After an appeal from the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement, Vermont-based company Ben & Jerry's announced in the summer of 2021 that it would no longer sell its ice cream in the Occupied Territories. While the company made clear that it would continue to sell its products within the Green Line (Israel's pre-1967 borders), Israel's condemnation was swift and fierce. Prime Minister Naftali Bennet said the decision was a “boycott of Israel” and that the company branded itself as “an anti-Israel ice cream” (JTA Staff 2021). Yair Lapid, Israel's foreign minister and then alternate prime minister characterized the decision as “shameful surrender to antisemitism, to BDS and to all that is wrong with the anti-Israel and anti-Jewish discourse” (JTA Staff 2021). President Herzog called the boycott “a new sort of terrorism, economic terrorism” and declared that “we must oppose this boycott and terrorism in any form” (Lis 2021). In doing so, Herzog discursively lumps the boycott with terrorism.
The American Jewish response was more diverse however. Some Jewish supermarkets such as Glatt Express in Teaneck, New Jersey, an area with a high Jewish population, announced it would no longer carry the brand. An online campaign pressured kosher certifier KOF-K to remove Ben & Jerry's kosher certification (Nachman Mostofsky [@Mostofsky] 2021). Jeremy Ben-Ami of J Street, meanwhile, noted that antisemitism did not apply to this case (Jeremy Ben-Ami [@JeremyBenAmi] 2021). Daniel Sokatch, CEO of New Israel Fund, made the distinction that most Israelis did not: the decision was not antisemitism or a boycott of Israel since it only applied to the Occupied Territories (New Israel Fund 2021). At the same time, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) expressed its disappointment at the decision stating, “You can disagree with policies without feeding into dangerous campaigns that seek to undermine Israel” but fell short on calling for any actions against Ben & Jerry's (ADL [@ADL] 2021). Yet, by 2022, the ADL had announced that it was intensifying its campaign against antizionism as a form of antisemitism. CEO Jonathan Greenblatt labeled Jewish groups that support BDS, such as Jewish Voice for Peace, as “extremists” and promised to apply more pressure against them including through litigation and “advocacy muscle” (Burley and Lorber 2022). These tensions, between critical, including antizionist voices, and pro-Israeli activism has animated the Jewish Diaspora for decades. However, with the introduction of the BDS movement and the increased support for it, including among Jews in the United States, the debate has become even more entrenched and divisive.
In recent years there has been a growth in research on the challenges Israel and its policies pose for diasporic communities (Ben Hagai and Zurbriggen 2017; Gilbert and Posel 2021; Kahn-Harris 2014; Waxman 2016), the difficulty among Jews to discuss issues related to the state (Ben Hagai and Zurbriggen 2017; Gilbert and Posel 2021) or the treatment of Palestinians (Beinart 2012, 2020; Ben Hagai and Zurbriggen 2017; Ben Hagai et al. 2013; Hagai et al. 2013; Waxman 2019), the debate over the definition of antisemitism (Penslar 2022), or the factors that make Jewish Americans more likely to support Palestinians (Dessel et al. 2017). Studies have also compared Jewish Israeli to Jewish American attitudes, beliefs, and practices (Pew Research Center 2017). In some ways these studies tangentially speak to attitudes toward, or engagement with, the BDS movement, but little work has been done on the consequences of the divergence between Israeli and American Jewish attitudes and actions about BDS for Israeli policy making.1 Studies on Jewish attitudes related to BDS tend to focus on single, campus-related campaigns of divestment and Jewish students’ response to them (Ben Hagai and Zurbriggen 2017; Chaitin et al. 2017; Cohen and Avraham 2018).
This article fills this gap in the literature by examining the role that diasporas play as audiences in Israel's securitization of BDS. Since securitization only takes effect once it is accepted by the audience, that audience plays a significant role in this process. Consequently, to advance a clearer understanding of securitization dynamics involving multiple actors across international borders, it is important to have theoretical clarity on who such audiences are, and how they function within processes of securitization. Specifically, I ask what role does the American Jewish Diaspora serve in Israel's securitization of BDS and to what effect? I argue that audiences can play multiple roles in the securitization process and their role is determined by the securitizing speech act and what they can do for the securitizing actor. Because Israel uses antisemitism as a metanarrative of securitization, it incorporates all Jews in the securitization process as internal audiences. However, audience reaction differs between homeland (Israeli) Jews and American Jews. While Israel's response to BDS is accepted by homeland Jews, it is far more divisive among Diaspora Jews in the United States. I focus on American Jews in the securitization process rather than all world Jewry because of the material and political support they provide for the State of Israel, more than any other Jewish community worldwide and because of the importance of US aid to Israel.2 As a result of this gap between audience responses, Israel finds itself in a securitization dilemma, defined as a process by which the securitization of a referent object can result in its insecurity (Olesker 2021). The gap between audiences’ reactions signals a weakening of Jewish support for Israel and its policies and can exacerbate its sense of delegitimization.
