Rajasthan: A Crucible for Subnationalism

In 1949, nineteen princely states and three chiefships in the region of Rajputana merged to form one political unit, today known as the state of Rajasthan.⁴ The integration itself took place in five stages. These included the formation of the Matsya region (inaugurated in 1948 and encompassing the four erstwhile states of Alwar, Bharatpur, Dholpur, and Karauli); the formation of the first Rajasthan Union (on 25 March 1948, with Banswara, Bundi, Dungarpur, Jhalawar, Kishangarh, Kota, Pratapgarh, Shahpura, and Tonk); the inclusion of Udaipur in the first Rajasthan Union; the creation of “Greater Rajasthan” (which included the remaining Rajput states of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Bikaner, and Jaisalmer); and, finally, the merging of Matsya with Greater Rajasthan (on 30 March 1949, when the present-day boundaries were drawn).

The geographical area comprising modern-day Rajasthan has a complex history. It has witnessed numerous foreign invasions, leading to conflicts between these invading armies and those of the local emperors. Some prominent examples include the battles at Tarain (1191 and 1192) between the Ghurid emperor Muhammad Ghori and the Rajput ruler Prithviraj Chauhan; the Battle of Kanwa (1527) between Rana Sanga of Mewar and the Mughal King Babur, and the Battle of Haldighati (1576), which pitted Rana Pratap against the Mughal emperor Akbar. While there can be a tendency to view these strictly as local–outsider conflicts, professional historians have unraveled the fissures of this imagined dichotomy, noting that many Rajput kings fought alongside the “foreign” forces and commanded many regiments.⁵ However, I will show below, in order to simplify history, complex histories such as these have to either be omitted or presented in a manner that consolidates a local–outsider narrative, thus privileging the former (in this case, the Rajputs) as belonging to the nation.

Scholarly attempts to trace the political history of Rajasthan from precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial times are invariably linked with the study of the political ascendancy of the Rajputs.⁶ In the nineteenth century, the community had monopolized virtually all positions of political power and landownership in the princely states that would eventually constitute today's Rajasthan.⁷ Even after the formation of modern Rajasthan, the resultant political structure ensured Rajput prominence, which is evidenced by the fact that the Maharajas of Udaipur and Jaipur were given the titles of “Maharaja Pramukh” and “Raj Pramukh,” respectively. At the same time, the rulers of Kota and Jaipur were designated “Uprajpramukhs,” a title equivalent to that of provincial governor. Thus, there is a clear indicator of who the most important community in the state is. This strong identification of the Rajput community with the state led to what is known as the development of subnationalism in Rajasthan. However, it was not until the 1980s that Rajasthan saw the emergence and growth of a subnational movement that prioritized the dominant pan-state identity, that of the Rajputs.

One major cause of the emergence of this subnational movement is the ascendancy of the BJP and its ideological mentors, the Sangh Parivar. It was the Sangh Parivar – the union of Hindu nationalist organizations led by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Volunteer Organization, RSS) in the 1980s – that facilitated the “beginnings of an identification with Rajasthan.”⁸ According to Rob Jenkins, the growth of a regional identity movement spearheaded by the BJP is no surprise, as it forms part of the party's broader strategy to expand its political and electoral presence throughout the country by “focusing on social and political circumstances prevailing in a wide array of states.”⁹ In his study of the BJP's rise in the state, Jenkins argues that Rajasthan represents an excellent opportunity for the Hindu Right to expand its presence. The region's history provides ample scope to wed nationalism with regionalism and regional identity in order to justify an inclusive form of caste politics.

Of course, Rajasthan also represents a particular case in the political psyche of the BJP and the Hindu Right. In its narrative, Rajasthan is privileged over other states and regions in India because it is deemed as the “guardian of the true faith, a self-confident, assertive, and martial tradition of Hindus.”¹⁰ This tradition is said to be lacking in other regions owing to the corrupting influence of “foreign elements” such as “the West” and “Muslims.” As noted above, Rajasthan provided most of the resistance to foreign invasions. Regional pride thus manifests itself in the maintenance of a particular social order characterized by Rajput rule, where belonging to the region is determined along religious lines.

A preexisting regional identity mixed with Hinduism constitutes the “Rajput ethic,” which the Sangh Parivar uses to increase its presence in Rajasthan.¹¹ The basis of this ethic is to value heroism over prudence and action over thought.¹² In other words, more emphasis was placed on courage than on the consequences of one's actions. This exceptional ethic is rooted in a belief in the region's unique contribution to a broader nationalist awakening and a continuation of Hinduism that was not disrupted by foreign elements. When discussing symbols of mobilization, Jenkins argues that the traditional pantheon of the Hindu Right, and especially the supreme god Rama, often acquired secondary status vis-à-vis Rajput regional identity.¹³ This is what he terms “Rajput Hindutva,” or the regionalization of the BJP's core national ideology, which recognizes the virtues of Rajput rule.

