those in power as follows:

Self-interest, on which certain theories of natural law and hedonistic philosophies have tried to place primary emphasis, was held to be only one such insight, regarded as rooted in the objective structure of the universe and thus forming a part in the whole system of categories. In the industrial age, the idea of self-interest gradually gained the upper hand and finally suppressed the other motives considered fundamental to the functioning of society; this attitude dominated in the leading schools of thought and, during the liberalistic period, in the public mind. (Horkheimer 1947: 14)

Later he notes: “The more ideas have become automatic and instrumentalized, the less does anybody see in them thoughts with a meaning of their own. They are considered things, machines. Language has been reduced to just another tool in the gigantic apparatus of production in modern society” (Horkheimer 1947: 15–16).

Furthermore, Karl Polanyi (1944), referring to the economics of the Industrial Revolution, seems to point out that modern economic systems are shaped by the “eclipse of reason.” Like Horkheimer, he states that society as a whole does not have any control anymore over the nature and direction of the economic developmental processes: “Nineteenth century civilization alone was economic in a different and distinctive sense, for it chose to base itself on a motive only rarely acknowledged as valid in the history of human societies, and certainly never before raised to the level of a justification of action and behavior in everyday life, namely, gain. The self-regulating market system was uniquely derived from this principle” (Polanyi 1944: 30). Polanyi did not articulate that modern economic systems are also “denaturalized,” meaning that they have become completely disconnected from the real needs of daily circumstances in human life. However, he implicitly talks about the increasing “denaturalization” of the economy. Societal development is largely led by orientations on “economic benefit,” “capital accumulation,” and “short-term profit” (Polanyi 1944). In the modern, capitalistically oriented politico-economic paradigm, desocialization and denaturalization have become self-evident, veiled behind self-referential processes that radically claim that what is done is right. To serve the ends of those in power, modes of democratic governance are increasingly colonized by the incorporation of kinds of private governance. All this is justified and accepted in Horkheimer's carefully orchestrated “culture industry.” Maybe in addition to referring to denaturalization, we should also speak of the colonialization of society and nature by the instrumental rationality of powerful political-economic complexes.

A Case from the Netherlands

The impacts of the “eclipse of reason” recently came to light in the so-called “Childcare Benefits Scandal” in the Netherlands, which in 2021 led to the resignation of the Dutch government. Between 2005 and 2019, governmental authorities wrongly accused an estimated 26,000 parents of making fraudulent benefit child benefits claims (Henley 2021). They were required to pay back the entire amount of the allowances they had received. In many cases, the imposed fine amounted to tens of thousands of euros, driving families into severe financial and personal hardship. The tax administration systems underlying the accusations were largely based on algorithms. These digital systems were in all respects de-relationalized, decontextualized, and dehumanized references. Investigators described the procedures of the AI administrations as “discriminatory” against parents with foreign backgrounds as well as filled with “institutional bias.” At the end of the day, the overall judgment in the public realm (including Dutch politics), as well as the outcomes of jurisprudential lawsuits, ruled that fundamental principles of the rule of law had been violated. Until today, compensation payments have not been effectuated because administrators and politicians are not able to act beyond the limits of digital administrative systems that have been politically and technologically cast in iron. Such administrative and regulative systems originally were meant to be mere auxiliaries to enhance and do justice to labor and welfare policies and objectives. Through tendencies related to the “eclipse of reason,” strongly enhanced by the created untamable power of sociotechnological complexes (AI), they have become dehumanized. In internal bureaucratic self-referential processes, its “existence in its own right” for long periods was sustained.