The article proceeds as follows. First it briefly articulates the tenets of securitization theory and the role of audiences in the process, and then expands the theoretical framework to explore the role that diasporas can play as audiences in the securitization process. It then applies the theoretical framework to Israel's securitization of BDS. In doing so, it shows how antisemitism was used as a metanarrative for the securitization of BDS, which incorporated Diaspora Jews as an internal audience in the securitization process with mixed results. The narrative of antisemitism as a threat to Jews is accepted by most, but extraordinary anti-BDS actions that push against democratic and liberal values are not.
Audiences in Securitization Theory
Securitization refers to the process by which securitizing actors, who can credibly speak about security, use speech acts to construct issues as posing a threat to national security.3 Once the speech act is accepted by an intended audience, the securitizing actor can advance extraordinary actions that break away from normal politics, such as existing institutions and processes. Often these new rules adopt illiberal action seen as necessary given the constructed threat.
Securitization scholars recognize securitization as an intersubjective and socially constructed process that engages speakers and audiences in creating a social fact—a threat (Balzacq 2012: 63; Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde 1998: 31). Yet in its original articulation, securitization theory omitted the conceptual clarity of the audience as a separate unit of analysis, leaving its definition vague and case specific. This vagueness has been criticized as it serves to weaken the importance of the audience in the framework. Ole Waever later tried to provide more analytical clarity by arguing that audiences are those who need to be convinced for the securitizing move to be successful. He recognized that there could be cases in which various categories of audiences can be involved in one securitization process, but how to analyze or conceptualize who they are remained unclear (Waever 2003). Similarly, Juha Vouri (2008) argued that the audience is defined by its capability to authorize for the securitization actor what it needs to complete a successful securitization process. Audiences can (but do not always) authorize the threat construction and legitimize the proposed action in response to the threat. But audiences may also mitigate, reject, or otherwise enhance securitization through their participation in the process (Stritzel and Chang 2015). Despite some of these developments, a review of the securitization literature indicates that the identity of audiences is not treated equally across all empirical studies (Côté 2016). Instead, it is case and context specific (Balzacq 2005; Collins 2005; Roe 2008; Salter 2008). Perhaps this is why Michael Williams noted that the concept of the audience still remains “radically underdeveloped” (2011: 212).
Most relevant for the discussion here is the question of what happens when several equally important audiences that can authorize securitization are involved in one process. Scholars have recognized that multiple audiences can be involved in a single securitization process (Bright 2012; McInnes and Rushton 2013; Roe 2008; Salter 2008). More often than not however, these audiences represent different constituencies within one domestic setting (see, for example, Bourbeau 2013; Hayes 2012; Roe 2008; Salter 2008; Salter and Piché 2011; Watson 2013). Mark B. Salter (2008) identifies different settings, each with its own audience, in which securitization can take effect. The securitization can be effective in one setting while failing in another. Paul Roe (2008) and Thierry Balzacq (2005) both recognize that there could be formal audiences, who are required for the securitization process to take effect, and moral audiences, who provide support for the construction of threat and proposed actions. For example, it could be suggested that political elites who can influence the foreign policies of their countries may be seen as formal audiences but wider public opinion, especially in democracies, matters as well. This research seems to implicitly recognize that when the immediate audiences vital to the policy change are convinced, securitization can take effect despite the objection of more “distant” audiences in other settings. Yet how these different audiences function in one securitization process is not fully developed. For example, Salter's framework remains unclear on how each setting is connected to the other, whether interactions in one setting impact those in another, which setting matters the most, or how we would determine that question.