The characterization of the Rajput community by the Hindu Right is crucial to cementing a positive reflection of the “self” because, as Jenkins observes,

the defining feature of Rajputana, the special gift of the land to the Rajputs to the Hindu nationalist reawakening has been its preservation of a stable social order through Rajput rule. The Rajput community embodies an ideology that uses traits of honour and shame as yardsticks to measure social prestige.¹⁴

Prerna Singh, who has studied India's subnationalisms from a comparative perspective, concurs and argues that it was politically beneficial to mobilize on the Rajput ethos, as it enabled the BJP to attract a more extensive voter base in the state, where a subnational identity appealed more to the people.¹⁵

Indeed, data relating to the caste composition of representatives from the BJP elected to the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly during the 1980s indicates a rising Rajput representation and a clear identification of the community with the party and its ideology. It can be argued that it was the predecessor of the BJP, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), which set the stage for bringing Rajputs into the Hindutva fold. In the 1967 assembly elections, the BJS won 22 of the 184 seats. This meant that roughly a third (31.8 percent) of the representatives were from the Rajput community, the highest number ever elected.¹⁶ Subsequently, in elections held in the state from 1980 to 2003, the percentage of Rajput representatives from the party steadily increased, reaching its apex in 1998 with 18.8 percent.¹⁷ As if to further stress the identification of Rajputs with the BJP, the community elected the highest number of representatives from the party in the elections of 1993 in the aftermath of the Babri Masjid demolition.¹⁸

In order to understand why this happened, it is essential to discuss the activities of the Sangh Parivar in the state around the time. Rajput identity was strongly imbued with a Hindu mindset in which Muslims were castigated as foreigners. Rajasthan had historically provided a bulwark of resistance to foreign elements, which had helped to preserve the Rajput culture and ethos. This categorization of Muslims enabled the Sangh Parivar to penetrate society in Rajasthan in order to increase its influence in the region. In the 1990s, rallies held by the Sangh and its affiliates, such as the BJP and the World Council of Hindus (Vishwa Hindu Parishad, VHP), warned that “there are only two places for a Muslim – Pakistan and Qabristan [graveyard].”¹⁹ Shail Mayaram has noted that historical reconstruction was at the heart of Hindu nationalism. According to this reconstruction, as the RSS ideologue and historian Purushottam Nagesh Oak remarked, “Rajputs originally built Shahjahanabad and Fatehpur Sikri, and the Taj Mahal was a Rajput palace appropriated by the Mughals.”²⁰

Moreover, this construction of a highly polarized atmosphere contributed to many incidents of communal violence in the state. The BJP actively sought the Hindu vote in order to obtain a mandate to construct the Ram temple at Ayodhya. At the same time, its chief opponent, the Indian National Congress, also known as the Congress,²¹ was reliant on support from minorities, particularly Muslims. The Rath Yatra or Chariot Pilgrimage (a movement organized in 1990 by then BJP president Lal Krishna Advani in order to garner Hindu nationalist support for the temple movement in Ayodhya) also contributed to the violence that erupted in different parts of the state, including Kota, Bikaner, Udaipur, and the capital Jaipur.²² The late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed a steady rise in the number of sants (religious figures) and mahants (chief priests of temples) associated with the Sangh. The sant of the Laxminarayan temple organized the procession of kar sevaks (volunteers from the Sangh) who departed for Ayodhya in order to take part in the Ram temple agitation and the subsequent demolition of the Babri Masjid in November 1992.²³

The description of this political context (the emergence of a regional subnationalism dominated by Rajput identity and ethos) forms the first part of this article. This, second, part investigates how notions of valor and sacrifice have been used to construct a vision of national identity based on the idea of defending the nation, a privilege of the Rajputs. In this regard, two distinct communities—local/indigenous and foreign—have been created. This part further discusses religion as the most fruitful lens via which to understand this dichotomy, in which Hindus have been placed in the former and Muslims in the latter category in spite of historically documented contradictions. This omission has been crucial for the cementing of a majoritarian narrative.

The process of majoritarian identity making has been further accomplished by obliterating the religious identities of two well-known historical figures, the Mauryan emperor Ashoka and the Dalit freedom fighter Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, who both converted to Buddhism. The omission of their conversions from the narrative is an important method for guaranteeing a linear narrative of history that prioritizes a single community.

A Note on Differences in Textbooks

It is relevant to highlight that the textbooks in circulation during the Congress government in Rajasthan (2008–2013) were prescribed by the National Council of Education Research and Training (NCERT). The Congress's successor, the BJP (2013–2018), substituted them with a new set of textbooks written under the auspices of the Rajasthan State Textbook Authority in order to ensure a history that emphasized the regional context of the state. The textbooks that I will look at consist of the social science textbook for years eight, nine, and ten, the political science textbook for year eleven, and the history textbook for year twelve.

It is important to understand why this particular change was instituted. In order to answer this question, we must understand the role played in this regard by the BJP minister for education in Rajasthan, Vasudev Devnani. Two aspects need to be considered here, namely, the institutional and the ideological. Concerning the former, Devnani was keen to recruit potential textbook authors from within the state. In fact, at the end of the recruitment exercise, all of the authors hailed from the state of Rajasthan and all of them were connected to the RSS, the ideological mentor of the BJP.

Regarding the second aspect, Devnani, like many outspoken politicians, wanted a definite say in how the history of India would be told in these textbooks. First, taking a cue from the political context of the time, he openly declared that the purpose of these textbooks would be to ensure that “no more Kanhaiyas are born in the state.”²⁴ This was a reference to Kanhaiya Kumar, the former president of the Jawaharlal Nehru University Students’ Union, who was arrested in 2016 on charges of sedition. The university came under attack from the government and sections of the media for harboring “anti-national” elements that were ostensibly aiming to “break up” India.²⁵ Devnani's remedy was to ensure a more patriotic education for school pupils, in order to guarantee that such mindsets were not created in the future.

Second, another of Devnani's ideological stances involved the altering of particular events associated with the history of Rajasthan. One of the most prominent of these alterations was the statement that the Rajput king Maharana Pratap had “defeated” the Mughal emperor Akbar at the Battle of Haldighati. As will be discussed below, this battle is known to have ended in a stalemate;²⁶ the significant issue for Devnani was to ensure that “our” heroes would be prioritized in order to inculcate a feeling of patriotism among pupils. For Devnani, historical scholarship should play second fiddle to ideological purity, and this was the only way to ensure that his and the government's story would win the day. Therefore, it was crucial for the BJP to regionalize the entire textbook production process and to ensure that the majoritarian narrative (Hindutva) was contextualized in the regional narrative (Rajput Hindutva). While the primary aim of this regional variation was to reinterpret medieval history, the larger majoritarian narrative was also applied to the ancient and modern periods of Indian history, as my analysis will show.