Instrumental and Communicative Rationality

Jürgen Habermas ([1984] 1981; [1987] 1981) in his theory of communicative action offers an interesting perspective on the nature and impacts of specific qualities of relationality. This sociological framework is thoroughly “relational.” It focuses on the deployment of “action-oriented” orientations of subjects in discursive societal processes in public space. Particularly, the distinction of “instrumental” and “communicative” rationality may illuminate our concerns with the exploitative approaches of modern humans to nature. “Rationality” is elaborated as a “relational” concept in which reason, reasonability, discursive argumentation, and (the symmetry of) human relationships constitute cornerstones (see also Broome 2021). It is connected with allowed opportunities and abilities to provide and accept good reasons for objective, normative, and subjective claims concerning choices about subsequent human action. Meaning, values, principles, legitimacy, agency, and action are to a large extent borne by the quality of communicative processes between participating actors.

“Instrumental rationality” refers to the use of reason in order to achieve specific goals, which are set by specific actors and which primarily serve the interests of these specific actors. Basically, this rationality is deployed in limited circles of actors “in charge.” Because of the asymmetry of involved relationships, there is little room for democratic discursive argumentation. Authority, power, and/or money are the main resources used to enforce, realize, and legitimize the asymmetry, the decisions taken, and the subsequent actions. Instrumental rationality, among other things, underlies the authoritative power of the state in legal systems. Evolved from (supposedly) reasonable discursive democratic processes, the “rule of law” is widely accepted and has become a self-evident good. However, with regard to our socioecological concerns, instrumental rationality is primarily deployed to serve the goals of powerful and moneyed capitalist politico-economic complexes. Seen from the framework of communicative action, Horkheimer's “eclipse of reason” may be appreciated as an expression of instrumental rationality. Through what Horkheimer calls “culture industry,” the legitimacy and self-evidentiality of the goals, related societal relationships, and patterns of vested interests are disseminated and have been accepted among vast amounts of “consumers.” In other words, these have been grounded in objective societal structures. The challenge, then, is that overcoming these structures—given these limitations—cannot just be achieved by a voluntary act or call for establishing communicative rationality.

Communicative rationality, quite distinct from instrumental rationality, is based on an essentially different quality of relationality. This kind of rationality aims at realizing shared understanding and consensus between an appropriate scope of directly and indirectly involved actors. The consensus concerns (1) the terms of the discursive communication; (2) what is good and serves everybody's needs and interests; and (3) what needs to be done. The discursive argumentation concerns “reasonable” claims expressed by participants that relate to three distinct orientations: (1) the objective (referring to the “truth”); (2) the subjective (referring to “truthfulness”); and (3) the normative (referring to “justness”). The quality of the involved “relationality” comes first; goals and outcomes come second. The distinction between “communicative” and “instrumental rationality” is quite an illuminating way to understand and articulate the quality of involved relationships that—often concealed—currently underlie modern humans’ mechanical utilitarian approaches regarding nature. Societal tendencies of de-relationing, denaturalization, and decontextualization (and its societal impacts) are to be interpreted as processes of colonization of communicative rationality by instrumental rationality. The toxic imbalances between the two are painfully expressed into today's socioecological disasters.

Critical Points of Attention

There are two critical points concerning the communicative framework that, with regard to our concerns about the relationship between humans and nature, need attention. First, it is important to note that Habermas's perspective implies an inclination toward traditional idealism. It is a framework that is founded in principles and orientations of reason and reasonableness as the primary driver of human action. Regarding what is happening in Ukraine, Gaza, and many other conflictual situations in the world, it is difficult to imagine that today's autocratic political leaders and ruthless instigators of war would be willing to accept the reasonable rules of communicative rationality. The same holds true regarding the money-powered imperialist billionaires of Big Tech, who do not seem to be tamable in the expansion of their influential power in all societal realms. Instead of being an applicable methodology, communicative rationality may rather be appreciated as an ideal-typical, normative appeal and criterium to pursue and safeguard the democratic content of our societies. To put it another way, perhaps communicative rationality, being limited to its rational orientations, is determined to always be bounded to reason, whereas we know that quite contrasting configurations of values are more powerful in driving human action.