To advance a conceptual clarity of the multiple roles audiences across national borders can play in the securitization process, we may distinguish between three types of audiences. Recall that audiences are determined by the speech act that identifies a shared threat and by their ability to authorize, mitigate, or otherwise curtail the securitization of a referent object for the securitizing actor. When the referent object is a direct threat to the audience, and its support is required to complete the securitization process, we may say that the audience is internal to the securitization. Internal audience acceptance is vital for the success of the securitization process since it provides both formal and moral support for the securitization. When outside actors who are not threatened directly by the referent object of securitization but can facilitate the process for the securitizing actor, they operate as functional actors and may provide support for the securitization.4 However, there are cases in which audiences are, intentionally or unintentionally, involved in the securitization process but are either not directly threatened by the referent object or do not function to directly advance the process. BDS activists themselves may serve this function in Israel's securitization process. In this case we may categorize these as external audiences who nevertheless can impact the process. When securitization is accepted by one set of audiences but rejected by another, the securitization may be complete but have damaging consequences for the referent object by increasing its insecurity. This is known as a securitization dilemma.5
To summarize, securitization literature has made considerable progress in analytically and empirically examining the role and function of audiences in the securitization process. We now recognize that multiple audiences can be involved in one securitization process. Yet, securitization studies involving multiple audiences tend to focus on one national and/or institutional context. Balzacq noted that the audience has a particular “social-cultural disposition” (2005: 172). When it comes to ethnic states like Israel, group distinctiveness is most important and diasporas have been recognized as important independent actors who influence home and kin-state politics (Shain and Barth 2003). Diasporas challenge the alignment of state and society as they can operate in ways that defy traditional territorial boundaries (Cohen 1997). Studies of civil wars have treated diasporas as external nonstate actors who impact the internal conflict (see, for example, Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Hall 2016; Lyons 2006; Shain 2002). Does that make them internal or external audiences? Others have studied diasporas as transnational actors who mobilize on behalf of ethnic kin, which in the context of securitization can operate as functional actors as well (see, for example, Adamson 2002; Koinova 2014; Koinova and Karabegović 2017; Sokefeld 2006). Diasporas can also figure importantly in international peace processes (Cochrane, Baser, and Swain 2009; Zunzer 2004). Yet in most studies of securitization, even among ethnic states, diasporas are not included in the analysis. Here I advance a framework that allows us to capture different audiences, across national and functional boundaries that operate within one securitization process (figure 1). In the case of this study, the articulation of BDS as antisemitic suggests that we should treat all Jews as internal audiences of the securitization process. In the following sections, I examine the role of the American Jewish Diaspora in Israel's securitization of BDS.
Audiences in the securitization process
Citation: Israel Studies Review 37, 3; 10.3167/isr.2022.370302
Audiences in the securitization process
Citation: Israel Studies Review 37, 3; 10.3167/isr.2022.370302
Audiences in the securitization process
Citation: Israel Studies Review 37, 3; 10.3167/isr.2022.370302
Diasporas as Audiences
In conceptualizing diasporas as international actors, Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth identified two types of diaspora roles—active and passive. When diasporas are passive, it is the homeland and/or host states who do the acting but when diasporas are active, they influence the host or home state's foreign policy usually through interest groups, such as lobbies. The American Jewish Diaspora is no exception to this (Shain and Barth 2003: 453–454). While the argument here applies to the Jewish Diaspora at large, the empirical examination focused on the American Jewish Diaspora since it has been extremely active in maintaining connections to Israel and impacting its policies as well as influencing US foreign policy with regard to the state, including foreign aid (Ben Hagai et al. 2013; Shain 2002; Waxman 2010).
Despite this activism, there has been very little written about the function and efficacy of the Jewish Diaspora in the battle over BDS. Reut Cohen and Eli Avraham (2018) examined strategies employed by pro-Israeli NGOs to combat academic boycotts but their work focused on activists’ strategies rather than the functional role of diasporas in anti-BDS activism. Moreover, Cohen and Avraham note that “with the exception of one website, it is not clear who is the intended target audience of the sites we analyze or what relationship was built with this audience” (Cohen and Avraham 2018: 210).
When it comes to securitization, we can say that political elites, such as leading Jewish organizations, can play an active role as audiences since they can, to varying degrees, mobilize to influence their host states’ foreign policies. However, the wider Jewish community is also important since the Israeli state claims to act on their behalf too. In other words, they provide the moral support necessary for the securitization process. Therefore, we must examine both levels of audiences in the securitization process.
The efficacy of diasporas as audiences is dependent on its ability to organize as an influential interest group and the homeland's receptivity to ethnic kin activism (Shain and Barth 2003: 462). However, the diaspora must also be willing to advance the policies of the homeland and this might not always be the case. For example, when Israeli officials wanted US Jews to participate in a counter-boycott campaign against the Arab boycott in 1959, Rose Halprin, of the Jewish Agency in New York, dismissed this approach as harmful to Israel and Jewish communities in the United States (Central Zionist Archives 1957). Earlier, during the Suez crisis when the United States demanded that Israel withdraw its forces, Nahum Goldman, who was the president of the World Jewish Congress at the time, indicated to Israel that the organization would not mobilize against the US position despite supporting Israeli action in the region.