The rationale for these textbooks lies in the fact that they provided the most amount of material promoting the understanding of types of historical narratives that the BJP wished to prescribe in the state. It was only from year twelve that history was an independent subject of study, whilst it formed part of the broader social sciences in the earlier years. The textbooks also carried with them Devnani's own ideological underpinnings in great detail, particularly with regard to the Battle of Haldighati. Indeed, the outcome of the battle, introduced in year ten, was expanded upon in year twelve to ensure that the “desired” outcome was learned by pupils continuously.

Education, it must be pointed out, is part of the concurrent list of state responsibilities in the Constitution of India. As such, states are entitled to prescribe their own curriculums and textbooks, provided that they do not deviate from the tenets set forth by the Union government. Indeed, this federal autonomy has allowed the national political parties to ensure that their narratives of Indian history are enshrined in regional textbooks, even if they are not in power at the center, or, if they wish, to speed ahead in states in which they are less likely to invite opposition from coalition partners at the center. The BJP, which formed the government on its own in 2017, was able to introduce the new set of textbooks in Rajasthan, while textbooks written under the auspices of the previous Congress government (in power from 2004 to 2014) were still in use in many NCERT-affiliated schools during the BJP's first term in power at the center (from 2014 to 2019). Therefore, the proactive efforts of the state government, particularly under Devnani, ensured that a fresh regional outlook on history would be introduced in the state with minimal interference from the central government.

Methodology

As the primary source of this study is the textbook (understood here as the final word on national identity to be disseminated to school pupils by governments), it is vitally important to study the ideological uses of the language employed therein. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is employed in order to analyze the text's interpretation of the nation's history as imagined by the BJP. According to Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, CDA is “characterized by common interests in demystifying ideologies through the systematic and reproducible investigation of semiotic data.”²⁷ In this context, the data refers to the written content in the textbooks that expresses the party's differing ideological narratives, the components of which will be explained below.

The crux of the analysis involves studying the discourse on national identity in the textbooks. Within the broader CDA school, discourse is defined as

so socially consequential that it gives rise to important issues of power. Discursive practices may have major ideological effects—that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities, through how they represent things and position people.²⁸

It is in this sense that the discourse on Hindu nationalism in Rajasthan history textbooks is the objective of this study, which seeks to examine in what ways the discourse of the BJP aims to place people into categories of “heroes” and “villains” of the nation; which events are accorded priority in the history of the nation; and, subsequently, which ones are forgotten. As Hindu nationalism is based on privileging the majority culture, I will analyze the discourse from the perspective of how it constructs a narrative of dichotomous majority and minority communities and discuss how contemporary power relations are shaped by examining and contrasting the positive or negative nature of their representation.

Within CDA, I also use the discourse historical approach (DHA). I employ five essential questions in order to understand the discourse and identify its main trends and themes.²⁹ These questions seek to bring out the chief components of the BJP's discourse on national identity in the history textbooks. These components include the following:

1. How are persons, objects, phenomena/events, processes, and actions named and referred to linguistically?

2. What characteristics, qualities, and features are attributed to social actors, objects, phenomena, events, and processes?

3. What arguments are employed in the discourse in question?

4. From what perspective are these nominations, attributions, and arguments expressed? Are the respective utterances articulated overtly or are they intensified or mitigated?

Finally, via DHA, I will study the ideology behind the textbooks prescribed by the BJP. In my work, I adopt the DHA definition of ideology as “a one-sided perspective or world view composed of related mental representations, opinions, attitudes, and evaluations, which members of a specific social group share. Ideologies are an important means of establishing and maintaining unequal power relations through discourse.”³⁰ Accordingly, I investigate the nature of the majoritarian identity prevalent in the textbooks and attempt to reconstruct the master narrative reflected in them.

Ashoka and the Omission of His Buddhist Identity

The Golden Age of ancient Indian history is closely related to the rise of empires that ruled parts of the country during this time. Of these, the Mauryan Empire is deemed to be one of the most significant. One of the most significant Mauryan rulers was Ashoka. The textbook authors understood that an effective way to construct a deified representation is to fill textual spaces with a ruler's political and territorial achievements. In terms of his territorial conquests, Ashoka is presented as having conquered various parts of Kashmir and Khotan and incorporated them into his empire. The year ten social science textbook notes the extent of his kingdom, which it mentions spread from the Tamil region to Afghanistan.

The year twelve history textbook relies on inscriptions from the period that portray the ruler as “godlike” and “god-loving,” and repeats some of his territorial exploits mentioned in the year ten textbook, describing how “in the seventh year of his reign, by defeating Kashmir, Khotan and their adjoining areas, he brought them under the control of the Mauryan Empire.”³¹ The textbook then proceeds to give specific geographical boundaries of his territory, stating that

what is established from the inscriptions is that his empire extended from the northwest (Afghanistan) to Karnataka in the south, Kathiawada in the west, up till the Bay of Bengal in the east. According to the Rajataringini, along the Vitasta River, he laid the foundations for the city of Srinagar and settled in the Nepali town of Lalitpattan.³²

After discussing Ashoka's territorial achievements, which are presented as having brought about order, the year twelve textbook emphasizes his contributions to bringing about “national unity.” In this regard, the Battle of Kalinga is a significant point of discussion in the narrative. It is stated that “in the eighth year of his reign in 261 BC, Ashoka invaded Kalinga, its capital being Toshli. He wished to tie all of India into one common thread.”³³ The invasion is thus presented as necessary in order to unite the country and establish a unified chain of command, which was to be administered by Ashoka.