Second, the theory in its focus on human action clearly has affinity with the so-called discourse of action-oriented “constructive voluntarism” (Herrmann et al. 2012). In understanding human existence from such a perspective looms the risk of falling into the trap of the mechanical positivist dichotomy between subject and object, and thus being stuck in mechanical utilitarianism. Quite in contrast with dialectically based frameworks, such as social quality theory, there is no explicit reference to the constitutive interactive processes between individuals, societal configurations, and nature. The significance of the theory therefore should be delimited to an interesting perspective from which to articulate and illuminate the importance of the conditional qualities of public relationality in human action.

Transcending Self-Evidentiality

Jurisdiction is increasingly being deployed to cover for the poor performances of governments and the misbehavior of private companies. This concerns many issues, not the least of which is controlling climate change and other ecological disturbances. Private persons, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), ecological scientists, “green” politicians, and other advocating agents have no other choice than to appeal to the courts to stand against governments and companies and defend nature's right to coexist with humans. What is the “rightful place of nature”? The quest to articulate thoughts about this issue goes hand in hand with some uneasy paradoxical tensions.

First, our relationship with nature itself inevitably begins and ends with human beings, who are able to think and rationally communicate about it. It is only humans who are the thinking “subjects”—nature must be “it.” “It” cannot speak another language; it cannot communicate in any way other than how expresses itself in its appearance and processes. And we cannot communicate in these “‘it’ languages.” What we can do is “listen” to what nature tells us about ecological “imbalances,” reaching from the change of seasons to exceptional catastrophes and the establishment of states of lasting irreparable disasters as the “new normal.” From our sense of eco-consciousness, we can responsively engage with nature with respect. But at the end of the day, aspects of our coexistence with nature are in need to be articulated and represented by us. All this being true, we have to keep in mind the limitations of being bounded to rationality when we are communicating about nature.

Second, “law” is a highly abstract concept based on presumptions and such moral principles as justice and equality. However, we can only really grasp issues of jurisprudence when they occur to us in concrete terms. Juridical questions, through written laws, acts, regulations, administrative orders, and practical applications, become tangible. The “rightful place of nature” is an abstraction that is hard to pin down. The idea itself profoundly questions ingrained orientations and juridical practices. It transcends and even contradicts our common understanding of jurisprudence. To get access to a better understanding of this concept, we must allow our thinking to escape from a trap. Because of the self-evidentiality of the content and the established nature of regulatory mechanisms, this trap is difficult to overcome. The self-evidentiality is sustained by self-referential processes that we find ourselves in. Fundamental questions like “what precisely are the needs that need to be regulated?” and “what should be achieved?” are not asked anymore.

What Do We Have?

In order to make our abstract thoughts about the “rightful place of nature” more tangible and disputable, we suggest some concrete explorative ideas on the status quo and the “possible” and the “necessary.” We will focus on lawsuits related to climate change. In Figure 1, an impression is presented concerning the usual content of lawsuits addressing issues related to climate change.

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Climate-Change-Related Lawsuits: Case Subjects and the Governmental Institutions, Private Corporations, and Individuals Involved. (Source: Climate Change Litigation Databases; joint project of the Sabin Centre for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School and Arnold & Porter, https://climatecasechart.com/non-us-climate-change-litigation/).

Citation: The International Journal of Social Quality 13, 2; 10.3167/IJSQ.2023.130205

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The following are significant characteristics. All charges concern the violation of the rights of (certain groups of) humans or threats to the quality of their life. Thresholds for violation —formalized in laws, obligations, and rights—logically solely address the involved persons. The court cases rule about factual failures of practices or policies, which cause avoidable costs in the foreseeable future for those affected. The charged “subjects” are institutions, companies, or private persons. Outcomes solely express concerns about a proven range of behaviors that are harmful with respect to the safety of humans.

In our legislative systems, climate change as such, its imbalances, and natural distortions do not exist as juridical entities sui generis. The same holds true for living and nonliving nature. It is important to dissect the framing and phrasing of these lawsuits: they concern proceedings initiated by and directed against humans adversely affecting the environment in order to protect the rights of other humans. Reference is made to “the environment,” not to “nature” itself. These lawsuits are fully centered on the rights and well-being of humans. Their content and their litigants are 100 percent anthropocentric.