In terms of securitization, the efficacy of diasporas is increased when the referent object includes a threat that impacts them. Not every securitization by ethnic states will include ethnic kin or allow them to exert effects on the process. In cases where the community identity that connects diasporas to their co-ethnics serves as the referent object of securitization, and when diaspora support can enable the securitizing act to advance, we may say that diasporas are an internal audience. In other cases where diasporas are not directly threatened but nevertheless work to advance the interests of the homeland, they serve as functional actors. In cases where they neither advance securitization on behalf of the homeland, nor are they threatened, we may regard diasporas as external audiences. The analytical determination of the role of diasporas in the securitization process must begin with the securitizing speech act that articulates the referent object under threat.
Case Study: Antisemitism as Metanarrative
Metanarratives of security, or meta-securitization, refers to concepts of security that “are retrospective and, crucially, selective abstractions of all the different acts and narratives that contribute to a successful securitization, stripped of reference to any internal dynamics and local context that are not directly related to the final securitization” (Wilkinson 2010: 94). Using this concept we can analyze different events, involving different actors, that are all distilled into one story of (in)security. In these cases, the referent object is securitized to encompass a “security logic” that has potency for a large audience, often across time and space. This potency is made even more effective with an audience if it already agrees with the metanarrative and it allows the securitizing actor to capture multiple audiences at the same time.
A discussion of the use of Jewish insecurity as a metanarrative that serves as a security logic for Zionism and much of Israeli foreign policy far exceeds the scope here (for a good summary, see Abulof 2009; Lupovici 2014: 398–399; Olesker 2011: 384–385;). More pertinent is a focus on the use of antisemitism as a metanarrative for BDS's securitization, and how the use of antisemitism necessitates the incorporation of the Jewish Diaspora as an audience in this process.
Since emerging on the international political stage, Israeli officials have categorized the BDS movement as antisemitic. In response to the introduction of a BDS resolution at the NGO forum during the 2001 UN World Conference against Racism in Durban, South Africa, Israel's deputy foreign minister Rabbi Michael Melchior characterized it as “discrimination against Jews because they are Jews. In short, it is antisemitism” (Melchior 2001). Subsequent statements by Israeli leaders have emphasized this construction further. For example, former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, speaking at the 5th Global Forum on Combatting Antisemitism, noted that the international “obsession with the Jewish state and the Jewish people has a name. It is called anti-Semitism” (“PM Netanyahu Addresses 5th Global Forum for Combating Antisemitism” 2015). He repeated the message later that year at an anti-BDS summit sponsored by conservative donor Sheldon Adelson (Prime Minister's Office 2015). Ayelet Shaked, while serving as Justice Minister, noted that there were three things that motivated the BDS movement: antisemitism, radical Islam, and naivete (Lis 2015). Yair Lapid characterized BDS leaders as “out and out anti-Semites” (Shalev 2015). Scholars (Cannon 2019; Elman and Romirowsky 2019; Fishman 2011; 2012; Nelson 2019; Sharansky 2004; Topor 2021) and Israeli think tanks (Diker 2016; Reut Group 2010) have also contributed to the framing of BDS as a form of antisemitism.6
Recall that the efficacy of diasporas as audiences is dependent on their ability to organize as an influential interest group and the homeland's receptivity to ethnic kin activism (Shain and Barth 2003: 462). Cannon notes that “in light of concerns and manifestations of anti-Semitism, anti-Judaism, and anti-Zionism [pro-Israel and anti-BDS legislation] reflect the political will of the mainstream American Jewish electorate to combat the economic, legal, and political tactics of BDS” (Cannon 2018). Since 2011, leading Jewish organizations have strongly condemned BDS noting that criticism “becomes anti-Semitism, however, when it demonizes Israel or its leaders, denies Israel the right to defend its citizens or seeks to denigrate Israel's right to exist” (Jewish Virtual Library n.d.). Jewish American groups heavily lobbied for the passing of anti-BDS legislation at the state and federal levels. Lawfare—the use of legal means to combat BDS—has also been a cornerstone of the Israeli response to BDS abroad (Olesker 2021). The ADL, for example, strongly opposes BDS and sees it as a form of antisemitism. It notes that, especially on campuses, the movement created a climate “in which antisemitic actions and expressions may be emboldened” (ADL 2022b). AIPAC, the strongest pro-Israeli American lobby, has worked to advance anti-BDS laws in the United States, including The Combating BDS Act (S. 2119), a federal bill that will allow state and local governments to divest from entities that support BDS against Israel. Since 2014, thirty-three states have passed some form of anti-boycott regulations that prohibit state and local governments from contracting with or investing in individuals, firms and nonprofit organizations who support the boycott against Israel. In addition, several federal bills that would limit BDS activity are pending (see, for example, Rubio 2019). In some cases the federal courts have ruled against the anti-BDS laws leading legislators to amend and narrow their scope to companies rather than individuals (ACLU 2019). In other cases, anti-BDS legislation was ruled constitutional (Lapin and JTA 2022).