The outcome of the war is deemed to be significant, for here another side to Ashoka is represented. The authors remark that “after 1 lakh³⁴ people were killed and 1.5 lakh people were taken prisoner, Ashoka was moved, and he sought to abandon the policy of war in the future.”³⁵ Thus, the text adopts a multifaceted approach in order to make Ashoka more legitimate and presentable to the pupils. On the one hand, he is praised for taking the Mauryan Empire to great heights via the conquest of territory; on the other, he is regarded as compassionate—as someone who, upon seeing the traumatic effects of war, decides to embark on a different course.

The section on Ashoka concludes with a description of his policies in the social sphere, which once again tries to place him as one of the architects of the Golden Age, the foundations of which were laid by his Mauryan predecessors. The notion that Ashoka brought order to society is introduced by the following description, among others: “By formulating his dhamma [a code of ethical behavior focusing on social ethics and the accommodation of diverse views],³⁶ he established a code which was to be followed by king, people and bureaucracy. Social, political and cultural unity and development received a huge impetus, which led to improvements.”³⁷ As if further elevating him to a status many could not attain, the text describes Ashoka as “a historical ruler who directly communicated with the people.”³⁸ The term “historical ruler” is significant here, for it implies that no one before him did what he was able to do. The subsequent section provides evidence of the uniqueness of Ashoka's rule, during which

for [the sake of] peaceful coexistence, he provided weaker groups with mobility, while prisoners of war were sent to mines and forests. Ashoka became the type of ruler who looked after not only the spiritual and moral uplifting of the people but also their productive strengths and capabilities.³⁹

While this description presents the emperor looking after the welfare of his subjects, the text is silent on the specifics of what Ashoka did for the “spiritual uplifting” of the people. The only concrete contribution mentioned is that “he ordered the construction of 84,000 stupas in his empire.”⁴⁰

Furthermore, as if to stress that Ashoka's rule benefitted not only those within his empire in India, but those all around the world as well, the text is keen to emphasize that he “taught the lesson of religious tolerance to the whole world, while also emphasizing that equal importance and respect must be granted to all religions.”⁴¹ There is a need to stress that Ashoka (and more broadly, the Golden Age of ancient India) was responsible for preaching and spreading the message of religious harmony and for secularizing the population in order to avoid future religious conflicts after the Kalinga War.

One of Ashoka's most significant contributions, which the BJP textbooks describe in detail, was his policy of dhamma. The year ten social science textbook refers to this as a policy that rendered the moral improvement of humankind. This policy included “renunciation from sin, [improving the] welfare of the world, charity, giving alms, truth and purity.”⁴² The textbook goes on to list the essential tenets of dhamma as “being of a saintly nature, doing welfare work, being free from sin, bringing flexibility to relationships, generosity towards Brahmanas, charity, giving alms, preventing the slaughter of animals, listening to parents and elders and keeping a healthy lifestyle.”⁴³ According to the text, Ashoka considered these traits, as quoted in the text, as the most critical components of dhamma.

While the description is extremely detailed concerning Ashoka's dhamma policy, an important aspect to highlight here is “who” Ashoka is when he is showered with such high praise for his change in character after the Kalinga War and for trying to bring about the uplift of his people. The text successfully omits that Ashoka had converted to Buddhism and that it was his conversion that allowed him to formulate the policy of dhamma. In fact, throughout the entire discussion of Ashoka in the BJP textbooks for years ten and twelve, there is no mention of him leaving the Hindu faith and converting to Buddhism. The questions to be asked here are why exactly Ashoka's conversion is not mentioned and why this detail is not deemed significant enough by the authors (and, by extension, the government) to be incorporated into the narrative.

First and foremost, it is essential to note that in the larger Hindutva historical framework, all successes of the Golden Age are attributed to the Aryans, whom the BJP narrative regards as Hindus and the original inhabitants of the nation. Thus, any successes or positive transformations in society must be attributed to the Hindu kings. As such, omitting Ashoka's conversion is one way of highlighting how Hindus tried to bring about a more just and egalitarian society. Second, building from the first point, if Ashoka's conversion were mentioned, this would have suggested a fissure in this period, since the notion of peaceful coexistence would then have to be attributed to Buddhism, thereby downplaying the contribution of Hindus toward societal uplift. In addition, it would make a distinction between the faiths, suggesting that Ashoka had fought as a Hindu but renounced his faith to become a Buddhist, thereby giving the impression that not all faiths preached peaceful coexistence. By ignoring his conversion, the text continues with a linear progression of history, keeping Hindus at the center of the positive narrative. Thus, it is easier to bring complex personalities under a broader umbrella and to incorporate them into a majoritarian narrative than to explain events or concepts that go against this narrative and that may be perceived negatively by the majority.

Interestingly, whether knowingly or unknowingly, the text brings Buddhist elements into its narrative by mentioning the construction of stupas. However, once again, it fails to mention Buddhism as a separate faith that had inspired Ashoka to construct them in the first place. Finally, we must look at the Hindu Right's broader relationship with religions like Buddhism, which emerged as a reaction to the orthodoxy in Hinduism. This is crucial in order to explain the near absence of Buddhism as an independent faith and its role as an essential catalyst for Ashoka's change of heart post-Kalinga. In order to understand this relationship (which is ambivalent at best and hostile at worst), it is imperative to understand how Hindu nationalist ideologues view the religion itself.