Noteworthy are the deployed definitions of legal subjects. The law defines subjects by four criteria: they must be able (1) to have rights and obligations under the law; (2) to act in their own name; (3) to sue and be sued in court; and (4) to be held liable for their acts (Wilhelm 2023). Definitions of entities of nature (e.g., animals) are structurally absent. Efforts to overcome such a structural limitation are full of confusion and contradictions. The absurdity is for instance expressed in the German Civil Code. The following definitions of legal bodies can be found in Section 90—on the concept of “the thing”: “Only corporeal objects are things as defined by law”; on the concept of “animal”: “Animals are not things; they are protected by special statutes; the provisions that apply to things are to be applied accordingly to animals, unless otherwise provided” (our emphasis). Similar absurdity is farcically expressed in a note from the Tagesspiegel Checkpoint:

If you want to snack on a pigeon in the pedestrian zone in front of H&M, it's probably even legal, as long as you kill the fowl quickly and without pain . . . At any rate, the public prosecutor's office only had one case on file for public pigeon killing . . . That was dropped “because a suspect was not identified.” In addition, a spokesperson explained, “the killing was done for subsequent consumption.” The killing of animals—except primates, cats, and dogs due to European meat hygiene law—for consumption and meat production, he said, constituted a reasonable reason for killing, taking into account the entire body of legal and socially accepted norms. (Tagesspiegel 2023; our translation)

Aside from the sole formal recognition of single human “subjects” as legal entities, there is another rather problematic aspect to the orientation of our legal systems. Socioecological challenges are by definition contextual, multidimensional complexities. Complex interrelationships between humans, their daily circumstances, and societal economic, political, and cultural systems, as well as entities of nature itself, are constituent parts of it. By solely addressing single actors, our juridical systems basically deny the full scope of these complexities. With their specific anthropocentric orientation, they precisely reflect the loss of relationality that we have discussed above.

Where Should We Go from Here?

Some explorative thoughts regarding new possible orientations for our jurisprudential systems, which would be at stake in our quest for the “rightful place of nature,” are outlined in the following section. The synopses in Tables 1 and 2, of the existing orientations of legal systems, are contrasted with alternative orientations. Please note that this exercise is not meant to be conclusive. It is meant to help us to think outside the box and to help us escape the ingrained self-evidentialities of our thinking.

Weydt (2023), commenting on characteristics of the German legal system, concludes that the standard for all juridical arguments holds that nature (except for a few animal protection laws) is only ever worthy of protection if it serves humankind. By and large, this observation must be equally relevant for other Western constituencies. It is just not possible in our strictly formalized and solidified systems to appreciate and approach nature as an entity of existence with a right to exist. The focus on human subjects and the anthropocentric orientation is written in stone. Also, no justice can be done to the multidimensional complexity of socioecological challenges. The move toward communicative discursivity and the inclusion of more relevant actors, societal conditions, and societal dimensions is far out of reach. The reasons for the rigidity are fully understandable and reasonable. The legal security of human subjects constitutes one of the principal motives of the rule of law. To ensure security, the systems are fixed in strict, institutionalized definitions, structures, regulations, and procedures: fiat iustitia et pereat mundus (“Let justice be done, even if the world will perish”). Legal security needs to be maintained by approaching it from orientations of instrumental rationality, in which there is little space for continuous argumentation about its principles of content and form. Yet it is precisely here where we must transcend the limitations of self-evidentiality and try to think about an appropriate mode for the juridical presence of nature (e.g., animals, oceans, forests). This also regards the content (the harm done to whom or what). The same holds true concerning nature's representation in court and the scope of involved actors. For the “rightful place of nature,” we need to find and enter new pathways to question ingrained self-evidentialities. The road to success depends on our preparedness to go in a new direction, be inspired by a strong sense of eco-consciousness, and be pushed by given realities, needs, and possibilities.