The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations represents fifty-three leading Jewish organizations in the United States. In 2021, most of its members actively worked to thwart BDS as part of their work to combat antisemitism including most recently Ben & Jerry's decision (Gross 2022). Its president, Malcolm Hoenlein, has commented extensively about the dangers of BDS and its connection to antisemitic action (for example, Hoenlein 2020). The Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs, during its capacity as the governmental body leading the response to BDS, also engaged with leading Jewish organizations to develop those responses worldwide (Rudee 2019; Jaffe-Hoffman 2018).
However, not all Jewish groups have supported Israel's use of laws to combat BDS. When Israel included in its domestic anti-boycott law boycotts of “areas under its control,” that is, the Occupied Territories, this definition was first condemned by some Jewish groups. For example, in 2011 the ADL came out against the law as undermining freedom of speech and expression and thus stifling Israel's democratic values (Shamir 2011). Tablet magazine noted Israel “delegitimizes itself” and “BDS was the big winner” after the law passed (Tracy 2011). American Jews from across the political spectrum lambasted the law (Kampeas and JTA 2011). The New York Times used its editorial page to condemn the law, arguing that it would “seriously tarnish” Israel's reputation as a “vibrant democracy” (New York Times 2011). Moreover, a leaked internal ADL memo revealed that even ADL staff believed the anti-BDS laws in the United States were not effective at combating BDS and were harmful to Jews (Nathan-Kazis 2018). J Street opposes BDS but also anti-BDS legislation (J Street n.d.).
Israel's 2017 amendment to the entry law that bars supporters of BDS from entering the country was subject to similar criticism after several high-profile cases in which Americans, including Jews, were detained or denied access due to their pro-Palestinian activities. Regardless of political affiliation, 72 percent of Americans rejected such legislation that penalizes people who boycott Israel as an infringement on free speech (Telhami and Rouse 2019). These legislations have further contributed to Israel becoming a wedge issue in US politics and served to place Israel on the illiberal side of the debate on First Amendment rights (Reut Group 2018: 28). However, illiberalism and exceptionalism mark the securitization process. While those can be accepted by one set of audiences, it can, at the same time, be rejected by another equally important set of audiences. At best, we can say that even at the elite level, Diaspora response to Israel's lawfare was mixed.
Israel's securitization of BDS involved other exceptional institutional actions that include reorganization of bureaucratic politics to create a “BDS ministry” in the form of the Ministry of Strategic Affairs. Until June 2021, the ministry spearheaded Israel's response to BDS and delegitimization more broadly (Olesker 2019). Additionally, Israel worked with clandestine groups to collect information about BDS activists (Entous 2019; Entous and Farrow 2019), established a Government/Non-Governmental Organization (GONGO) to coordinate its activities in civil society abroad (BZ 2018), and even used the IDF to work against Palestinian activists (Olesker 2021).