However, before delving into this issue, it is first necessary to examine how Buddhism is viewed in the more extensive lexicon of the modern Indian state. According to the Constitution, “[any] reference to Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion.”⁴⁴ Interestingly, the BJP textbook mentions quite a few Buddhist characteristics and concepts from ancient to contemporary times, while denying the independent agency of the faith and its people in both eras. In other words, it was easier for the authors to reconvert the dead (rather than the living) in order to validate the majoritarian ideological narrative.

Moving on to the Hindu nationalist ideologues themselves, the textbook authors seem to have followed the example of Harbilas Sarda, a former member of the Arya Samaj and key figure of the Hindu Mahasabha, by trying to (not) explain Ashoka's conversion. Sarda regarded Buddhism as a “modified form of Hinduism”⁴⁵ and held that the teachings of Buddha were later incorporated into Vedic Brahminical doctrines. From this perspective, the textbooks might not need to mention Buddhism, but this omission goes a long way in ensuring a continuous narrative for Hinduism and in maintaining the impression that Ashoka remained a faithful adherent throughout his life.

By contrast, Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, widely viewed as having provided the ideological backbone to Hindu nationalism, seems to have followed an attitude of outright hostility in his perception of the Buddhists. In the ancient period, he regards Buddhists as having committed “seditious acts” by not being loyal to Indian kings. The textbook, in preaching Ashoka's message of unity and equality among faiths, is quite far from Savarkar's understanding of Buddhists as “opiates of universalism and nonviolence.”⁴⁶ This perception of Buddhists in the ancient period can be regarded as one that has been successfully imported into contemporary times, when Muslims and other groups that oppose the BJP's idea of the nation are labeled as “anti-nationals” and “traitors.” Thus, there are quite a few instances where specific values were indeed transplanted from the Golden Age to the present. Whether this has benefitted everyone, or led to peace and unity, is highly questionable.

Finally, Ashoka's status as a significant figure in unifying the country is cemented further with the history textbook for year twelve. The authors note that “by observing the notion of one religion, one language and one script, he unified all of India” and that “the implementation of a uniform civil code and penal code was one of his key objectives to guarantee social justice.”⁴⁷ The usage of the term “uniform civil code” is also significant, for it is one of the main points listed by the BJP as part of its policies. The BJP contends that a uniform civil code is needed to bring about equality in terms of access and has often accused other parties of “minority appeasement” when they oppose its introduction. It is therefore vital to stress that Ashoka introduced such a code, and by recently rescinding the Triple Talaq law, which has made instant divorce among Muslims in India illegal, the party has sought to ensure that it is seen as the true inheritor of Ashoka's legacy when it comes to social justice.

Maharana Pratap and the Myth of Rajput Unity

As mentioned above, the former BJP minister of education in Rajasthan, Vasudev Devnani, supported the textbook narrative of a decisive Rajput victory at the Battle of Haldighati. It is therefore not surprising to find that both the year ten and the year twelve history textbooks prescribed by the BJP adhere to Devnani's perspective and seek to make Maharana Pratap (who is given maximum representation in terms of textual space) the central protagonist of the medieval period. The year ten textbook not only introduces the military exploits of Pratap, but also seeks to familiarize pupils with his personal life and relationships, indicating that no detail is insignificant when it comes to him (a precision that is strikingly lacking in the descriptions of Mughal rulers).

The year twelve history textbook describes Pratap's ability as an organizer who could unite various factions of the Rajputs under a common banner. The authors further amplify his significance by pointing out that “he (unlike the rulers of the princely states of Bikaner and Jaisalmer) rejected Akbar's authority, and thereby emphasized the importance of the freedom of the ‘motherland.’”⁴⁸ The term “motherland” refers to Mewat, and the authors imply that it could only be free if it was under Pratap's rule (and not part of the Mughal Empire). Pratap's selflessness and heroic status are amplified further, with the text quoting him having exclaimed: “Until Mewar is freed, I will not stay in the palaces, I will not sleep on the bed, I will not eat from gold, silver, bronze and copper utensils.”⁴⁹ Thus, in the textbook narrative it is not only Pratap's military credentials, but also his traits (most significantly, his readiness to sacrifice luxuries and privileges for the greater good of freeing his territory from foreign rule) that acquire paramount importance.

It is interesting to compare the description of Pratap with that of his principal rival at the time, the Mughal emperor Akbar. While Pratap and other local rulers are presented as having “expanded” their territories, in the description of Akbar's empire in the year ten social science textbook the term “stealing” appears frequently. This word is used to describe Akbar's conquest of Gujarat from Muzzafar Shah and Bengal from Dawood Khan. Even when explaining Akbar's Rajput policy, the textbooks place more importance on the Rajputs as a community than on Akbar's policy of seeking to form alliances with them.

According to the text, Akbar “wanted to use the bravery and strength of the Rajputs to his advantage.”⁵⁰ Thus, what is more important is to describe in favorable terms the Indigenous community and to specify that they (due to their virtues) were responsible for the Mughal Empire's expansion. By minimizing or omitting the various strategies (such as forming alliances) that Akbar employed in order to defeat rivals for territory, the authors once again place the local community at the center of the narrative. The contradictory fact that the same local community helped consolidate foreign rule in India seems to be lost in the narrative.

The authors thus omit the other reasons for Mughal victory in India, such as superior military capability. Instead, it is the Rajputs who are idolized for their physical traits and strengths. Yet the authors do not specify whom they assisted with these strengths. There is thus a need to create a more decontextualized past and to provide a more positive representation of the community owing to their predominance in Rajasthan, as well as to denote a more favorable portrayal of their caste identity (noble warriors).

Indeed, a fundamental omission on the part of Pratap also has to do with the identity of the soldiers in his army. For example, as the historian of medieval India Satish Chandra has pointed out, “Rana's forces included an Afghan contingent led by Hakim Khan Sur.”⁵¹ Thus, the key for the BJP narrative is to present two homogenous, opposing sides. This makes it easier to create identities where bias for one side is evident on account of community characteristics.