Assessing homeland Jews’ support for these securitizing acts is more difficult. Studies have yet to empirically assess opinions of homeland Jews on BDS alone. A small study of a highly educated sample by Julia Chaitin, Shoshana Steinberg, and Sharon Steinberg (2017) found that homeland Jews were least likely to agree with BDS while Western Jews were more likely. According to the 2020–2021 INSS (Institute for National Security) national security index, only 7 percent of Israelis believe that international isolation, most associated with the goals of BDS, is the most significant threat to the state. Other threats, such as a nuclear Iran, the conflict with the Palestinians, and terrorism, rank much higher. This of course does not indicate that Israelis are not concerned with the issue: 45 percent of Israelis believe Israel is capable of successfully dealing with the threat of international isolation (Israeli and Pines 2022: 70). Yet there are few public opinion polls of homeland Jews’ attitudes toward BDS even in regularly conducted surveys on national security issues. Anecdotally, it is apparent that Israelis strongly object to BDS, and this would be reasonable as it undermines their interests. Right-wing publications characterize Israelis who support BDS as the “enemy from within” (Solomon 2018). Israeli (Jewish) political elites however, have been highly active in both framing BDS as a national security threat and responding to it, as previously discussed here (see also Olesker 2019, 2021). Both right-wing parties, such as Likud, and centrist parties, such as Yesh Atid, frame BDS as antisemitic and a security threat. Support for these parties in the Knesset remains high.7
However, Jewish American public opinion about BDS is far less decisive. American Jews are highly concerned about the growth of antisemitism, with 75 percent indicating in 2020 that there was more antisemitism than the five years prior. Moreover, 53 percent of those surveyed indicated that they felt less safe as Jews than five years prior. However, this does not correlate with an opposition to BDS. First, it is important to note that the overwhelming majority of Americans still have not heard of BDS. According to the most recent Pew Center Poll, 53 percent of respondents said they have not heard about BDS and another 31 percent have not heard much about it. Just 5 percent have heard at least “some” about BDS and express support for it, including 2 percent who strongly support it (Alper 2022). However, in another poll from October 2019, 48 percent of American Democrats say that they somewhat or strongly support BDS, compared with only 15 percent who somewhat or strongly oppose it. Among Democrats who have heard of and are familiar with BDS, the support was even stronger, 66 percent. Among those who were familiar with BDS, 63 percent strongly or somewhat agreed that BDS was a peaceful and legitimate method of opposing Israeli occupation, and it was not tantamount to antisemitism. Similarly, the exact opposite sentiments were expressed by Republicans (Telhami and Rouse 2019).
The most recent 2020 Pew Research Center survey of American Jews shows that while 58 percent across all age groups still feel very or somewhat attached to Israel, only 34 percent strongly oppose the BDS movement. In other words, the majority of Jews remain connected to Israel, and indeed 60 percent indicate that they have a lot or something in common with Jews in Israel, but only a minority strongly oppose BDS in ways that the securitization of the movement requires of the audience. There is a strong political divide between Democrats and Republicans on this issue as well. While 54 percent of Republican or Republican-leaning Jews oppose the BDS movement, only 28 percent of Democrats or those leaning Democrat do. Given that half of the US Jewish population identifies as liberal, and only 16 percent identify as conservative, it is not surprising that most Jews do not strongly oppose BDS, unlike their Jewish counterparts in Israel.
Younger Jews especially have become more critical of Israel and less likely to support the state for its violation of Palestinian human rights (Cohen and Kelman 2007; 2010; Lang/Levitsky 2009; Pew Research Center 2013; Zimmerman 2016). Among younger Jews between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine, the opposition to BDS shrinks to 27 percent, but even among older Jews over the age of sixty-five, less than half, 44 percent to be exact, oppose the movement (Pew Research Center 2021). Moreover, younger Jews find it increasingly difficult to support anti-BDS activism because they frame BDS in intersectional ways that align with their support for other progressive movements (Ben Hagai and Zurbriggen 2017: 191).
Discussion
The data presented here indicates that Israel's response to BDS has furthered its polarization within US politics both between Democrats and Republicans and within the American Jewish community itself, where there is a divide between Jewish elites and the public. Most American Jews have not accepted the narrative of constructing BDS as an existential threat to the Israeli state, even when they do not necessarily support BDS itself and remain concerned about antisemitism. At the same time, Jewish activists on campus fighting BDS resolutions can and do at times feel unsafe as a result of these resolutions (Beckwith and Rossman-Benjamin 2017; Ben Hagai and Zurbriggen 2017).
This divide between American and Israeli Jews is exploited by the BDS movement to further weaken the effectiveness of the securitization process because it makes it more difficult to sustain diasporic solidarity with the state's policies. The Reut Group, which was one of the first Israeli think tanks to identify delegitimization as a strategic threat to Israel, characterizes the growing rift among Jews as a “strategic stumbling block” that threatens Israel's bipartisan status in US politics (Reut Group 2018). In an interview, Eran Shayshon, director of the Reut Group noted that the risk is in the fact that if Israel loses the Jewish community in the United States, the largest in the world, it loses its legitimate claim as the national home for the Jewish people and this goes well beyond the issue of BDS alone.8 This alienation from predominantly liberal American Jews is problematic in that it further contributes to Israel's delegitimization by undermining ethnic kin solidarity.