One of the best-known battles between Pratap and Akbar was the Battle of Haldighati. Indeed, the BJP history textbooks are keen to amplify its significance in Indian history, with the year ten narrative describing it as a “world famous war.”⁵² Once again, the authors stress that Pratap was not willing to accept Mughal superiority, noting that “soon after the retreat of the Mughals, he bestowed upon himself the right to rule upon his territories, while he provided jagirs [land in lieu of salaries] to his feudal lords.”⁵³ The year ten and twelve textbooks provide detailed descriptions of the battle itself. The most significant characteristic of these descriptions is that they take a definite stance on the battle's outcome and seek to show how Pratap indeed won. According to the year ten social science textbook, “some historians have labelled the ending a resultless war, or a war without a definite outcome. However, the following points to a more thought-provoking analysis.”⁵⁴

The analysis that follows begins with an explanation of the purpose of the war, which the text describes as twofold, consisting in Akbar's objective of “capturing Rana Pratap alive and then eventually killing him in a spectacle, along with the desire to conquer his territory.”⁵⁵ Yet according to the text, “the Mughal emperor could not meet these objectives.”⁵⁶ In the same passage, the authors also seek to substantiate their attribution of victory to Pratap:

The Mughal victory cannot be proven because due to Akbar's hatred for Man Singh and Asaf Khan, his fort gate was closed and the Mughal army was fearful during the time it spent at Mewar. The fact that they were not able to pursue the Mewar Army gives the impression that the Haldighati war was [decided] in favor of Pratap. From February to October 1577, Akbar and Shahbaz Khan carried out three attempts to capture Mewat, [which] were carried out in order to accomplish Akbar's battle objectives. However, they was unsuccessful. The fact that Maharana Pratap established his capital at Aawargarh, located close to the Kamalnath Mountain in Kolyari village, indicates that he was the victor in the battle.”⁵⁷

While the texts are indeed quite successful in presenting a definite opinion on the outcome of the battle, this success needs to be weighed against the text's interpretation of Pratap's objectives as well as some analysis of other works on the event. First, as the text states, Pratap's objective was to liberate Mewar from the Mughals. Here we find that the term “India” (or the whole nation) no longer figures in the narrative. Still, the nation's regionalization amplifies the state's contribution. This is crucial in order to present the Rajputs positively and to place Rajasthan's contribution to the “freedom struggle” at the forefront of the narrative.

Here, however, there is a contradiction, for the Rajputs themselves were not all on one side, and not all of their enemies (in this case, evidently all Muslims) were on one side. As mentioned above, Pratap's army did have an Afghan contingent, and Akbar had won the support of many Rajputs. Indeed, Chandra points out that “Akbar's campaign was led by Man Singh”⁵⁸ and observes that “Rana Pratap's refusal to bow before the Mughals had little effect on most of the Rajput states, who realized it was impossible to stand out for long in favor of complete independence.”⁵⁹ Explaining the motivations of these Rajputs, Chandra further states that “by allowing a large measure of autonomy to many Rajput rajas, Akbar established an empire, which those Rajput rajas did not consider harmful to their interests.”⁶⁰ It is evident that the authors’ tendency to omit and even distort the facts goes a long way toward the creation and consolidation of an identity-centered history rubric crucial to the BJP and the Hindu Right.

The battle, as the textbooks try to portray, was not a local versus outsider or even a Hindu versus Muslim conflict, but rather just one of many skirmishes for territorial supremacy and the quest for political power where identity lines were blurred. However, the BJP narrative presents history through a linear prism of good and evil (local hero and foreign villain) in order to ensure that the ideology of the party finds its way into textbooks and thereby into the minds of the next generation of learners.

Finally, in the year twelve history textbook the section on Pratap ends with a brief account of different facets of his personality. The text is keen to showcase how he balanced various aspects of empire building. The authors present Pratap as a benevolent ruler, stressing that this was because he did not wage war on the unarmed (“He had taken a vow not to do this. He kept two swords, including one to give to the enemy”)⁶¹ and thereby further cementing his reputation as a king who sought peace even after battle (unlike his opponents, who had been described as motivated by greed and a desire for territorial conquest.

The authors further solidify Pratap's status as a community unifier, such that “Mewat's emblem is the symbol of social harmony. On the one hand, there are the Kshatriyas, while on the other are the Bhil warriors. All loved Maharana Pratap, and everybody was ready to give up their life for him.”⁶² Here, sectarian divisions are forgotten. According to the textbook, Pratap was one of the only viable rulers capable of uniting different factions against the enemy and was viewed as the sole ruler who could bring various sects under a common ideological umbrella. Finally, he is projected as a defiant ruler who valued freedom, as “even after many sufferings, he refused to accept Akbar's authority at any cost.”⁶³

It is essential to highlight the reasons for such detailed descriptions and hagiographical depictions of Pratap. First and foremost, the territory he ruled over, Mewat, is in present-day Rajasthan. This represents an opportunity for the BJP narrative to appropriate a regional context in the fight against external aggressors. Bravado and defiance are central notions that help to showcase how Pratap and his community attempted to fight the Mughals, thereby giving Rajasthan a central place in India's history. In what is clearly an attempt to omit certain contradictions associated with the Rajputs vis-à-vis their interests, the textual narrative emphasizes that Pratap was a unifying figure liked by all communities. Had the text mentioned that not all Rajputs were swayed by his quest for freedom, it would have been a complicated facet to explain. However, by omitting this contradiction the authors successfully showcase the Rajputs as patriots and Pratap as a leader who was able to command authority over his people by virtue of his personality and objectives.

Finally, in any representation involving the description of virtuous traits, there will always be someone to serve as a counterweight. Here, this function is fulfilled by Akbar, who represents a radical shift from the deification of Pratap. Again, this should come across as hardly surprising, for it satisfies the ideological bias of those in charge of education in Rajasthan, namely Devnani and Union minister of home affairs Rajnath Singh, the latter, who in a 2017 newspaper article demanded to know why Akbar is always “rated great.”⁶⁴ To this end, the texts have successfully made Pratap exactly that and left Akbar with only a few crumbs of positive contributions while placing him within the broader narrative of an aggressive enemy that was detrimental to the nation.

The Appropriation of Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar

Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, a Dalit social reformer and constitutional lawyer, widely regarded as the father of India's constitution, represents something of a challenge as far as representation in history textbooks is concerned. He criticized the Congress and had bitter arguments with Mohandas Gandhi.⁶⁵ At the same time, his radical ideas on the annihilation of caste and his critique of Hindu society do not make him an ideal hero for the Hindu Right.

Though ever since coming to power in 2014, the BJP government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi has claimed that “no government has honored Ambedkar as fulsomely as this administration,”⁶⁶ it is surprising that he is not remembered as fondly in the BJP textbooks. From the many leaders presented in the year eight social science textbook, Ambedkar is completely missing. The year nine social science textbook, while listing a few freedom fighters (including Tilak, Nehru, and Patel), omits Ambedkar altogether.

Ambedkar finally emerges in the year eleven political science textbook in the context of the Communal Award, which granted separate electorates for Dalits.⁶⁷ Here, Ambedkar is described as having been “advised by Madan Mohan Malaviya and other leaders to not throw his weight behind a move designed to divide Indians and the freedom movement,” a move that was “designed to instigate Hindus to fight against each other.”⁶⁸ The section ends by describing how Ambedkar agreed to this course of action and signed the Poona Pact in 1932. It is interesting to note that the context behind Ambedkar's push for separate electorates for Dalits (which was based on his view that the upper castes did not represent their best interests) is omitted altogether. The authors thereby wished to avoid conflict in their narrative of homogeneity and unity, where caste contradictions (and specifically, Dalit assertions of identity) are ignored entirely. In other words, the authors sought to avoid giving pupils the idea that the freedom fighters had conflicting interests and were united only in their quest to attain freedom for India.

Interestingly, the authors adopt a similar method of omission when it comes to the representation of Ambedkar, in order to present a more unifying and accommodative character. Unlike the hagiographical biographies of other leaders in the freedom struggle, his portrayal contains no information on his early life and battles over the issue of caste. This is not surprising, since Ambedkar, in his recollection of his early life, describes in great detail the amount of discrimination he encountered, even after returning from abroad to set up his law practice. Moreover, while the literary works of Savarkar and Tilak have been mentioned frequently in different textbooks, Ambedkar's works are absent from the narrative. In addition, while the year eleven textbook mentions the Communal Award and Ambedkar's demand for separate electorates, it neglects to explain why the community sought the electoral reform.

Ambedkar is presented as part of a wider pantheon of social reformers within the Hindu community. The text carefully portrays him as someone “who worked within Hindu society to bring about equality between upper castes and other Hindus.”⁶⁹ His position as a unifier is further solidified by the text, which notes that he “wanted Hindi to be the national language in order to guarantee the unity of India.”⁷⁰ With this statement, the text moves beyond omission and decontextualization and provides factually incorrect information. Recent debates on Ambedkar have centered on the question of whether he wanted Sanskrit to be the national language post-independence. Although the matter is still contested, prominent leaders of the BJP have claimed publicly that Ambedkar had indeed advocated for Sanskrit to be made the national language of India.⁷¹

Finally, Ambedkar's fight against untouchability is not given a separate space or section but is instead described as part of similar efforts made by other figures, including Dayanand Saraswati, Gandhi, and Keshav Baliram Hedgewar. It is interesting to note the three personalities with whom he is grouped regarding the fight against untouchability. Dayanand represents the Arya Samaj (Noble Society), an organization dedicated to bringing converts back to Hinduism. Hedgewar founded the RSS, established by Maharashtrian Brahmins in 1925. Finally, Gandhi opposed separate electorates on the grounds that it would fragment Hindu society.

It would be worthwhile to delve a little deeper into the attitudes of the three figures Ambedkar is compared with, in order to bring out their differences with respect to caste. First, while Dayanand was opposed to the caste system, his Shuddhi (Purification) movement, which aimed to convert lower castes back to Hinduism (particularly in Punjab) went against Ambedkar's philosophy, which was a radical break from Hinduism itself, the most radical manifestation of which was Ambedkar's conversion to Buddhism in 1956.

Second, the main facets of RSS ideology were most clearly manifested in the writings of its second sarsangchalak (“leader”), Madhav Sadashivrao Golwalkar. In his works (most notably, in his Bunch of Thoughts), Golwalkar staunchly defends the caste system, remarking that “the individual who does his assigned duties in life in a spirit of selfless service only worships god through such performance.”⁷² He further adds that the caste system played a great role in ensuring stability in society: “Castes, there were in those ancient times too, continuing for thousands of years of our glorious national life. There is no instance of its having hampered progress or disrupted the unity of society. It served as a great bond of social cohesion.”⁷³

Finally, one of the biggest differences between Golwalkar and Ambedkar is how they viewed Buddhism. While Ambedkar embraced Buddhism, Golwalkar chastised that religion for allowing foreign invasions of India.