There are other indications of the impact of Israel's policies in the loss of important epistemic authorities. Early on, as Israel was developing its response to delegitimization, officials understood the importance of capturing epistemic authorities that shape the discourse around the state.9 Such authorities are found in mainstream media, social media, and academia (Michael 2007). In all those arenas, BDS has made strides in shifting the debate around the state and legitimizing discourse that, for example, compares the state to apartheid. Such discourse appeared most recently in an Amnesty International report (Amnesty International 2022). The ADL issues regular reports on anti-Israel discourse and activities on campus (ADL 2022a). During the May 2021 fighting in Gaza, social media exploded with anti-Israel discourse fueled by some leading social media figures (Haris 2021). The rise of social media also makes it very difficult for states to control the narrative despite some evidence of Artificial Intelligence blocking Palestinian activists online (Almehdar 2021; Dwoskin and De Vynck 2021). Some evidence suggests that social media coverage of the conflict by citizen-journalists also influences mainstream media coverage and focus on the impact of the conflict on civilians (Hatte et al. 2021). Bari Weiss, a former New York Times columnist and fierce supporter of Israel noted in her May 2021 newsletter that “the world has gone Corbyn,” (emphasis in original) referring to the former leader of the British Labour Party who was accused of sparking antisemitism throughout the party during his leadership. She goes on to note, in reference to an anti-Israel tweet by progressive Democrat representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, that “America didn't need a Corbyn. We just needed a Twitter and a few demagogues in Congress” (Weiss 2021).
Against this backdrop, the ambivalence of American Jews toward Israel's anti-BDS actions further challenges Israel's ability to effectively combat delegitimization when the community on whose behalf it claims to operate is itself divided on its actions. Different groups within the community have diverging positions on Israel's policies signaling an internal audience divide. While the BDS movement has not had a significant material impact on Israel at the elite level, this divide among Jewish reception has a real impact of reducing Israel's overall international image and among Americans in particular. This serves to weaken the effectiveness of Israel's securitization process by reducing moral support of internal audiences as most liberal-leaning Americans, including Jews, remain unconvinced by Israel's articulations of threat.
Conclusions
A year after Ben & Jerry's decision to stop selling ice cream in the Occupied Territories, its parent company, Unilever, sold the Israeli branch to the longtime Israeli licensee of the ice cream who could continue selling it in Israel and the territories under a Hebrew and Arabic name (Gewirtz 2022). The ADL as well as other Jewish American groups with whom the Israeli licensee was working championed the decision. Having convinced Unilever to sell the company to the Israeli licensee meant that Ben & Jerry's would no longer profit from the sale of the ice cream in Israel or the Occupied Territories (ADL 2022c; Dovrat Meseritz 2022). This decision, like many others, demonstrates the paradox of the impact of BDS. While the movement has minimal economic and diplomatic impact on Israel, the discourse around the state, especially in liberal spaces occupied by Ben & Jerry's consumers, remains highly divided but increasingly hostile to Israel and its supporters. As several studies have highlighted over the years, this hostile environment is tied to BDS activity (Cannon 2018; Diker 2020; Diker and Berk 2018; Elman and Romirowsky 2019; Nelson 2019; Romirowsky 2016). There is no indication, however, that the reversal of the Ben & Jerry's decision has had any impact on the anti-Jewish discourse or served to mend the divide within the Jewish community and thus advanced the acceptance of Israel's construction of BDS as a threat among the wider Jewish Diaspora community.
This article conceptually contributes to our understanding of how audiences operate in the securitization process. It also begins to empirically examine diasporas as independent actors involved in securitization processes initiated by their ethnic kin. Theoretically and empirically, the findings here stress the importance of taking audience reception of securitization efforts seriously. This builds on second-generation securitization scholarship, which has increasingly focused on the role of the audience in the securitization process.
Audiences are identified by the speech act that is used to justify the securitization in the first place. They are also identified by the role they can play in facilitating the securitization for the securitizing actor. This conceptualization of audiences in securitization also aligns with literature on diasporas and international relations by connecting intra-Jewish politics with securitization processes. Israel has long constructed its Jewish Diaspora as “integral parts of the kin community” (Shain and Barth 2003: 473), and this construction places them within its securitization process. When antisemitism is used as a metanarrative for the securitization of BDS, all Jews, not just homeland Jews, are incorporated as internal audiences in the process. In the case of US Jewry, we see that Jews are concerned about antisemitism as a threat but not all accept BDS as a form of antisemitism. While elite Jewish organizations have largely accepted this construction, public opinion polls suggest a more divided response to BDS among the American Jewish public. Some Jewish organizations and leaders also support Israel's securitizing moves (laws and policies) against BDS, others do not.
At the core of Israel's securitization of delegitimization is the tension between the way domestic and international audiences view the securitization process. The audience is a crucial participant in the creation and construction of meanings of threats to security. When it comes to contesting BDS, Israel faces a dilemma between its need to demonstrate to homeland Jews the effectiveness of its actions against BDS, and the impact it creates for Diaspora Jews, especially liberals in the United States who are alienated by some of Israel's actions. This tension, between homelands and diaspora audiences exacerbates the securitization dilemma. This dilemma can create ineffective outcomes of a security policy by undermining the actor's goals of enhancing the security of the referent object (Olesker 2021: 138–139).
The study here demonstrates that although securitization of BDS was successful, it also contributed to the Jewish community's internal divide that has been well documented over the past two decades. While on the one hand, the securitization of BDS was a success, on the other hand, it failed to take into serious consideration whether its securitizing efforts would be accepted by audiences outside the territorial boundaries of the state. Perhaps in recognition of this, the Israeli government that came into power in 2021 dismantled the Ministry of Strategic Affairs, commonly known as the ‘BDS Ministry.’ Led by Naftali Bennet as prime minister and Yair Lapid as the foreign minister, Israel's government moved the ministry's budget back into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Meanwhile, Nachman Shai, who in 2021 became Minister of Diaspora Affairs, publicly recognized that Israel “will lose” if American Jews continue to support BDS (Magid 2021).
The study here reveals the need for an even deeper analytical framing of the audience beyond the internal/external split examined here. What the data suggests is that we can find a split between political elites and public opinion within one set of what is defined here as internal audiences. Even as political elites continue to show support for Israel and provide it with legitimacy for its international standing as a liberal democracy, the American public is becoming less supportive. This threatens Israel's long-term international standing even as it continues to enjoy a high level of support from the United States at present.
More work needs to be done, both empirical and theoretical, to study the various roles audiences can play in the securitization process. Future research should conceptualize the split between audiences even further to understand what happens when audience reception of securitization splits across territorial borders and between different levels of society within one securitization process. Such research will both broaden and deepen the understanding of the audience's function in the securitization process.
Moreover, serious empirical research on the BDS movement itself is still lacking. Here the focus has been on Israeli securitization of BDS, but questions remain on the role and function of BDS activists as either functional actors or external audiences to Israel's securitization process. How does Israeli securitization impact their activities, if at all? Do BDS activists engage in counter-securitization maneuvers in response to Israeli securitization? This special section in this issue of Israel Studies Review greatly advances our understanding of the BDS movement and Israel's response to it. Nonetheless, empirical studies on Israeli Jewish attitudes regarding BDS are still absent. Concern about BDS is clearly present in the Israeli polity. Leading security-oriented institutes, such as INSS (Institute for National Security), JISS (Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security), JCPA (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs), BESA (Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies), have all dedicated publications to the threat of BDS. Scholars have also empirically examined world views of Israel to assess the impact of BDS (Ben Levy 2016; Globe Scan 2014). Research on Israeli (Jewish) public opinion regarding BDS, however, could greatly contribute to this area of scholarship. What this study and others demonstrate is the important function BDS plays in animating the dynamics of state and sub-state actors vis-à-vis Israel.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Dr. Jessica Roda and Dr. Karolina Krasuska for reading and commenting on earlier drafts as well as the helpful comments of the two anonymous reviewers.
Notes
Chaitlin et al., begin to compare American and Israeli attitudes towards BDS but the study is fairly limited to a small sample (2017).
Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of US foreign aid (Sharp 2022). American Jewish diaspora is one important element of US support for Israel although as discussed laer, it is not monolithic even among pro-Israel lobby groups within the US (Waxman 2010, 2012). In recent decades right-wing Christian support for Israel has also been important, especially in increasing support for Israel among Republicans. The discussion of right-wing Christian support for Israel exceeds the scope here, however.
Although the analysis here largely focuses on traditional discourse in the form of spoken and written utterances by policymakers, speech acts may include non-verbal communication such as photos, songs, images, even protests (Hansen 2000; McDonald 2008; Wilkinson 2007; Williams 2003). More recent studies have emphasized the behavioral change that needs to accompany the rhetoric of the securitizing actor (Floyd 2010, 2011) and the importance of the media as securitizing actors (Croft 2012).
For more on functional actors see Floyd (2020).
For more on the tension between internal and external audiences see Olesker (2021).
BDS is also commonly framed as an extension of terrorism (for extensive discussion, see Olesker 2021) and more recently as a form of Soviet-style warfare (Atlan 2021).
In the 24th Knesset, Likud and Yesh Atid are the two largest parties with a total of forty-seven seats, representing 39 percent of seats.
Eran Shayshon, interview with author, 18 November 2018.
Yossi Kuperwaser, interview with author, 31 March 2019.
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