We know as a matter of history that our north-western and north-eastern areas, where the influence of Buddhism had disrupted the caste system, fell easy prey to the onslaughts of Muslims. Gandhar, now called Kandahar, became Muslimised completely. Conversion took a heavy toll in East Bengal also. But the areas of Delhi and Uttar Pradesh, considered very orthodox and rigid in caste restrictions, remained predominantly Hindu even after remaining as the citadels of Muslim power and fanaticism for many centuries.⁷⁴

Ambedkar, not surprisingly, does not see caste as a positive trait of society. In his seminal work, The Annihilation of Caste, he remarks that “it is only when Hindu society becomes a casteless society that it can hope to have strength enough to defend itself” and warns that “without such internal strength, Swaraj for Hindus may be only a step towards slavery.”⁷⁵ Finally, he cites Buddha as an inspiration for tackling orthodoxy. “You must not only discard the Shastras, you must deny their authority, as did Buddha and Nanak. You must have courage to tell the Hindus that what is wrong with them is their religion—the religion which has produced in them this notion of the sacredness of caste.”⁷⁶

It is therefore no surprise that in addition to situating him within Hindu society, the textbook narrative omits (as it had in the case of Ashoka) Ambedkar's final act of defiance against Hindu society, namely his conversion to Buddhism. Ashoka's embrace of Buddhism had led him to denounce war and conflict, and Ambedkar's conversion was meant to free Dalits from the shackles of upper-caste violence. However, the BJP textbooks, in order to bring Ambedkar onto their side, must compromise in their representation of this radical act of his in order to ensure that he does not deviate from the broad ideology that they have allocated to him.

In the textual narrative, Ambedkar is only another name among Hindu social reformers whose efforts were similar to those of the three personalities mentioned above. In order to craft a homogenous identity that unifies them, it was necessary to decontextualize their achievements. The text achieves this in the following ways. First, although it states that other reformers fought against untouchability, it fails to mention the specifics of what they did. This makes it easier to include more names and to tie them to the broader objective of fighting a particular social evil. Ultimately, as far as ideology is concerned, there is no space for nuance, and all of the reformers are presented as having adopted similar methods to fight against untouchability.

Not only does Ambedkar's representation therefore present the portrait of a nationalist who shared the same vision for India as various Hindu organizations, but by ignoring his Buddhist identity the authors also situate him in the larger context of Hindu nationalist conceptions of other Indic faiths, thereby bringing them under one umbrella. An important frame of reference once again is Savarkar, whose conceptions of citizenship and belonging to India are invariably linked to religious affiliation. Preference is reserved for Hindus, whereby he remarks that a Hindu is someone who “looks upon the land that extends from Sindu to Sindu—from the Indus to the Seas—as the land of his forefathers—his Fatherland (Pitribhu), and who above all addresses this land, this Sindhusthan, as his Holyland (Punyabhu), as the land of his prophets and seers, of his godmen and gurus, the land of piety and pilgrimage.”⁷⁷ The irony in this regard is that Savarkar, while delineating his conception of citizenship as being exclusive to Hindus, relies on interpretations of the term “Hindu” that derive from the same foreign regions that he regards as the natural homes of Muslims and Christians. Irfan Habib explains,

The word “Hindu” itself is derived from the ancient Iranian form of “Sindhu,” the name of the Indus river. By extension, people living beyond the Indus river were to them “Hindus.” It is interesting how a word used by followers of an alien religion came to be adopted by the designated people themselves, who previously had no idea they belonged to one faith, and for which indeed they had no specific name.⁷⁸

While for Savarkar it is evident that Muslims and Christians are excluded from the designation “Hindu” (“they can never be recognised as Hindus, for their holy land is far off in Arabia or Palestine”),⁷⁹ it is pertinent to point out the contempt that he displays for Buddhists in his characterization of the Indian nation. In this regard, he believes that it is not just faith, but devotion that is key to staking a claim to belonging to the Hindu nation. As mentioned above, Savarkar condemned Buddhists for committing seditious acts and demanded that they be denied independent agency (“the only solution to preserve national independence was to hang Indian Buddhists, guilty of seditious acts and to pull down monasteries, which had become centres of sedition”).⁸⁰ Savarkar further enshrines the exclusion of Buddhists from the Indian national imagination when he states that “they should give up all dreams of endangering the national life of India and her independence.”⁸¹ Here, I agree with Megha Kumar that Savarkar's exclusionary rhetoric is to be seen in the context of the period,⁸² during which Ambedkar was formulating his long-term plans to leave the Hindu fold and to eventually embrace Buddhism.

Conclusion

For the BJP, the crafting of a majoritarian narrative rests on the omission and decontextualization of problematic episodes and themes of Indian history. In each of the three eras presented above, BJP officials felt the need to dispose of traits that do not align with their broader ideology and beliefs associated with the writing of Indian history. The textbook authors achieved a linear progression (and subsequent compartmentalization) of Indian history by using more ominous exclusion techniques in order to relegate radical figures to the periphery while allowing for more unifying episodes to be front and center.

In the case of Ashoka, the authors felt the need to divorce him from his newly found Buddhist identity after the Battle of Kalinga to showcase a pacifist and reformed society that only a Hindu ruler could have brought about. Furthermore, the authors’ representation of the Battle of Haldighati as a victory for Rana Pratap over Akbar showcases the influence and authority writers and ideologues have in altering historical events to suit their narrative. The authors’ portrayal of the Rajputs as united in their efforts against external enemies and their omission of the prevalence of Muslims within Pratap's army once again highlight the importance of smoothing over fissures within the community to create two mutually exclusive groups, where only one could lay claim to defending the “Indian” nation. Finally, in line with its political outreach toward Dalits, the party narrative blends Ambedkar into the pantheon of Hindu reformers by successfully omitting his Dalit identity as well as his eventual departure from the Hindu fold to avoid any suggestion of fissures or divisions within the community, thus cementing a wholly positive portrayal of an imagined unified nation.